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As medical care becomes an increasingly large share of Gross Domestic Product,
understanding the mechanisms for how and why medical care spending is rising be-
comes increasingly important. Such an evaluation should consider the productivity
relationship between medical care and health. An evaluation of medical productiv-
ity involves the measurement of medical care input prices, disease treatment output
prices, and the productive relationship between medical care inputs and disease
treatment health outcomes.
Medical care price measurement is complicated by the heterogeneity of ser-
vices, the role of insurance in negotiating prices, rapid technological advancements
vi
in medical care and limited availability of transaction price data. Health outcome
prices are difficult to construct because of the difficulty in measuring health out-
comes, the heterogeneity of health outcomes, and the messy relationship between
consumption goods and health. Finally, in addition to accurate input and output
price measurement, a productivity assessment requires a measurable causal rela-
tionship between medical care services and health outcomes. To date, all of these
requirements have been insurmountable hurdles to assessing the productivity of
medical care for the entire United States economy.
This dissertation uses the Medical care Expenditure Panel Survey to address
the necessary requirements for evaluating the productivity of medical care. The sec-
ond chapter constructs regional medical care price indices using transaction prices
that control for service type heterogeneity. The data employed in the analysis as-
sociates the observed medical care spending with the diseases the spending is used
to treat. This association is exploited in the third chapter, which constructs med-
ical care treatment prices for twelve of the major health conditions in the United
States. The fourth chapter compares the productivity of medical care services used
to produce disease treatment health outcomes across insurance types.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Medical care is becoming an increasingly important share of the economy. It cur-
rently represents a larger share of Gross Domestic Product than food and the growth
rate in medical care spending consistently outpaces the inflation rate. Understand-
ing the mechanisms for how and why medical care spending increases is therefore
becoming increasingly important. However, a formal assessment of the welfare im-
plications of the increased spending is difficult to determine. Much of the difficulty
arises from the complexity involved in measuring medical care productivity. On
the one hand, medical care may be becoming more productive such that increased
medical care spending may result in significantly longer and more productive lives
that improve health outcomes and enhance societal well-being. On the other hand,
increased spending may be independent of increasing medical care productivity, and
thus reflect increasing prices for identical services, or a deterioration in the health
of the average citizen for reasons exogenous to the medical care market. Which of
these possibilities explains the nature of the current rise in medical care costs is an
important empirical question.
Empirically measuring the causal relationship between medical care and
health, in other words the productivity of medical care, requires specifying a struc-
1
tural relationship between medical care services and health outcomes. The nature
of this relationship is well-defined in the literature. Medical care is an input in the
production of health (Grossman, 1972). The production process is disease specific
and requires that the considered inputs and outputs be allowed to depend on the
disease considered. The technological process that relates medical services to health
depends on an estimable technological relationship and observed and unobserved
patient characteristics (see Berndt, Busch and Frank (2001); Cutler, McClellan and
Newhouse (1998); and Triplett (1999) for a discussion of this literature).
Any such evaluation begins with the measurement of medical care prices.
However, medical care price measurement is complicated by the heterogeneity of
services, the role of insurance in negotiating prices, rapid technological advancements
in medical care and the collection of transaction prices that may differ dramatically
from reported list charges. The first chapter of this dissertation uses the Medical
care Expenditure Panel Survey to construct regional medical care price indices that
control for these issues over the period 1996-2003.
One of the more important aspects of the medical care market is its dy-
namism. Medical care regularly introduces new drugs, procedures and medical
devices into the marketplace. Evaluation of whether technological advancement
affects society’s ability to produce better health outcomes in an efficient manner is
an important empirical question. However, evaluating the efficiency of medical care
markets is complicated by health measurement difficulties, the heterogeneity of dis-
eases and medical services, and limited availability of transaction prices data. The
third chapter of the dissertation addresses several of these productivity issues by
constructing disease treatment prices. Currently, no government statistics associate
medical care service expenditures with the diseases those services are used to treat.
Consequently, the government statistics such as the National Health Accounts, the
Producer’s Price Index (PPI) and the Medical Care component of the Consumer
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Price Index (mCPI) cannot enable even a cursory evaluation of productivity be-
cause they cannot relate the input services they consider to the health outputs they
produce. The productivity and efficiency of medical care markets are addressed
by constructing health care output prices for twelve of the major health conditions
in the United States. The analysis also uses the Medical care Expenditure Panel
Survey over the period 1996-2003.
Once the ability to identify productivity has been established, one can make
productivity comparisons over time, across regions, and as the fourth chapter ex-
ploits, across insurance types. In the medical care sector more than 80% of medical
expenditures are paid by insurers in behalf of patients. Moreover, the entities that
make payments for medical care in behalf of the patients are a heterogeneous group
that includes public insurance payers such as Medicaid and Medicare, private insur-
ance payers, and individual patients. Despite the large role of medical care insurance
and the heterogeneous nature of the insurance types, very little is known about how
the presence of insurance affects the technologies employed to treat disease or the
health outcomes that come as a result of that treatment. Evaluation of how medical
care treatments depend on the insurance type of the patient is performed for three
of the most costly health conditions in the United States over the period 1996-2003.
The evaluation uses the Medical Care Expenditure Panel Survey to test whether
the input demands in specific disease treatments differ across insurance types. The
differences are interpreted as technological differences across insurance types. The
technologies are then mapped into health outcomes in order to decompose the effect
of insurance on health outcomes.
3
Chapter 2
Medical Care Input Prices
In order to implement a productivity assessment, a natural place to begin is with
the construction of input prices. Inputs in the health care sector are medical care
services. Medical care price construction begins by defining what constitutes a
medical care service. There is some disagreement about how medical care services
should be defined, but this paper argues that medical care services should be defined
narrowly and in such a way that allows for the identification of differences in medical
care service intensity across regions, over time and across diseases (see Newhouse
(2001) for an overview of medical care price measurement issues). Medical care
prices that are defined in this way facilitate future technological comparisons of
disease treatments.
Although defining what constitutes a medical care service and constructing
its price appear to be simple conceptual exercises, in practice the procedures are
complicated by several important and unique market features. These features in-
clude the heterogeneity of medical care services, rapid technological advancements
in medical care, the role of insurance in negotiating prices, and differences between
unobserved transaction prices and reported list charges.
Product heterogeneity is important in medical care. Medical care includes
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services as varied as drugs, orthopedic supplies, hospital stays, and office visits. Even
within specific service categories the administered service can vary in complexity.
For example, some office visits are routine checkups while others may involve surgery.
Related to this type of heterogeneity is the issue of technological innovation. The
incorporation of technological advancement into prices is difficult in any market, but
these difficulties are exacerbated in dynamic markets like medical care. New drugs,
surgical procedures, and other service improvements are regularly introduced. How
to compare them to older technologies is not obvious.
The construction of medical care prices is also complicated by the complex
nature of financial exchanges made in the medical care market. Specifically, the
actual price paid for a service is made exceedingly obtuse by the role of insurance.
Indeed, the amount paid and by whom the payment was made often depends on
the service, the insurer and potentially the health condition of the patient. More-
over, the insurer is often the government which may have motives other than profit
maximization. Insurers may offer a menu of indemnity plans to patients, and may
negotiate with medical care providers for prices. The outcomes of these relation-
ships, such as the total price paid for a service and the share of the price paid by
the patient, may ultimately result from the relative strength of the insurance firm’s
bargaining position. Many factors affect the bargaining positions of the insurance
firm including the presence of other insurance firms, the density of medical care
providers in the area, the size of local employers, and the demographic character-
istics of the population. Consequently, there are many reasons for why the prices
actually received by medical care providers may differ substantially from the re-
ported list charges often used in determining medical care prices. Moreover, these
differences may be economically important because of the large role of insurance.
Roughly 80% of medical expenditures are made by insurers in behalf of patients,
and thus the bargaining position of the insurer may have large implications on the
5
actual price received by the medical care providers.
This paper uses the Medical care Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) over
the years 1996-2003 to construct medical care prices. The constructed prices use
the full expenditures received by the medical care provider. All prices control for
technological advancements, service-type heterogeneity, patient characteristics and
insurance payer using hedonic pricing models and price index aggregation theory.
2.1 Methodology
Medical care prices are defined as regional price levels for homogenous medical care
service products over the period 1996-2003 using the MEPS. Service type hetero-
geneity is controlled using a variant of the Country Product Dummy variable (CPD)
model described in detail by Summers (1973). The CPD model is a hedonic pricing
model that has been used extensively to estimate cross-country purchasing power
parities. This paper follows Kokoski, Cardiff and Moulton (1994) in implementing a
CPD model to construct price levels across geographic regions in the United States
for medical care services. The services are organized into a hierarchy of four ag-
gregation levels. The most aggregated service level is the Group. The constructed
Groups correspond directly with the National Health Accounts (NHA)1. Groups are
subdivided into categories of decreasing aggregation. These categories are Expendi-
ture Classes (EC), Stratum, and Entry-Level-Items (ELIs). As an example, one of
the ELI services considered is Acyclovir. Acyclovir is a molecular pharmaceutical
product in the group Drugs, the Stratum Anti-Viral Agents, and the expenditure
category Anti-infective Medications. All events are assigned to sub-categories by the
author using the description of the services provided by the MEPS. The group-level
services and their associated sub-categories are listed in Appendix 1.
1The 1996 MEPS survey is the only sample to report nursing home care. Thus, there is no
group, reported here, that corresponds with nursing home care in the National Health Accounts.
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Implementation proceeds as follows. The price of an event i that belongs to
ELI s is estimated using the following hedonic regression:
lnP si = α0 +
K∑
k=2
βskRki +
J∑
j=1
γsjCji (2.1)
In equation 1, βsk and γ
s
j are estimated coefficients, P
s
i is the total expenditures paid
for the event i, and Rki is a region-year dummy variable that is one if the event
occurred in region-year k, and zero if it did not. Cji is the jth characteristic of
event i. The characteristics included in the hedonic regressions vary by ELI but
often include disease and insurance type indicators as well as demographic variables
such as age and gender. The price of the sth service in region-year k relative to the
reference area is exp(βˆsk).
Once the ELI prices have been estimated, I use the log of the disaggregated
ELI prices, lnP sk = βˆ
s
k, to construct the aggregate stratum-level prices. The aggre-
gation procedure is performed by taking the share-weighted-average of the n ELI
prices that are members of stratum v in region-year k:
lnP vk =
n∑
s∈v
wvks lnP
s
k (2.2)
Here, lnP vk is the log price of stratum v services for the region-year k, and w
s
k is
the expenditure of ELI s in region-year k as a share of total expenditure in the
region-year k spent on all ELIs in stratum v.
The next step in the aggregation procedure uses the stratum level prices,
lnP vk , to construct EC-level prices. The EC-level price aggregation procedure em-
ploys a bilateral Tornquist comparison in order to facilitate multi-lateral compar-
isons across region-years. Using this procedure, the Tornquist bilateral price compar-
ison of region-year j to region-year k for EC u uses the following weighted geometric
average of the V stratum-level prices that are members of EC u to determine each
7
region-year bilateral comparison price:
lnP ujk = (1/2)
V∑
v∈u
(wuvj + w
u
vk) ln(P
v
j /P
v
k ) (2.3)
In Equation 3, wuvj and w
u
vk represents stratum v’s fraction of total EC u expenditure
in regions j and k, respectively. If there are K region-years, then this procedure
results in a KxK matrix of bilateral prices. These bilateral prices are used to
construct a multi-lateral price index for each EC-level region year. The multi-lateral
price for a region-year, lnP uk , is determined by taking the weighted share of the K
bilateral prices such that:
lnP uk =
K∑
j=1
suj lnP
u
jk (2.4)
where suj is the share of spending in region j on total spending on EC u services.
The data often do not support the creation of all the disaggregated sub-
categories. Dental visits and drugs are estimated at the most disaggregated ELI
level, but hospital care is estimated at the stratum level, physician and non-physician
office care are estimated at the EC-level, and home health care and other supplies
are estimated at the group level. For these cases, the method described above can
be used sequentially to obtain multilateral prices at successively higher levels of
aggregation.
2.2 Implementation with the MEPS
The most important feature of the MEPS is the nature of the reported expenditure
data. The MEPS reports the medical care consumption for every individual in a na-
tionally representative individual level survey. The total medical care expenditures
associated with all types of medical care received by every respondent is reported
for each individual in the survey. The expenditures include and distinguish between
8
all payments made by and in behalf of the respondent, and include payments made
by the respondent’s family, private insurance, public insurance such as Medicare
and Medicaid, workman’s compensation and automobile insurance. All expendi-
tures are associated with a medical care event such as a prescription or a hospital
stay. Finally, the survey includes a follow-up component that interviews the medical
care provider to determine the expenditures received for each event associated with
the survey respondent. This follow-up component accounts for expenditures for-
gone that occur as a result of charity care, bad debt, provider discounts, insurance
discounts and other potential sources of discrepancies between reported list charges
and the actual expenditures received.
2.2.1 Group-level services
The specific group-level medical care services considered are dental care, home
health care, hospital care, physician ambulatory care, non physician ambulatory
care, drugs, durable supplies and non-pharmaceutical non-durable supplies. These
groups are an exhaustive list of the medical care consumption reported by the MEPS
over the full period 1996-2003. The services reported by the MEPS are organized
in such a way as to correspond roughly with the NHA. Table 1 presents the ratio
of medical care expenditures to the reported list charges for several of the group-
level services considered in the construction of medical care prices.2 Charge data
has been used by government statistics and several important cost-benefit studies to
construct medical care prices. The results from Table 1 demonstrate the importance
of using expenditure data to construct these prices.
Table 1 reveals that charges overstate the actual transaction expenditures by
roughly 40% over this period. The ratio of overall annual expenditures to charges
is always in the range of 52.7% - 66.3%. This ratio has steadily declined over the
2Drug charges are not reported by the MEPS, and are thus not included in the charge-
expenditure ratio.
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Table 2.1: Expenditure to Charge Ratio
Home Doctor Non-Dr All
Year Dental Health Hospital Office Office Other (non-Rx)
1996 0.813 0.785 0.619 0.679 0.754 0.912 0.663
1997 0.893 0.730 0.539 0.648 0.703 0.934 0.602
1998 0.860 0.810 0.517 0.626 0.729 0.912 0.582
1999 0.858 0.836 0.508 0.626 0.652 0.918 0.579
2000 0.846 0.855 0.477 0.601 0.659 0.894 0.547
2001 0.896 0.917 0.463 0.604 0.669 0.893 0.544
2002 0.893 0.919 0.441 0.614 0.724 0.906 0.533
2003 0.892 0.918 0.447 0.609 0.698 0.895 0.527
period, falling from its peak of 66.3% in 1996 to 52.7% in 2003. However, both the
magnitude and the rate of decline in the overall ratio masks the relationship between
expenditures and charges within each of the medical care services. For many of the
services, the ratio of expenditures to charges remains flat over the period or even
increases. The ratio for home health increases from 78.5% in 1996 to 91.8% in 2003.
Dental care experiences a similar increase in the ratio from 81.3% in 1996 to 89.2%
in 2003. Even those services that exhibit the same general pattern as the overall
ratio have very different rates of decline. For instance, the ratio for hospital services,
which appears to drive much of the overall ratio, declines very quickly from 61.9% in
1996 to less than 45% in 2003. This decline represents a 16-point change. However,
office-based physician visits, which exhibits the same general pattern as hospital
services, declines at a much slower rate from 67.9% in 1996 to 60.9% in 2003 for a
total 7-point change.
The share of total medical care spending represented by each group-level
service is listed in Table 2.3 As can be seen from Table 2, hospital care represents
approximately half of all medical care expenditures, which is the largest share of
total medical care spending. However, this fraction has been steadily declining,
3Durable and non-durable supplies are combined into ’Other’ medical care spending.
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Table 2.2: Total Share
Home Doctor Non-Dr
Year Dental Health Hospital Office Office Other Drugs
1996 0.073 0.061 0.541 0.143 0.039 0.027 0.116
1997 0.080 0.052 0.530 0.140 0.040 0.029 0.128
1998 0.084 0.039 0.526 0.149 0.043 0.023 0.137
1999 0.086 0.052 0.492 0.146 0.042 0.028 0.155
2000 0.087 0.040 0.501 0.149 0.043 0.021 0.159
2001 0.079 0.042 0.469 0.158 0.050 0.022 0.180
2002 0.076 0.041 0.457 0.163 0.063 0.021 0.178
2003 0.073 0.031 0.478 0.147 0.059 0.021 0.191
and has fallen from 54% of total medical care spending in 1996 to 48% of spending
in 2003. The same decreasing pattern is true for home health which has fallen
from 6.1% of expenditures in 1996 to 3.1% of expenditures in 2003. In contrast,
the fraction of spending represented by drugs and non-physician care has increased
over the period. The fraction of total medical spending represented by drugs has
increased dramatically from 11.6% of total expenditures in 1996 to 19.1% of total
expenditures in 2003. The rise in the drug share of total medical care spending
has drugs overtake physician ambulatory care as the second largest share of total
spending in 1999. The rise in non-physician care has been less dramatic, rising from
3.9% of total expenditures in 1996 to not quite 6% of total expenditures in 2003.
The other services, including dental care, physician care and other services have
remained a steady fraction of the total spending over the period.
2.2.2 Controlling for Heterogeneity
The unit of observation, or event (as defined by the survey), depends on the group
considered. The event for dental care, physician care and non-physician care is
the visit. Home health events are measured as months of service. Drug events are
defined by the survey as a prescription, but are combined with information from
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Table 2.3: Per Person Utilization
Home Doctor Non-Dr Rx
Year Dental Health Office Office (Presc.)
1996 1.095 0.197 3.311 1.223 6.937
1997 1.058 0.164 3.148 1.288 6.907
1998 1.057 0.129 3.163 1.357 7.202
1999 1.071 0.126 3.110 1.258 7.481
2000 1.032 0.120 3.161 1.195 7.783
2001 1.058 0.122 3.340 1.374 8.773
2002 1.075 0.139 3.371 1.717 9.345
2003 1.071 0.135 3.318 1.795 9.650
Hospital Nights Nights
Year ER Stays Per Person Per Stay OP
1996 0.110 0.155 0.621 4.000 0.455
1997 0.114 0.148 0.583 3.934 0.466
1998 0.110 0.143 0.619 4.328 0.447
1999 0.111 0.137 0.544 3.964 0.420
2000 0.116 0.140 0.639 4.546 0.446
2001 0.118 0.161 0.617 3.836 0.516
2002 0.114 0.164 0.606 3.699 0.551
2003 0.113 0.161 0.616 3.830 0.538
Mosby’s Drug Consult in order to construct the daily dose of a molecule. Durable
and non-durable supplies are defined as the unit of supply considered, i.e. a towel,
a bandage or a wheelchair. Hospital events are unique in that the definition of what
constitutes an event depends on the stratum. Inpatient events are hospital ”stays”,
while Emergency Room and outpatient events are defined as visits. The reported
characteristics of these events are used to define a medical care service and control
for the product heterogeneity.
Table 3 presents the aggregate per person utilization for each of the group-
level services. Utilization is measured as the number of events per person, where
events are defined to be consistent with the survey observations. Table 3 suggests
that utilization for most services has remained flat over this period. This pattern
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is consistent across office based physician and non-physician services, dental care,
emergency room care and inpatient care. In addition, the relative intensity of in-
patient care, measured as the nights per visit, has also remained relatively flat over
this period. A couple of exceptions to this pattern stand out. The number of pre-
scriptions written has increased steadily from seven prescriptions per person per
year to almost ten prescriptions per person per year. In addition, the number of
outpatient hospital visits has risen, but less dramatically. This rise appears to have
been due to a shift in utilization patterns since the year 2000. Home health care
has also experienced a shift in utilization patterns, but the shift occurred after 1997
and utilization decreased.
Estimation of separate hedonic prices for very specifically defined ELI services
is the most appropriate method to control for product heterogeneity. Separate
hedonic regressions for each medical care service implicitly allows all region-year
prices to vary across services. However, this method is often infeasible because
some services are observed infrequently in the data. Infrequent observation can lead
to a loss of statistical power in determining the price. For this reason, some services
are combined in order to address the statistical validity of the results.
When services are pooled the event characteristics are controlled by including
event characteristic variables in the pooled hedonic regression. The number and type
of controls included in the regression often depend on the type of service considered.
For instance, office-based visits include controls for whether the visit includes a
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) service or an X-ray, whereas drugs often include
controls for the manufacturer and strength of the molecule. Although the service
considered determines many of the controls included in the regression, some controls
are included in almost every regression. These controls are listed below:
• Region-Years: Every hedonic regression includes thirty-nine region-years that
are used to identify the price. Each of the eight years 1996-2003 are inter-
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acted with five regions. The regions are defined by the geographical location
of the area and whether the address is located in a Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA). The regions include MSA-Northeast, MSA-Midwest, MSA-West,
MSA-Southeast, and non-MSA. All of the interactions except for the 1996
MSA-Northeast interaction are included in each regression in order to identify
the price of the service relative to the omitted region-year.
• Insurance Indicators: Each individual is assigned into one of six insurance
types. The insurance types are private, Medicare only, Medicare and Private,
Medicaid only, Medicare and Medicaid and other public insurance combina-
tions, and no insurance. Each medical care event is associated with the insur-
ance type of the respondent who received the event. Indicator variables for
the associated insurance type are included in the hedonic regressions for all
services.
• Disease Types: The MEPS associates each medical care event with a three-
digit International Classification of Disease code (ICD-9 code). These codes
are used to create indicator variables for what type of medical condition the
associated event is used to treat. These indicators may identify the nature
of the type of service provider seen. For example, whether a physician seen
was a specialist or a general practitioner. The specificity of the disease type
included in the regression depends on the type of service considered.
• Demographic Characteristics: The nature of some services may depend on
the demographic characteristics of the individual being treated. For example,
children may visit pediatricians, or women may visit their obstetrician even
for routine checkups. Demographic variables are included to control for this
type of heterogeneity. Demographics include age-group dummies and gender.
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2.3 Office-based Physician Services
The MEPS reports every visit to either a physician or non-physician that occurred
outside of the hospital by a survey respondent as office-based care. The MEPS
provides specific details about office-based events including the service provider seen
(i.e. a physician or non-physician), procedures performed during the event, and the
”category” of the event. Office-based physician services are defined as office-based
care where the patient reports seeing a physician during the visit. These services
are compared with the physician services account from the NHA.
Office-based physician care services are estimated at the EC-level. Expendi-
ture classes are defined using the types of procedures performed during the visit and
the ”category” of the visit. The procedures that occur during an event are neither ex-
haustive nor mutually exclusive and include surgeries, Xrays, MRIs, chemo-therapy,
and/or physical therapy. Procedures do not include measures of the intensity or the
duration of the services. Visit categories include whether the visit is a checkup, a
treatment or diagnosis, maternity care, vision care, or an emergency visit. Any visit
category can involve any one or more of the available procedures.
Two major types of EC-level type services are constructed, those services
with surgeries and other major procedures, and those services without surgeries and
major procedures. All visits that include a surgery are pooled together as a specifi-
cally defined service, regardless of the visit category. All services that include major
services other than surgery, such as X-rays and MRIs, are pooled together separate
from both the surgical visits and the other types of visits. All visits that do not in-
clude a surgical procedure or other major non-surgical procedure are categorized by
their visit category. Some similar visit categories without major procedures are also
pooled together. For example, well-child visits and checkups are combined together.
Office-based physician care visits are pooled with hospital outpatient physi-
cian care in order to increase the precision of the outpatient visits. Outpatient
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Table 2.4: EC-level Shares for Physician Services
Diagnosis/ Non-Surgical Psych-
Year Checkup Treatment Surgery Procedure ological
1996 0.151 0.284 0.078 0.250 0.054
1997 0.147 0.285 0.076 0.268 0.045
1998 0.160 0.299 0.076 0.267 0.045
1999 0.159 0.278 0.069 0.299 0.039
2000 0.151 0.280 0.072 0.293 0.045
2001 0.155 0.270 0.074 0.306 0.042
2002 0.162 0.254 0.071 0.319 0.049
2003 0.163 0.267 0.069 0.319 0.044
Post-
Year operative Allergy Vision Maternity Other
1996 0.079 0.009 0.0236 0.048 0.023
1997 0.091 0.009 0.0218 0.043 0.014
1998 0.074 0.009 0.0170 0.041 0.013
1999 0.075 0.008 0.0164 0.043 0.014
2000 0.075 0.010 0.0154 0.044 0.016
2001 0.076 0.010 0.0153 0.037 0.014
2002 0.076 0.009 0.0128 0.033 0.014
2003 0.070 0.010 0.0157 0.031 0.011
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events are associated with the exact same information as the office-based care, and
thus outpatient events are categorized using the same procedure as above. See the
section on Hospital care for a more detailed description of how outpatient care is
combined with office-based care.
Hedonic regressions are performed separately for each expenditure class ser-
vice. In order to control for product heterogeneity, the hedonic regressions include
statistical controls for product types. The disease-type controls mentioned earlier
are extremely important in the consideration of office visits. The MEPS does not
report whether an individual sees a specialist or a general practitioner, only whether
the individual saw a physician. However, physician types can be very heterogeneous
and may include internists, cardiologists, neurologists, and general practitioners.
Physician type heterogeneity is assumed to be controlled by the inclusion of ICD-9
condition code dummy variables in the hedonic regressions. Office-based physician
regressions include statistical controls that indicate the types of procedures that
occur at a visit in addition to the standard statistical controls such as insurance,
demographic characteristics, region-years, and disease types. These additional con-
trols include variables that indicate whether the patient received anesthesia and
lab-tests. For those services that pool major procedure types other than anesthesia
and lab tests, the hedonic regressions also include statistical controls for the type
and number of procedures. For example, controls include whether the visit involved
an X-Ray, an MRI, or an X-Ray and an MRI. Similarly, if the expenditure class
regressions pool visit categories, dummy variables are included that identify the
reported visit category.
Table 4 reports the expenditure share of physician care represented by each
Expenditure Class. Non-surgical major procedures and diagnosis/treatment visits
are the two largest expenditure categories and together represent more than half
of all office-based physician spending. The share of diagnosis/treatment remains
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Table 2.5: EC-level Prices for Physician Services
Region- Diagnosis/ Non- Psych- All
Year Checkup Treatment Surgical Surgical iatric Physician
MSA NE 1996 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
MSA NE 1997 0.948 0.980 0.935 0.962 0.751 0.951
MSA NE 1998 1.013 1.107 0.870 0.916 0.769 0.990
MSA NE 1999 1.036 1.091 1.092 1.045 0.942 1.056
MSA NE 2000 1.154 1.140 1.320 1.065 1.033 1.118
MSA NE 2001 1.223 1.211 1.463 1.148 1.099 1.206
MSA NE 2002 1.260 1.260 1.457 1.108 1.100 1.214
MSA NE 2003 1.247 1.292 1.550 1.184 1.125 1.271
MSA MW 1996 0.946 0.885 0.997 0.972 0.727 0.925
MSA MW 1997 0.932 0.904 1.178 1.050 0.790 0.966
MSA MW 1998 1.094 0.953 1.160 0.946 0.758 0.989
MSA MW 1999 1.049 1.056 1.066 1.173 0.807 1.098
MSA MW 2000 1.143 1.157 1.282 1.079 0.884 1.120
MSA MW 2001 1.324 1.242 1.460 1.217 0.967 1.246
MSA MW 2002 1.370 1.444 1.766 1.267 1.117 1.371
MSA MW 2003 1.418 1.447 1.770 1.289 1.079 1.399
MSA SE 1996 1.004 0.942 1.003 0.950 0.906 0.971
MSA SE 1997 0.936 0.912 1.052 0.893 0.828 0.923
MSA SE 1998 1.011 1.001 1.070 0.960 0.925 0.985
MSA SE 1999 0.991 1.002 1.058 1.020 0.805 0.994
MSA SE 2000 1.094 1.064 1.599 1.063 0.719 1.088
MSA SE 2001 1.267 1.209 1.388 1.128 0.956 1.188
MSA SE 2002 1.290 1.316 1.447 1.190 1.082 1.269
MSA SE 2003 1.305 1.345 1.803 1.206 1.028 1.306
MSA WE 1996 1.026 1.009 1.083 0.961 0.818 1.007
MSA WE 1997 1.089 1.093 1.177 1.071 0.786 1.088
MSA WE 1998 1.109 1.135 1.289 0.968 0.860 1.080
MSA WE 1999 1.172 1.181 1.284 1.141 0.880 1.166
MSA WE 2000 1.243 1.259 1.858 1.185 1.075 1.272
MSA WE 2001 1.467 1.397 1.690 1.309 1.200 1.393
MSA WE 2002 1.354 1.318 1.493 1.186 1.173 1.293
MSA WE 2003 1.407 1.368 1.677 1.265 1.049 1.344
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Region- Post- All
Year operative Allergy Vision Maternity Other Physician
MSA NE 1996 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
MSA NE 1997 0.948 0.940 0.945 1.102 0.780 0.951
MSA NE 1998 0.980 1.388 1.059 1.089 0.889 0.990
MSA NE 1999 1.018 1.293 1.057 1.196 0.873 1.056
MSA NE 2000 1.069 1.321 0.932 1.225 0.839 1.118
MSA NE 2001 1.237 1.528 1.129 1.259 0.969 1.206
MSA NE 2002 1.271 1.752 1.184 1.104 1.164 1.214
MSA NE 2003 1.327 1.541 1.356 1.516 1.390 1.271
MSA MW 1996 0.892 1.291 0.991 1.073 0.852 0.925
MSA MW 1997 0.899 1.021 0.874 1.190 0.682 0.966
MSA MW 1998 1.017 1.191 0.984 1.138 1.000 0.989
MSA MW 1999 1.247 1.362 1.110 1.325 0.811 1.098
MSA MW 2000 1.166 1.308 1.117 1.139 0.888 1.120
MSA MW 2001 1.260 1.788 1.055 1.239 1.194 1.246
MSA MW 2002 1.492 1.465 1.262 1.228 1.360 1.371
MSA MW 2003 1.500 1.624 1.460 1.541 1.352 1.399
MSA SE 1996 0.988 1.092 1.001 1.226 0.842 0.971
MSA SE 1997 0.934 1.117 0.972 1.099 0.792 0.923
MSA SE 1998 0.931 1.026 0.990 1.023 0.893 0.985
MSA SE 1999 1.052 1.106 0.993 0.856 0.879 0.994
MSA SE 2000 1.103 1.181 1.161 1.217 0.788 1.088
MSA SE 2001 1.205 1.461 1.152 1.209 1.090 1.188
MSA SE 2002 1.329 1.139 1.213 1.467 1.216 1.269
MSA SE 2003 1.333 1.689 1.289 1.439 1.178 1.306
MSA WE 1996 1.047 0.879 1.173 1.370 0.967 1.007
MSA WE 1997 1.211 1.338 1.149 1.293 0.840 1.088
MSA WE 1998 1.146 1.045 1.133 1.346 1.073 1.080
MSA WE 1999 1.331 1.285 1.114 1.199 1.013 1.166
MSA WE 2000 1.326 1.760 1.278 1.304 1.344 1.272
MSA WE 2001 1.396 1.542 1.402 1.680 1.107 1.393
MSA WE 2002 1.324 1.402 1.468 1.424 1.384 1.293
MSA WE 2003 1.402 1.527 1.291 1.413 1.178 1.344
19
Region Diagnosis Non- Psych- All
Region-Year Checkup Treatment Surgical Surgical iatric Physician
NON-MSA 1996 0.890 0.859 1.061 0.955 0.767 0.915
NON-MSA 1997 0.889 0.868 1.203 0.966 0.604 0.922
NON-MSA 1998 0.948 0.954 1.283 1.036 0.666 0.988
NON-MSA 1999 1.056 1.040 1.306 1.130 0.824 1.073
NON-MSA 2000 1.128 1.094 1.382 1.186 0.874 1.141
NON-MSA 2001 1.240 1.201 1.611 1.120 0.930 1.189
NON-MSA 2002 1.279 1.296 1.484 1.152 0.996 1.250
NON-MSA 2003 1.350 1.335 1.663 1.210 0.907 1.299
Region- Post- All
Year operative Allergy Vision Maternity Other Physician
NON-MSA 1996 0.907 1.010 0.890 1.223 0.804 0.915
NON-MSA 1997 0.959 0.977 1.007 0.989 0.945 0.922
NON-MSA 1998 1.079 1.144 0.930 0.886 0.872 0.988
NON-MSA 1999 1.029 1.014 1.055 1.095 0.949 1.073
NON-MSA 2000 1.169 1.225 1.115 1.231 0.935 1.141
NON-MSA 2001 1.199 1.158 1.295 1.229 0.908 1.189
NON-MSA 2002 1.273 1.519 1.130 1.684 1.158 1.250
NON-MSA 2003 1.348 1.473 1.315 1.490 1.010 1.299
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relatively flat over this period while the share of non-surgical major procedure visits
has increased significantly from 25% of office-based care to almost 32% of office-
based care. Most of the other shares have remained relatively flat over time with
the exceptions of maternity care and vision care which have declined over time.
Maternity care’s share of total physician expenditures has fallen from almost 5%
of expenditures to slightly more than 3% of expenditures. Vision care began as
very small share of expenditures and fell from 2.36% to slightly more than 1.5% of
expenditures.
Table 5 reports the EC-level physician care multi-lateral prices over this
period for the five major regions. The West region begins the period with highest
price level for total office-based physician visits. The West also has the highest
average price level over the period. However, the Midwest has the highest rate of
increase at approximately 6.4% per year, and ends the period with the highest price
level. Non-MSAs begin the period with lowest price level while the Southeast has
the lowest price average price level over the period and the Northeast finishes the
period with the lowest price level. The northeast has the lowest rate of increase of
any region in the country at 3.3% per year which is almost a full point lower than
the West, the region with second lowest inflation rate.
There are dramatic inflation rate differences across services. For instance,
maternity care in the West rises at a rate of less than 1% per year, whereas surgical
care increases nearly 10% per year in the Southeast. Surgical care has the highest
inflation rate in four of the five regions, and in the West surgical care has the second
highest inflation rate relative only to allergy care. Psychotherapeutic care has the
lowest inflation rate in three of the five regions, but allergy care and maternity care
have the lowest rates in the Midwest and the West respectively.
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2.4 Office-based Non-Physician Care
Office-based non-physician services are defined as office-based care where the patient
reports seeing a non-physician during the visit. These services are compared with
the non-physician services account from the NHA. Office-based non-physician care
services are estimated at the EC-level. Expenditure classes are defined using the
medical care provider type of the visit. Although procedures and visit categories
are reported for non-physician care, neither is used to define an expenditure class.
Non-physician medical care provider types identified by the MEPS include techni-
cians, social workers and occupational therapists, nurse practitioners, chiropractors,
physical therapists, physician assistants, and psychologists.
Office-based non-physician care visits are pooled with hospital outpatient
non-physician care in order to increase the precision of the outpatient visits. Out-
patient events are associated with the exact same information as the office-based
care, and thus outpatient events are categorized using the same procedure as above.
See the section on Hospital care for a more detailed description of how outpatient
care is combined with office-based care.
Hedonic regressions are performed separately for each expenditure class ser-
vice. In order to control for product heterogeneity, the hedonic regressions include
statistical controls for product types. Some types of services provided during a non-
physician visit are controlled by including ICD-9 condition code dummy variables
in the hedonic regressions for each event. Unlike the physician care services these
dummy variables are not relied upon to identify the type of physician performing the
visit. In addition to the insurance, demographic and region-year controls included in
the standard regressions, office-based non-physician regressions also include statis-
tical controls for visit characteristics. The hedonic regressions for all non-physician
services include statistical controls for the type and number of procedures performed
at a visit. These procedures are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, and in-
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Table 2.6: Non-Physician Expenditure Shares
Chiro- Nurse Optom- Psych- Tech- Physical Social
Year practor Pract. etrist ologist nician Therapist Worker Other
1996 0.096 0.182 0.058 0.080 0.212 0.191 0.047 0.134
1997 0.118 0.214 0.056 0.074 0.209 0.170 0.050 0.109
1998 0.133 0.186 0.058 0.092 0.219 0.193 0.028 0.093
1999 0.124 0.158 0.056 0.089 0.239 0.153 0.035 0.146
2000 0.138 0.210 0.042 0.078 0.225 0.177 0.039 0.091
2001 0.106 0.225 0.046 0.067 0.244 0.176 0.038 0.098
2002 0.102 0.216 0.049 0.048 0.288 0.164 0.020 0.113
2003 0.110 0.194 0.038 0.045 0.279 0.173 0.035 0.126
clude Xrays, MRIs, chemo-therapy, and/or physical therapy. Non-physicians do not
perform surgeries, and thus the surgeries are not included as control variables in the
regressions. All non-physician visits also include dummy variables used to identify
the reported visit categories.
Table 6 reports the share of total non-physician expenditures on each EC-
level non-physician service. Technicians, nurse practitioners and physical therapists
account for most of the spending on non-physician care. In addition to representing
a large share of total non-physician expenditures, the share of technician care has
risen from approximately 21% of non-physician expenditures in 1996, to almost 28%
in 2003. This trend occurs at the same time that non-surgical procedure spending
for physicians has experienced increases. The trend for nurse practitioners, physi-
cal therapists and many of the other service types remains relatively flat over this
period. Exceptions include optometrist care which has steadily declined as a share
of total non-physician care over the period from 5.8% in 1996 to 3.8% in 2003. This
pattern occurs parallel to the decline in the share of vision care spending for physi-
cian services. Psychologist visits have undergone a downward shift in utilization
patterns beginning in 2001. Prior to 2001, psychologist expenditures never repre-
sented less than 7% of medical spending, but in 2002 and 2003 psychological visits
23
have represented less than 5% of total non-physician care spending.
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Table 2.7: Non-Physician EC-level Prices
Chiro- Nurse Optom- Psych- Tech- Total
Year practor Pract. etrist ologist nician Non-Dr
MSA NE 1996 1 1 1 1 1 1
MSA NE 1997 0.906 1.084 0.712 0.892 0.838 0.918
MSA NE 1998 0.879 0.823 0.797 0.941 0.855 0.883
MSA NE 1999 0.899 1.059 0.797 1.059 1.185 1.022
MSA NE 2000 0.858 1.368 0.901 1.122 0.898 1.024
MSA NE 2001 0.979 1.452 0.979 1.243 1.102 1.132
MSA NE 2002 1.108 1.559 1.03 1.355 1.16 1.208
MSA NE 2003 0.985 1.547 0.992 1.214 1.015 1.116
MSA MW 1996 0.825 0.847 1.061 0.895 0.888 0.933
MSA MW 1997 0.728 0.974 0.858 1.08 0.828 0.922
MSA MW 1998 0.78 1.051 0.82 1.072 0.959 0.996
MSA MW 1999 0.853 1.296 0.917 1.215 0.931 1.011
MSA MW 2000 0.908 1.248 0.753 1.163 1.222 1.096
MSA MW 2001 0.900 1.208 0.838 1.082 1.077 1.091
MSA MW 2002 1.016 1.461 0.803 1.202 1.093 1.145
MSA MW 2003 0.996 1.583 0.885 1.31 1.087 1.158
MSA SE 1996 1.009 0.769 0.909 0.93 0.895 0.88
MSA SE 1997 0.679 0.804 0.766 1.053 0.817 0.814
MSA SE 1998 0.911 0.93 0.662 1.015 0.728 0.83
MSA SE 1999 0.95 0.899 0.74 0.85 0.766 0.898
MSA SE 2000 0.906 1.153 0.739 0.901 0.85 0.952
MSA SE 2001 1.034 1.368 0.754 1.112 1.095 1.102
MSA SE 2002 1.182 1.177 0.871 1.117 1.053 1.123
MSA SE 2003 1.071 1.479 0.89 1.196 1.09 1.166
MSA WE 1996 0.788 1.154 1.106 0.814 0.95 0.991
MSA WE 1997 0.983 1.085 0.859 0.992 1.094 1.017
MSA WE 1998 0.811 1.14 0.835 0.902 0.866 0.952
MSA WE 1999 0.732 1.518 0.915 1.215 1.166 1.102
MSA WE 2000 1.007 1.768 0.923 1.167 1.011 1.162
MSA WE 2001 1.140 2.054 0.987 1.289 1.459 1.395
MSA WE 2002 1.083 1.588 1.06 1.219 1.248 1.261
MSA WE 2003 1.049 1.74 0.843 1.076 1.406 1.298
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MSA- MSA- MSA- MSA- Non-
Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
Physical Therapist
1 1.174 0.897 1.064 0.927
0.916 1.037 0.772 1.01 0.779
0.872 1.109 0.937 1.109 0.998
0.974 0.889 1.017 0.943 0.937
0.981 1.116 1.089 1.156 0.991
1.095 1.132 1.122 1.233 1.15
1.212 1.102 1.34 1.373 1.142
1.053 1.056 1.12 1.182 1.144
Social Worker
1 0.782 1.061 0.956 0.938
1.002 1.133 1.096 0.983 0.699
0.899 1.003 0.774 0.737 0.607
1.021 1.293 0.754 0.688 0.674
1.628 0.89 1.181 0.793 1.257
0.727 1.273 1.026 0.983 1.523
0.783 1.079 1.033 1.009 0.938
1.1 1.549 1.195 1.335 1.212
Other
1 0.901 0.801 0.988 0.863
0.913 0.904 0.796 0.909 0.612
0.97 1.092 0.677 0.917 0.661
0.836 0.9 1.115 1.096 0.768
0.792 0.959 0.802 0.986 1.217
1.138 1.122 0.914 1.192 1.015
1.014 1.158 1.048 1.029 0.9
0.998 0.963 1.126 1.143 1.127
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Chiro- Nurse Optom- Psych- Tech- Total
Year practor Pract. etrist ologist nician N-P
NON-MSA 1996 0.765 0.832 0.676 0.882 0.877 0.852
NON-MSA 1997 0.817 0.874 0.766 0.875 0.802 0.79
NON-MSA 1998 0.781 0.921 0.805 0.827 0.856 0.848
NON-MSA 1999 0.835 0.946 0.728 0.958 0.981 0.894
NON-MSA 2000 0.908 1.001 0.741 1.179 1.027 1.011
NON-MSA 2001 0.944 1.18 1.003 1.031 1.008 1.072
NON-MSA 2002 0.929 1.421 0.872 1.114 1.063 1.094
NON-MSA 2003 0.931 1.411 0.841 1.118 1.167 1.155
Table 7 presents the non-physician EC-level multi-lateral prices. Although
price movements for non-physician services appear much more uneven than in the
more homogenously defined physician services, we are heartened by the general
pattern consistencies observed between physician and non-physician visits. The
West region has the highest average price level for non-physician services over the
period, as it did in the physician visits. The Northeast experiences the lowest rate
of increase of all regions at slightly less than 1.5% increase per year. This pattern is
also consistent with the findings in the physician visits. The West begins the period
with the second-highest price level, slightly lower than the Northeast, and finishes
the period with the highest price level of all regions.
Non-physician services begin the period with a price decline. Prices decline
between 1996 and 1997 in four of the five regions, and decline at some point between
1996 and 1998 for all five regions. The rate of price increases for non-physician
services is much slower than the rate of price increases of physician services. The
two regions that experience the highest rates of inflation in non-physician services,
Non-MSA and the Southeast, experience inflation rates of 4.4% and 3.9% rate per
year, respectively. In contrast the physician services experienced inflation rates
above 6.5% per year over the same period.
The rates of price increases within non-physician EC-level services are hard
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to determine. Observed price spikes in a particular year may explain most of the
total increase. However, systematic patterns emerge. Nurse practitioners experi-
ence the fastest rate of increase in four of the five regions and the second highest
rate of increase in the Midwest region. In addition, either optometric services or
chiropractic care account for the service with the lowest rate of increase in every
region. Moreover, those services that have low rates of increase appear to have flat
or even decreasing prices over the period, whereas those services with high rates of
increase consistently have rates of increase between 3 - 10 % per year.
2.5 Dental Services
Dental care is the largest fraction of office-based non-physician care. It is therefore
reported separately from the other types of non-physician care in both the MEPS
and the NHA. The MEPS provides much more detail concerning the procedures
and the types of providers seen during dental visits than is provided for other types
of non-physician services. However, dental visits are not associated with ICD-9
disease codes as the overwhelming fraction of other medical care services are. Thus,
the types of conditions treated at each visit must be controlled using a combination
of the procedures and visit characteristics.
A non-trivial fraction of dental care spending and utilization is represented
by orthodontic care, which has highly irregular financing. A large fraction of ortho-
dontic care is paid upfront with a large fixed cost. Although maintenance care is
provided on a regular basis over an extended period of potentially years, these visits
do not typically involve subsequent payments. Orthodontic prices are therefore not
defined over a single visit like other types of dental care, but is rather defined over
all services used in straightening teeth.
Dental care services are defined at the ELI-level, which is the most disag-
gregated service level. For the reasons described above, the ELI-level dental care
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Table 2.8: Dental Care EC-level Expenditure Shares
Year General Surgery Cosmetic Orthodontics
1996 0.551 0.133 0.212 0.103
1997 0.549 0.130 0.235 0.086
1998 0.566 0.114 0.232 0.088
1999 0.533 0.127 0.232 0.108
2000 0.523 0.112 0.218 0.146
2001 0.544 0.120 0.206 0.130
2002 0.549 0.119 0.240 0.091
2003 0.557 0.108 0.231 0.104
services are defined using the type of dental provider seen and the service charac-
teristics provided by the MEPS. The services include whether the patient received
a general exam, a filling, crowns, bridges, X-rays, orthodontic care, oral surgery,
treatment for an abscessed tooth, or a root canal. Other services include teeth
whitening, implants, and general teeth cleaning. The binary service characteristics
that define the ELI services are listed in Appendix 1.
In addition to the standard insurance and demographic controls included in
each of the hedonic regressions, dental care services also include controls for the
specific types of services performed at visits. For instance, cosmetic service visits
include controls for whether the visit whitened teeth or inserted an implant. Surgical
visits include whether the surgery was gum surgery or other types of surgery. All
service types control for whether the patient saw a general dentist or a specialist
such as an endodentist or a periodontist. In addition, orthodontic services include
a variable for whether the visit was part of a ”fixed-fee” arrangement.
The EC-level service shares for all of dental care expenditures are presented
in Table 8. General dental services represent more than half of dental care spending.
Somewhat surprising is the importance of cosmetic services which represents more
than 20% of dental care. All expenditure shares remain relatively flat over this
period.
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Table 9 presents the EC-level dental care multi-lateral prices for the period
1996-2003. Consistent with the results from the physician and non-physician office-
based visits, the West region has the highest price level for overall dental care prices.
The West region begins and ends the period with the highest price level of any other
region. The non-MSA region has the overall lowest price level of any of the regions
and also begins and ends the period with lowest price level.
The rate of dental care price increases is brisk. None of the regions experience
less than 5.5% inflation, and the Southeast experiences more than 9% inflation per
year. The regional ordering of rates of increase for dental services is consistent with
the office-based non-physician services. Dental care price increases are the fastest
in the Southeast and the Non-MSA regions and the slowest in the Northeast.
The service type that experiences the largest price change varies significantly
by region. Depending on the region, any one of the services may represent either
the largest or the smallest price change over the period, although general dental
services never represents the largest price change and dental surgery never represents
the smallest price change. The price changes of individual services can vary quite
dramatically. Dental surgery in the Southeast increases at more than 16% per year,
and the increases in these prices occur steadily over the period.
30
Table 2.9: Dental Care EC-level Prices
Year General Surgery Cosmetic Orthodontics Dental
MSA NE 1996 1 1 1 1 1
MSA NE 1997 1.039 1.079 0.937 0.925 1.015
MSA NE 1998 1.102 1.179 1.363 0.892 1.157
MSA NE 1999 1.225 1.237 1.268 1.182 1.236
MSA NE 2000 1.229 1.589 1.24 1.449 1.302
MSA NE 2001 1.269 1.532 1.15 1.912 1.344
MSA NE 2002 1.326 1.612 1.374 1.463 1.39
MSA NE 2003 1.438 1.334 1.32 1.804 1.443
MSA MW 1996 0.878 1.165 0.893 1.395 0.972
MSA MW 1997 0.914 1.16 0.997 1.015 0.975
MSA MW 1998 1.05 1.456 1.046 0.844 1.073
MSA MW 1999 1.073 1.33 1.147 1.309 1.146
MSA MW 2000 1.176 1.338 1.116 1.419 1.211
MSA MW 2001 1.195 1.528 1.18 1.546 1.275
MSA MW 2002 1.317 1.736 1.424 1.256 1.385
MSA MW 2003 1.46 1.765 1.593 1.503 1.536
MSA SE 1996 0.914 0.858 0.866 0.862 0.896
MSA SE 1997 0.95 1.084 1.105 0.87 0.996
MSA SE 1998 1.086 1.181 1.077 0.735 1.069
MSA SE 1999 1.059 1.595 1.404 1.018 1.192
MSA SE 2000 1.171 1.432 1.329 1.548 1.286
MSA SE 2001 1.196 1.371 1.264 1.521 1.273
MSA SE 2002 1.349 1.571 1.603 1.438 1.448
MSA SE 2003 1.415 1.996 1.61 1.69 1.555
MSA WE 1996 1.143 1.284 1.151 1.34 1.187
MSA WE 1997 1.18 1.365 1.31 1.082 1.227
MSA WE 1998 1.303 1.657 1.418 1.252 1.366
MSA WE 1999 1.266 1.446 1.439 1.956 1.415
MSA WE 2000 1.342 1.367 1.324 1.684 1.389
MSA WE 2001 1.382 1.764 1.306 1.442 1.421
MSA WE 2002 1.471 1.7 1.605 1.408 1.531
MSA WE 2003 1.708 1.75 1.839 1.536 1.737
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Year General Surgery Cosmetic Orthodontics Dental
NON-MSA 1996 0.806 0.816 0.698 0.74 0.782
NON-MSA 1997 0.88 1.089 1.033 0.819 0.935
NON-MSA 1998 0.863 1.103 1.028 0.705 0.912
NON-MSA 1999 0.94 1.242 1.235 1.034 1.053
NON-MSA 2000 1.116 1.464 1.137 1.564 1.222
NON-MSA 2001 1.163 1.376 1.134 1.408 1.214
NON-MSA 2002 1.201 1.459 1.309 1.11 1.251
NON-MSA 2003 1.172 1.718 1.364 1.424 1.302
2.6 Hospital Care
Hospital care services are extremely heterogeneous but infrequently consumed events.
The MEPS reports three types of hospital care: Emergency Room (ER) Care, Hos-
pital Outpatient Care and Inpatient Care. These services are very heterogeneous,
which is exemplified by the fact that they have different event-type definitions. ER
and outpatient care events are defined as visits, whereas inpatient events are defined
as stays, or nights. Because of the extreme level of service type heterogeneity in
hospital care services, these broad EC-level services are disaggregated into Strata
using event characteristics. The structure of the hospital service hierarchy is defined
in Appendix 1.
The reported event characteristics used to define hospital Strata depend on
the expenditure class considered. Outpatient and ER services define a Stratum
by whether the patient saw a physician and whether the visit involved a major
procedure. Inpatient care defines Strata by whether the stay includes an operation.
Sometimes, a relationship between ER and inpatient care exists. If inpatient care
was initiated in the ER, then the dates identifying when care began and ended for
both the inpatient and ER care are used to identify the relationship.
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2.6.1 ER and Inpatient Care
The estimation of ER and inpatient hospital events proceeds similarly to the esti-
mation procedure for other event types. Each event is assigned to a Stratum based
on event characteristics. The event characteristics used to assign an ER event into
a Stratum include whether the category of visit is an emergency or non-emergency.
The characteristics of inpatient stays used to assign an event into a Stratum include
whether an operation was performed at the event. In addition to the event charac-
teristics used to assign events into Strata, ER visits are linked to hospital stays by
matching the inpatient admission date to the ER visit date. For those visits with
matching dates, the expenditure information from the ER is added to the inpatient
information and both events are defined as an inpatient event.
The statistical controls included in the hedonic pricing regression for inpa-
tient and emergency room care include the standard disease type, demographic and
insurance controls included in most all of the hedonic regressions. Additional con-
trols for whether an ER visit included lab tests, X-rays, surgeries and other major
procedures were also included in the hedonic regressions for Emergency Room care.
Inpatient care included controls for the length of stay and whether the admission
was initiated at the ER.
2.6.2 Outpatient Care
MEPS reports the exact same information for outpatient care as it does for office-
based care. We exploit this information parallel in order to assign outpatient events
to strata and estimate their price. Outpatient care is pooled with office-based care.
The criterion used to assign office-based care into Expenditure classes is the exact
same criterion used to assign outpatient care into strata. For outpatient care that
included a trip to the physician, events are assigned into strata using the category
of the visit and whether the visit involved a surgical or another non-surgical major
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Table 2.10: Hospital Service Expenditure Shares
Outpatient Outpatient
Year ER Inpatient Doctor Non-Dr
1996 0.054 0.747 0.128 0.072
1997 0.059 0.729 0.130 0.082
1998 0.055 0.722 0.151 0.072
1999 0.055 0.751 0.131 0.063
2000 0.054 0.765 0.118 0.063
2001 0.066 0.729 0.132 0.073
2002 0.066 0.716 0.135 0.082
2003 0.060 0.737 0.132 0.072
procedure. For outpatient care from non-physicians, the medical care provider type
is used to assign the outpatient visit to the strata. Once the stratum type has been
assigned to the event, the price of the event is estimated by including interactions of
whether the event occurred in the hospital with year dummies and region dummies.
Thus, the hedonic regression for a hospital outpatient checkup event would include
twelve hospital interactions, five region interactions and seven year interactions. The
price of the outpatient event would be identified using the hospital interactions and
the baseline office visit event.
2.6.3 Combined Hospital Services
Table 10 presents the hospital service expenditure shares. Inpatient care represents
the vast majority of expenditures at more than 70% of hospital spending in every
year, while ER spending represents the smallest fraction of spending. The share of
service spending remains almost constant over the period for all of the service types
considered.
34
Table 2.11: Hospital EC-level Prices
Region- Emergency Outpatient Outpatient All
Year Room Inpatient Non-Dr Doctor Hospital
MSA NE 1996 1 1 1 1 1
MSA NE 1997 0.970 0.880 1.068 0.840 0.898
MSA NE 1998 0.969 1.070 0.794 0.973 1.031
MSA NE 1999 1.046 1.246 0.966 1.037 1.186
MSA NE 2000 1.119 1.022 0.868 0.953 1.007
MSA NE 2001 1.063 1.114 0.908 1.090 1.092
MSA NE 2002 1.268 1.299 0.979 1.158 1.252
MSA NE 2003 1.495 1.595 0.865 1.290 1.477
MSA MW 1996 1.045 1.182 1.070 1.013 1.145
MSA MW 1997 1.122 1.177 1.300 1.005 1.165
MSA MW 1998 1.078 1.086 1.054 1.155 1.097
MSA MW 1999 1.222 1.191 0.996 1.101 1.167
MSA MW 2000 1.256 1.252 1.292 0.985 1.221
MSA MW 2001 1.408 1.309 1.046 1.163 1.276
MSA MW 2002 1.53 1.397 1.078 1.409 1.382
MSA MW 2003 1.636 1.718 1.116 1.498 1.632
MSA SE 1996 0.918 0.997 1.009 1.134 1.009
MSA SE 1997 1.007 1.056 1.160 1.018 1.053
MSA SE 1998 1.168 1.003 0.802 1.237 1.030
MSA SE 1999 1.025 1.139 0.827 1.148 1.111
MSA SE 2000 1.211 1.187 0.956 1.175 1.169
MSA SE 2001 1.207 1.197 1.065 1.223 1.192
MSA SE 2002 1.362 1.345 1.035 1.382 1.327
MSA SE 2003 1.429 1.490 1.121 1.621 1.475
MSA WE 1996 1.096 1.016 0.953 0.814 0.990
MSA WE 1997 1.151 1.177 1.233 0.797 1.124
MSA WE 1998 1.163 1.107 0.776 0.948 1.062
MSA WE 1999 1.191 1.200 0.938 0.916 1.143
MSA WE 2000 1.121 1.143 0.930 0.919 1.093
MSA WE 2001 1.451 1.257 1.142 0.994 1.225
MSA WE 2002 1.377 1.342 0.985 0.969 1.270
MSA WE 2003 1.576 1.602 1.089 1.097 1.495
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Region- Emergency Outpatient Outpatient All
Year Room Inpatient Non-Dr Doctor Hospital
NON-MSA 1996 1.023 1.065 0.936 1.055 1.053
NON-MSA 1997 1.035 1.067 1.064 0.994 1.057
NON-MSA 1998 0.99 1.07 0.835 1.277 1.074
NON-MSA 1999 1.009 1.166 0.876 1.205 1.139
NON-MSA 2000 0.991 1.166 0.992 1.073 1.132
NON-MSA 2001 1.107 1.177 0.912 1.188 1.154
NON-MSA 2002 1.265 1.336 0.963 1.288 1.292
NON-MSA 2003 1.41 1.502 1.072 1.431 1.449
Table 10 presents EC-level hospital prices. The Midwest has the highest
average price-level of any of the five regions. The Midwest both begins and ends the
period with the highest price level. The Northeast has the lowest price level of any
of the regions, beginning the period with a price level higher than the West region,
but finishing the period with the absolute lowest price level.
Many of the regions experienced flat and even decreasing hospital prices in
the early part of the period. The Northeast experienced a price decline between
1996 and 1997, and three of the four other regions experienced a decline in prices
between 1997 and 1998. The non-MSA region is the only region not to experience
a price decline between 1996 and 1998, however prices increased very slowly in the
non-MSA over that period at less than 1% per year. After 2000, all of the regions
experienced a much faster rate of price increase than did the period prior to 2000.
The rate of price increase for all regions after 2000 has been between 7.3% and 12%
per year, whereas the rate of increase prior to that period had been between 0-3.5%
per year. The West experienced the highest rate of price increase of any of the five
regions at more than 6.3% per year. The Non-MSA region experienced the lowest
level of price increase at 4.6% price increase.
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2.7 Drugs
The MEPS reports detailed prescription information for every drug purchased by
respondents to the survey. Unfortunately, prescription events are not comparable
across drugs because they vary in strength and quantity. In addition, the same drug
may be supplied in different types of forms. For example, prescription strength ac-
etaminophen is supplied as both a syrup for children and a pill for adults. Moreover,
previous literature has found that the same molecule of drug administered in the
same form, strength and quantity may vary dramatically in price based solely on
the manufacturer of the product, or even whether the drug is branded as a generic
or name-brand drug by the same manufacturer (see Griliches (1994) and Frank and
Salkever (1997)).
In order to address these issues we define a drug by the active ingredient,
which the literature generally refers to as the molecule. The molecule associated with
the drug identifies the ELI service for drugs. The event of the drug is constructed
to be the daily dose of the drug in order to be consistent across drug types. The
daily dose is chosen as the unit of choice because all drugs have a daily dose, and
the daily dose provides an intuitive therapeutic relationship between the drugs. The
total quantity of days is constructed using the prescription information supplied by
the MEPS such as the quantity and strength of the drug combined with daily dose
information provided by the Mosby’s Drug Consult. The daily dose of the drug is
allowed to vary by the age, weight and three-digit ICD-9 disease code of the patient.
The stratum and expenditure classes of the molecules are assigned using the
therapeutic class of the drug provided by the most recent MEPS surveys. The
therapeutic class of the drug is broken into sub-categories. Which category and
sub-category defines an expenditure class and a stratum depends on the size of the
categories and subcategories, measured in the number of molecules contained in the
category. The hierarchy of molecules and their assigned stratum and expenditure
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classes are reported in Appendix 1.
The ELI-level service is defined as the unique molecule produced by a manu-
facturer. If molecules are supplied in multiple forms, such as pills and syrups, then
the ELI service distinguishes between forms. The ELI-level regressions include sta-
tistical controls for the strength of the molecule in addition to the standard disease
type, insurance type and demographic controls included in the regressions for most
services. If some ELI services must be pooled for statistical reasons, then dummy
variables indicating the manufacturer of the drug are included in the hedonic re-
gressions. If molecules are pooled for statistical reasons, then molecule identifiers
are included in the regression in lieu of manufacturer controls.
Table 12 reports the expenditure share of the major EC-level drug types over
the period considered. Cardiovascular agents represent the largest share of total drug
spending, followed by hormones and Psychotherapeutic medications. Topical agents
represent the lowest fraction of spending of any of the major categories of drugs.
The most striking pattern in drug consumption has occurred with Cardio-
vascular Agents and Anti-Lipid medications. Cardiovascular agents have steadily
decreased as a share of total spending from almost 27% of spending in 1996 to less
than 20% of spending in 2003. Meanwhile, Anti-Lipid medications have steadily
increased their share from approximately 8% of spending in 1996 to more than 13%
of spending in 2003 to become the second largest expenditure class of any drug
category including hormones and psychotherapeutic medications.
Anti-infective agents appear to have exhibited a shift in consumption from
prior to post 1998. Anti-infective medications represented greater than 6% of drug
consumption prior to 1998 and fell to 3.2% of drug consumption by 2003. Many of
the other drug expenditure class categories remain flat over this period.
Table 13 presents the EC-level drug prices for the major drug categories.
In contrast to the prices of other services, regional price differences are very small.
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Table 2.12: Expenditure Shares for Drugs
Anti- Anti- CV Central GI
Year Infectious Lipid Agents Nervous Analgesics Agents
1996 0.075 0.080 0.269 0.056 0.079 0.086
1997 0.061 0.084 0.248 0.055 0.082 0.077
1998 0.038 0.090 0.240 0.057 0.085 0.084
1999 0.048 0.092 0.243 0.055 0.079 0.073
2000 0.034 0.098 0.218 0.056 0.086 0.073
2001 0.037 0.108 0.204 0.047 0.095 0.090
2002 0.033 0.122 0.199 0.056 0.085 0.095
2003 0.032 0.135 0.199 0.060 0.084 0.113
Misc Nutrition Respiratory Topical Psych.
Year Hormones Agents Nutrition Agents Agents Agents
1996 0.144 0.026 0.011 0.063 0.013 0.099
1997 0.148 0.027 0.013 0.075 0.012 0.118
1998 0.156 0.020 0.012 0.075 0.011 0.133
1999 0.166 0.028 0.011 0.085 0.013 0.107
2000 0.161 0.028 0.011 0.084 0.009 0.142
2001 0.145 0.027 0.009 0.099 0.007 0.132
2002 0.143 0.034 0.011 0.090 0.008 0.124
2003 0.124 0.040 0.010 0.072 0.006 0.124
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There is little difference in the price levels and inflation rates of drugs across regions.
The inflation rate ranges between 4.2% per year in the Midwest and 4.9% per year
in the West.
Although regional variability in drug service prices is small, the variabil-
ity in price changes across drug services can be very large. Miscellaneous agents
in the Non-MSA region increase at a rate of less than 2% per year, whereas the
Anti-infective agents in the Midwest have price increases of almost 14% per year.
Anti-infective medications have had significant price shifts during the period. Anti-
infective prices in the Northeast rose from less than 1.09 prior to 1999 to greater
than 1.43 after 1998. All regions experience similar price increases for Anti-infective
medications.
Analgesics also experiences a price shift during the period, although not as
severe as the price shift experienced by Anti-infective medications.
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Table 2.13: EC-level Drug Prices
Region Anti- Anti- CV CNS Anal- G.I. All
-Year Infect Lipid Agents Agents gesic Agent Rx
MSA NE 1996 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
MSA NE 1997 1.016 1.048 1.023 1.158 1.054 1.050 1.051
MSA NE 1998 1.089 1.126 1.039 1.322 1.060 1.174 1.086
MSA NE 1999 1.667 1.202 1.143 1.818 1.130 1.194 1.198
MSA NE 2000 1.505 1.243 1.210 1.335 1.075 1.151 1.184
MSA NE 2001 1.435 1.327 1.240 1.387 1.272 1.553 1.286
MSA NE 2002 1.505 1.353 1.227 1.431 1.557 1.318 1.294
MSA NE 2003 1.745 1.316 1.286 1.559 1.414 1.258 1.357
MSA MW 1996 0.968 0.969 0.969 1.026 1.005 1.035 0.997
MSA MW 1997 1.097 1.075 0.997 1.119 1.055 1.089 1.050
MSA MW 1998 1.058 1.095 1.004 1.117 1.062 1.122 1.065
MSA MW 1999 1.304 1.172 1.110 1.333 1.184 1.226 1.159
MSA MW 2000 1.320 1.130 1.121 1.201 1.069 1.154 1.154
MSA MW 2001 1.469 1.251 1.193 1.444 1.162 1.292 1.245
MSA MW 2002 1.594 1.367 1.209 1.507 1.237 1.267 1.293
MSA MW 2003 2.032 1.307 1.241 1.513 1.444 1.187 1.335
MSA SE 1996 1.013 1.037 0.980 1.084 1.027 0.987 0.998
MSA SE 1997 0.977 1.053 1.006 1.060 1.039 1.023 1.029
MSA SE 1998 1.084 1.112 0.988 1.056 1.068 1.120 1.055
MSA SE 1999 1.447 1.211 1.102 1.573 1.080 1.208 1.146
MSA SE 2000 1.449 1.156 1.139 1.282 0.999 1.211 1.165
MSA SE 2001 1.559 1.233 1.166 1.483 1.179 1.251 1.248
MSA SE 2002 1.599 1.346 1.212 1.400 1.189 1.242 1.279
MSA SE 2003 1.772 1.326 1.303 1.408 1.358 1.199 1.341
MSA WE 1996 0.964 0.984 0.942 0.949 1.027 1.030 0.979
MSA WE 1997 1.032 1.056 0.969 1.140 1.037 1.078 1.046
MSA WE 1998 1.076 1.137 1.000 1.073 1.024 1.169 1.057
MSA WE 1999 1.414 1.176 1.116 1.396 1.153 1.123 1.148
MSA WE 2000 1.367 1.179 1.105 1.318 1.195 1.128 1.186
MSA WE 2001 1.326 1.191 1.207 1.506 1.330 1.293 1.266
MSA WE 2002 1.396 1.295 1.194 1.454 1.367 1.223 1.289
MSA WE 2003 1.862 1.331 1.248 1.513 1.556 1.268 1.366
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Region- Hor- Misc Nut- Resp- Top- All
Year mones Agent rition iratory ical Psych Rx
MSA NE 1996 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
MSA NE 1997 0.998 1.180 1.016 1.165 1.099 1.161 1.051
MSA NE 1998 1.073 1.168 1.230 1.138 1.161 1.167 1.086
MSA NE 1999 1.267 1.293 1.220 1.161 1.288 1.342 1.198
MSA NE 2000 1.246 1.223 1.508 1.292 1.398 1.249 1.184
MSA NE 2001 1.401 1.226 1.510 1.412 1.405 1.513 1.286
MSA NE 2002 1.513 1.210 1.423 1.473 1.486 1.372 1.294
MSA NE 2003 1.731 1.203 1.547 1.683 1.432 1.676 1.357
MSA MW 1996 1.002 1.018 1.141 0.984 1.007 1.053 0.997
MSA MW 1997 1.038 1.137 1.165 1.080 1.194 1.143 1.050
MSA MW 1998 1.059 1.156 1.013 1.118 1.298 1.205 1.065
MSA MW 1999 1.134 1.261 1.107 1.155 1.323 1.464 1.159
MSA MW 2000 1.254 1.045 1.353 1.226 1.354 1.431 1.154
MSA MW 2001 1.445 1.128 1.596 1.342 1.379 1.491 1.245
MSA MW 2002 1.567 1.168 1.821 1.469 1.629 1.515 1.293
MSA MW 2003 1.701 1.405 1.781 1.555 1.511 1.580 1.335
MSA SE 1996 0.918 1.000 1.038 1.053 1.014 1.033 0.998
MSA SE 1997 1.008 1.117 1.086 1.078 1.157 1.107 1.029
MSA SE 1998 1.050 1.169 1.202 1.057 1.223 1.166 1.055
MSA SE 1999 1.129 1.042 1.264 1.148 1.204 1.300 1.146
MSA SE 2000 1.207 1.124 1.339 1.208 2.406 1.406 1.165
MSA SE 2001 1.388 1.270 1.796 1.484 1.296 1.471 1.248
MSA SE 2002 1.587 1.112 1.946 1.477 1.457 1.462 1.279
MSA SE 2003 1.690 1.282 1.765 1.730 1.513 1.580 1.341
MSA WE 1996 0.918 1.057 1.015 1.011 1.139 1.000 0.979
MSA WE 1997 1.085 1.066 1.053 1.130 1.207 1.156 1.046
MSA WE 1998 1.017 1.031 1.212 1.118 1.043 1.187 1.057
MSA WE 1999 1.109 1.153 1.372 1.150 1.322 1.404 1.148
MSA WE 2000 1.244 1.125 1.222 1.308 1.639 1.505 1.186
MSA WE 2001 1.507 1.257 1.302 1.431 1.421 1.463 1.266
MSA WE 2002 1.552 1.166 1.641 1.573 1.432 1.528 1.289
MSA WE 2003 1.652 1.225 2.069 1.752 1.527 1.690 1.366
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Region- Hor- Misc Nut- Resp- Top- All
Year mones Agent rition iratory ical Psych Rx
NON-MSA 1996 0.986 1.049 1.179 0.939 1.167 1.025 1.010
NON-MSA 1997 1.066 1.148 1.194 1.093 1.108 1.099 1.045
NON-MSA 1998 1.086 1.066 1.254 1.086 1.274 1.213 1.073
NON-MSA 1999 1.137 1.109 1.300 1.172 1.482 1.355 1.144
NON-MSA 2000 1.215 1.056 1.269 1.237 1.548 1.446 1.176
NON-MSA 2001 1.401 1.115 1.523 1.369 1.413 1.505 1.241
NON-MSA 2002 1.619 1.178 1.520 1.463 1.444 1.501 1.293
NON-MSA 2003 1.797 1.192 1.751 1.589 1.514 1.622 1.345
Region Anti- Anti- CV CNS Anal- G.I. All
-Year Infect Lipid Agents Agents gesic Agent Rx
NON-MSA 1996 1.061 1.022 0.989 1.026 1.025 1.038 1.010
NON-MSA 1997 1.109 1.093 0.991 1.015 1.031 1.068 1.045
NON-MSA 1998 1.015 1.143 1.005 1.134 1.094 1.119 1.073
NON-MSA 1999 1.490 1.185 1.104 1.358 1.082 1.107 1.144
NON-MSA 2000 1.415 1.192 1.188 1.311 1.090 1.104 1.176
NON-MSA 2001 1.504 1.216 1.166 1.400 1.229 1.323 1.241
NON-MSA 2002 1.581 1.368 1.194 1.489 1.313 1.246 1.293
NON-MSA 2003 1.778 1.327 1.246 1.465 1.448 1.276 1.345
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Table 2.14: Home Health Care Group-level Prices
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West Non-MSA
1996 1.000 0.573 0.756 0.747 0.720
1997 0.714 0.614 0.643 0.847 0.648
1998 0.770 0.509 0.640 0.680 0.542
1999 0.811 0.559 0.565 0.472 0.683
2000 0.859 0.637 0.571 0.832 0.598
2001 1.034 0.634 0.653 1.403 0.767
2002 1.107 0.815 0.758 0.667 0.744
2003 0.914 0.697 0.688 0.731 0.665
2.8 Home Health
Home health care is defined as a visit by any medical care provider to the patient’s
home. Home health services are recorded as months of care by the MEPS. A home
health month includes indicator variables for whether a type of provider visited the
home, such as a physician, a nurse practitioner, a social worker, a physical therapist
or even a volunteer. The MEPS also reports information concerning the frequency
of visits by the medical care provider, broadly what services were performed during
the visits and whether the medical care provider works for an agency.
Home health care is a unique and infrequently consumed event. Home health
care is therefore estimated at the group level. Thus, all information concerning the
type of medical care provider, the frequency of visits and what occurred during the
visit are included as statistical controls in the single hedonic regression performed
to estimate home health care prices. The multi-lateral group-level home health care
prices are reported in Table 14.
Table 14 presents home health care multi-lateral group-level prices. As with
non-physician care services, home health care service inflation rates are difficult
to determine with confidence, as price changes are a bit uneven. However, trends
emerge. Prices appear to remain relatively flat, and even decrease over the period.
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Four of the five regions experience prices that are lower in 2003 than they were in
1996. The Midwest region is the only region with an increase in prices, and the level
of increase was less than 2.7% per year. The price levels for care in the Northeast
appears significantly higher than price levels in other regions of the country.
2.9 Durable and Non-durable Supplies
Medical care supplies include eyeglasses, bandages, wheelchairs, hearing aids, sy-
ringes, and other medical care equipment. The MEPS reports most of these sup-
plies as ’other’ medical care services, but reports diabetic equipment as if it were a
pharmaceutical service. The MEPS typically categorizes other medical care supplies
into approximately eight categories that include ambulance, eyeglasses and contact
lenses, hearing devices, medical equipment, orthopedic devices, and other. Other
supplies typically have a text description of what ’Other’ means, and most other
services can reasonably be assigned to one of the assigned categories. For exam-
ple, canes and wheelchairs and are assigned to orthopedic devices, and towels are
included in disposable supplies. None of the supplies are associated with an ICD-9
code, and thus the disease the supply is used to treat is often unknown.
ELI-level services are defined by supply category. In addition to the standard
controls for demographics and insurance type, those services that combine supply
categories include controls for the types of categories included. For example, medical
equipment includes controls for whether the medical equipment is a hearing device.
Table 15 reports the group-level multi-lateral prices for durable and non-
durable supplies. The Midwest region has the highest overall price level for durable
supplies. They begin the period with the second-highest price level and end the
period with the highest price level of any of the five regions. The Southeast has
the lowest price level for durable supplies. They begin and end the period with the
lowest price level.
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Table 2.15: Durable and Non-Durable Supply Group-level Prices
Durable
Northeast Midwest Southeast West Non-MSA
1 1.149 0.963 1.242 1.008
0.990 0.985 1.057 1.107 0.955
1.148 0.924 1.012 1.007 0.981
1.006 1.035 0.960 1.161 1.170
1.185 1.171 0.994 1.074 1.009
1.084 1.218 1.108 1.208 1.120
1.246 1.357 1.265 1.156 1.230
1.265 1.305 1.137 1.137 1.218
Non-Durable
Northeast Midwest Southeast West Non-MSA
1 0.799 0.701 0.906 0.990
1.147 1.236 0.873 0.894 0.924
0.964 0.845 0.825 0.836 0.987
1.820 1.684 1.095 1.352 1.489
1.457 0.866 1.122 0.819 0.934
1.353 1.115 1.314 2.090 1.483
0.979 1.192 1.369 0.997 1.042
1.215 1.158 1.478 1.496 0.854
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Price increases in durable supplies have been relatively mild as compared to
other services groups. No region faces price increases faster than the 3.3% increase
per year experienced by the Northeast, and prices actually decrease in the West
over the period. Although part of the West’s decreasing prices is explained by the
unusually high prices faced in 1996, the region faces extremely flat prices for durable
supplies throughout the period.
The Northeast region faces the highest average price level for non-durable
supplies. They begin the period with the highest price level but end the period
with prices significantly lower than either the Southeast or the West regions. The
non-MSA region has the lowest average price level for non-durable supplies. The
non-MSA region begins the period with one of the highest price levels, but ends the
period with the lowest price level of any region.
Non-durable supply prices appear to change somewhat unevenly making the
rate of price increase for these services difficult to determine. However, there appear
to be large differences in the price changes faced by different regions. The Southeast
appears to experience a relatively steady 13.8% rate of price increase over this period
which is the largest price change of any region. They experience this extreme price
increase while facing some of the lowest price levels of any region. The other regions
appear to face high prices in late 1990s and in the early 2000s, but experience a
price decline in 2002 and 2003.
2.10 The Role of Insurance
Insurance type characteristics are included as statistical controls in the hedonic re-
gression for every estimated service. Insurance has an overwhelmingly important
role in determining the price of medical care services. The coefficients on the in-
surance variables are statistically significant and economically important in every
hedonic service. Moreover, the effect of insurance type is consistent across services.
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Table 2.16: The Role of Insurance in Selected Services
Private & Other
Service Medicare Medicare Medicaid Pub. Comb. Uninsured
Inpatient/Emergency Room
ER Emergency -0.201 -0.425 -0.629 -0.479 -0.151
ER Non-Emergency -0.268 -0.393 -0.529 -0.474 -0.259
ER Non-Doctor -0.166 -0.415 -0.325 -0.491 -0.093
Inpatient -0.188 -0.211 -0.265 -0.332 -0.611
Dental Care
Clean Only/Hygenist -0.070 -0.147 -0.417 -0.200 -0.122
Clean Only/Dentist -0.123 -0.117 -0.471 -0.262 -0.197
Filling Only/Dentist -0.096 -0.096 -0.480 -0.297 -0.117
Xray Only -0.090 -0.073 -0.521 -0.318 -0.142
Combination -0.019 -0.030 -0.568 -0.470 -0.190
Root Canal 0.064 -0.164 -0.367 0.063 0.007
Abscessed Tooth -0.365 -0.716 -0.416 -0.473 -0.321
Oral Surgery -0.145 -0.031 -0.668 -0.405 -0.121
Crowns -0.183 -0.061 -0.184 -0.297 -0.212
Cosmetic -0.048 -0.187 -0.464 -0.395 0.185
General Exam/Hygenist -0.062 -0.054 -0.469 -0.211 -0.126
General Exam/Dentist -0.068 -0.034 -0.520 -0.289 -0.095
Other Dental Services -0.165 -0.062 -0.521 -0.424 -0.190
Orthodontist - - -0.660 -0.536 -0.311
Office-based Physician
Checkups -0.114 -0.189 -0.178 -0.142 -0.175
Treatment/Diagnosis -0.019 -0.112 -0.156 -0.026 -0.169
Surgery -0.282 -0.490 -0.479 -0.421 -0.170
Major Procedure -0.110 -0.268 -0.325 -0.199 -0.167
Psychological 0.002 -0.187 -0.147 -0.127 -0.402
Postoperative -0.117 -0.214 -0.113 -0.132 -0.172
Allergy 0.107 0.105 -0.309 -0.100 -0.068
Vision -0.149 -0.215 -0.090 -0.135 0.060
Pregnancy - - -0.128 -0.114 0.004
Other 0.009 -0.084 -0.257 -0.167 -0.156
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Table 16 reports the insurance coefficients for a select group of services. Table
16 reveals that private insurance pays more for every service considered than does
any other insurance type. The magnitude of these price differences can be quite
large. For instance Private+Medicare pays more than 70% less than does private
insurance. The differences in the price paid by private insurance relative to Medicaid
insurance consistently has a large magnitude. Medicaid pays 26% less for inpatient
care than does private insurance. Inpatient care is by far the most expensive medical
service considered. For every other service considered, Private insurance rarely pays
less than 30% more for services than does Medicaid.
Although the pattern that private insurance pays more is consistent for all
of insurance types and all services, the size of the differences, and often the ”rank”
of the insurance types vary by service. For hospital care, Medicare typically pays
more for services than does private and Medicare, which pays more for services than
does public combinations and Medicaid . The magnitude of the differences between
the privately insured and other non-Medicaid insurance types is smaller for dental
services than it is for hospital services. However, the rank order remains pretty
much the same.
2.11 Conclusion
Medical care price measurement is complicated by the role of insurance in mask-
ing transaction prices, the heterogeneity of services, and dynamic technological ad-
vancement. We have employed a nationally representative dataset of medical care
consumption in order to construct medical care prices that control for product het-
erogeneity and insurance type pricing differences. We use an extension of the CPD
hedonic pricing model as applied to medical care services to control for product
heterogeneity and technological innovation. We have shown that the individual ser-
vices within service groups can experience vastly different price changes than other
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services within the group or the group as a whole. These large differences in price
levels and price changes across services implies that the failure to control for prod-
uct heterogeneity may significantly alter the measured prices for these services. In
addition, we have demonstrated that the use of list charges rather than expenditures
may significantly bias the results not least because charges overstate expenditures
and their relationship to expenditures differs across service types. Finally, we have
shown that price levels and inflation rates vary dramatically across regions, and that
insurance type is an important determinant of prices for nearly all of the services
considered.
These results are applicable to current discussions of how to invest money
and human capital resources into the construction of medical care price indices. The
current discussion includes the possibility of purchasing claims and hospital data to
facilitate such calculations. Our results suggest that any such analysis should be
able to account for medical care spending differences across service types, regions
and insurance.
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Appendix 1: Services
Group 1: Hospital Services
EC 11: ER Services
Stratum 111: ER Emergency
Stratum 112: ER Non-Emergency
EC 12: Inpatient Services
Stratum 121: Inpatient Operation
Stratum 124: Inpatient non-Operation
EC 13: Outpatient Physician
Stratum 131: Outpatient Physician Checkup
Stratum 132: Outpatient Physician Post-Operative Care
Stratum 133: Outpatient Physician Treatment
Stratum 134: Outpatient Physician Maternity
Stratum 135: Outpatient Physician Mental
Stratum 135: Outpatient Physician Treatment
Stratum 136: Outpatient Surgery
Stratum 137: Outpatient Physician Non-Surgery Procedure
Stratum 138: Outpatient Physician Other
EC 14: Outpatient Other Professionals
Stratum 141: Chiropractors
Stratum 142: Nurse Practitioners
Stratum 143: Optometrists
Stratum 144: Podiatrists
Stratum 145: Physician Assistants
Stratum 146: Physical Therapists
Stratum 147: Psychologists
51
Stratum 148: Technicians
Stratum 149: Other Health Professionals
Group 2: Physician and Clinical Services
EC 21: Surgical Procedures
EC 22: Checkup
EC 23: Treatment and Diagnosis
EC 24: Psych Care
EC 25: Postoperative Care
EC 26: Immunological Care
EC 27: Vision Care
EC 28: Maternity Care
EC 29: Other Care
Group 3: Other Professional Services
EC 31: Chiropractors
EC 32: Nurse Practitioners
EC 33: Optometrists
EC 34: Podiatrists
EC 35: Physician Assistants
EC 36: Physical and Occupational Therapists
EC 37: Psychologists
EC 38: Technicians
EC 39: Other Non-Physician Professionals
Group 4: Dental Services
EC 41: General Dental Services
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Stratum 411: Dental Hygienists
41101 DENTIST CLEANING ONLY/HYGENIST
41102 DENTIST GENERAL EXAM/HYGENIST
Stratum 412: Dental Services - No Hygienists
41201 DENTIST CLEANING ONLY
41202 DENTIST FILLING ONLY
41203 DENTIST XRAY ONLY
41204 DENTIST COMBINATION: FILLING/XRAY/CLEANING
EC 42: Dental Surgery
42001 DENTIST ROOT CANAL
42002 DENTIST ABSCESSED TOOTH
42003 DENTIST ORAL SURGERY
EC 43: Dental Cosmetic Services
43001 DENTIST CROWNS/BRIDGES/INLAY
43002 DENTIST COSMETIC
EC 44: Orthodontics
Group 5: Durable Medical Products
50001 EYEGLASSES
50002 ORTHOPEDIC
50002 MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
Group 6: Home Health
Group 7: Pharmaceutical
EC 70: Anti-Infective
Stratum 700: Amebicides
70001 METRONIDAZOLE
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Stratum 701: Anti-fungal
70101 FLUCONAZOLE
Stratum 702: Anti-viral Agents
70201 ACYCLOVIR
Stratum 703: Cephalosporin
70301 CEFPROZIL
70302 CEFUROXIME
70303 CEPHALEXIN
Stratum 704: Macrolide
70401 ERYTAB/ERYTHROMYCIN
70402 AZITHROMYCIN
Stratum 705: Penicillin
70501 AMPICILLIN
70502 AMOXICILLIN
70503 AMOXICILLIN/CLAVULANTE
70504 PENICILLIN V POTASSIUM
Stratum 706: Quinoline
70601 CIPROFLOXACIN
70602 LEVOFLOXACIN
70601 SULFASALAZINE
Stratum 707: Tetracyclines
70701 DOXYCYCLINE
70702 MINOCYCLINE
Stratum 708: Urinary Anti-Infective
70801 NITROFURANTOIN
70802 SULFAMETHOXAZOLE TRIMETHOPRIM
EC 71: Anti-Hyperlipidemic Agents
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Stratum 710: HMG-COA Reductase inhibitors
71001 ATORVASTATIN
71002 CERIVASTATIN
71003 FLUVASTATIN
71004 LOVASTATIN
71005 PRAVASTATIN
71006 SIMVASTATIN
Stratum 711: Fibric Acid Derivatives
71101 GEMFIBROZIL
71102 FENOFIBRATE
EC 72: Cardiovascular Agents
Stratum 720: Angiotensin Converting Enzyme (ACE) Inhibitors
72001 CAPTOPRIL
72002 ENALAPRIL
72003 LISINOPRIL
72004 MOEXIPRIL HCl
72005 FOSINOPRIL (MONOPRIL)
72006 QUINAPRIL HCl
72007 RAMIPRIL
Stratum 721: Anti-Adrenergic agents, peripherally acting
72101 DOXAZOSIN
72102 TAMULOSON
72103 TERAZOSIN
Stratum 722: Anti-Adrenergic agents, centrally acting
72201 CLONIDINE HCl
72202 GUANFACINE HCl
Stratum 723: Anti-Anginal Agents
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72301 ISOSORBIDE
72302 NITROGLYCERIN
72303 QUINIDINE SULFATE
Stratum 724: Beta-Adrenergic Blocking
72401 ATENOLOL
72402 LABETALOL
72403 METOPROLOL
72404 NADOLOL
72405 PROPRANOLOL HCl
72406 TOPROL
Stratum 725: Calcium Channel Blocking Agents
72501 AMLODIPINE
72502 DILTIAZEM
72503 FELODIPINE
72504 NIFEDIPINE
72505 VERAPAMIL
Stratum 726: Diuretics
72601 BUMETANIDE
72602 FUROSEMIDE
72603 HYDROCLOROTHIAZIDE (HCTZ)
72604 INDAPAMIDE
72605 METOLAZONE
72606 SPIRONOLACTONE
72607 TORSEMIDE
Stratum 727: Inotropic Agents
72701 DIGOXIN
72702 LANOXIN
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Stratum 728: Anti-Hypertensive Combinations
72801 AMLODIPINE/BENAZEPRIL
72802 HCTZ/TRIAMTERENE
72803 HCTZ/BENAZEPRIL
72804 HCTZ/BISOPROLOL
72805 HCTZ/LISINOPRIL
72806 HCTZ/LOSARTAN POTASSIUM
72807 HCTZ/Other Combinations
Stratum 729: Angio-Tensin II Inhibitors
72901 IRBESARTAN
72902 LOSARTAN POTASSIUM
72903 VALSARTAN
EC 73A: Central Nervous System Agents
Stratum 73A1: Anti-convulsants
73A101 CARBAMAZEPINE
73A102 CLONAZEPAM
73A103 DIAZEPAM
73A104 DIVALPROEX
73A105 GABAPENTIN
73A106 LORAZEPAM
73A107 PHENYTOIN
Stratum 73A2: Antiemetic/Anti-vertigo Agents
73A201 DIPHENHYDRAMINE
73A202 MECLIZINE
73A203 METOCLOPRAMIDE
73A204 PHENOBARBITAL
73A205 PROMETHAZINE
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73A206 PROMETHAZINE/CODEINE
Stratum 73A3: Anti-Parkinson Agents
73A301 BENZTROPINE
73A302 CARBIDOPA/LEVODOPA
Stratum 73A4: Muscle Relaxants
73A401 BACLOFEN
73A402 CARISOPRODOL
73A403 CYCLOBENZAPRINE
73A404 METHOCARBAMOL
Stratum 73A5: Miscellaneous Central Nervous System Agents
73A501 AMPHETAMINE/DEXTROAMPHETAMINE
73A502 DONEPEZIL
73A503 METHYLPHENIDATE
73A504 DEXTROAMPHETAMINE
Stratum 73A6: Anorexiant
73A601 PHENTERMINE/PHENTERMINE RESIN
EC 73B: Analgesic CNS Acting Agents
Stratum 73B0: Misc. Analgesics
73B001 ACETAMINOPHEN
73B002 ASPIRIN
73B003 HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE
73B004 SUMATRIPTAN SUCCINATE
73B005 TRAMADOL
73B006 ANTI-MIGRAINE AGENTS (MISC)
73B007 OTHER ANALGESICS
Stratum 73B1: Cox-2 Inhibitors
73B101 CELECOXIB
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73B102 ROFECOXIB
Stratum 73B2: Narcotics and Narcotic Combinations
73B201 ACETAMINOPHEN/CODEINE
73B202 ASPIRIN/OXYCODONE
73B203 ACETAMINAPHEN/PROPOXYPHENE
73B204 APAP/HYDROCODONE
73B205 MORPHINE SULPHATE
73B206 OXYCODONE
73B207 PROPOXYPHENE
73B208 ACETAMINOPHEN/BUTALBITAL/CAFFEINE
Stratum 73B3: Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Agents
73B301 DICLOFENAC
73B302 ETODOLAC
73B303 IBUPROFEN
73B304 INDOMETHACIN
73B305 KETOPROFEN
73B306 NABUMETONE
73B307 NAPROXEN
73B308 OXAPROZIN
73B309 PIROXICAM
73B310 SULINDAC
73B311 DICLOFENAC/MISOPROSTOL
EC 74: Gastro-Intestinal Agents
Stratum 740: H2 Antagonists
74001 CIMETIDINE
74002 FAMOTIDINE
74003 NIZATIDINE
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74004 RANITIDINE
Stratum 741: Misc. Gastro-Intestinal Agents
74101 CISAPRIDE
74102 DICYCLOMINE
74103 DOCUSATE SODIUM
Stratum 742: Proton Pump Inhibitors
74201 ESOMEPRAZOLE MAGNESIUM
74202 LANSOPRAZOLE
74203 OMEPRAZOLE
74204 PANTOPRAZOLE
74205 RABEPRAZOLE SODIUM
EC 75: Hormones
Stratum 750: Adrenal Cortical Steroids
75001 METHYLPREDNISOLONE
75002 PREDNISONE
Stratum 751: Anti-Diabetic Agents
75101 GLIMEPIRIDE
75102 GLIPIZIDE
75103 GLYBURIDE
75104 INSULIN
75105 METFORMIN
75106 PIOGLITAZONE
75107 ROSIGLITAZONE
Stratum 752: Misc. Hormones
75201 LEVOTHYROXINE
75202 RELOXIFENE
75203 TAMOXIFEN
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75204 ALENDRONATE
Stratum 753: Sex Hormones
75301 DESOGESTREL ETHINYL ESTRADIOL
75302 ESTRADIOL SINGLE THERAPY
75303 ESTRADIOL COMBO THERAPY
75304 ESTROGENS/METHYLTESTOSTERONE
75305 ESTROPIPATE
75306 FINASTERIDE
75307 MEDROXY-PROGESTERONE
75308 PROGESTERONE
EC 76: Misc. Agents
Stratum 760: Anti-Metabolites
76001 METHOTREXATE
Stratum 761: Misc. Coagulation Modifiers
76101 CLOPIDOGREL
76102 PENTOXIFYLLINE
76103 TICLOPIDINE
76104 WARFARIN SODIUM
Stratum 762: Genito-urinary Tract Agents
76201 OXYBUTYNIN
76202 TOLTERODINE
Stratum 763: Anti-Gout Agents
76301 ALLOPURINOL
76302 COLCHICINE
EC 77: Nutritional Products
Stratum 770: Vitamin and Mineral Combinations
77001 CALCIUM
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77002 FERROUS SULFATE
77003 FOLIC ACID
77004 POTASSIUM CHLORIDE
77005 PRENATAL VITAMINS
77006 ASCORBIC ACID
EC 78: Respiratory Agents
Stratum 780: Adrenal Cortical Steroids
78001 BUDESONIDE
78002 PREDNISOLONE
78003 TRIAMCINOLONE
Stratum 781: Anti-Histamines
78101 CETIRIZINE
78102 FEXOFENADINE
78103 HYDROXYZINE
78104 LORATADINE/PSEUDOEPHEDRINE
Stratum 782: Broncho-Dilators
78201 ALBUTEROL
78202 ALBUTEROL/IPRATROPIUM
78203 IPRATROPIUM BROMIDE
78204 SALMETROLXINAFOATE
78205 THEOPHYLLINE
Stratum 783: Respiratory Inhalant Products
78301 BECLOMETHASONE DIPROPIONATE
78302 FLUNOSOLIDE
78303 FLUTICASONE PROPIONATE
Stratum 784: Upper Respiratory Combinations
78401 CARBINOXAMINE/DEXTROMETHORPHAN
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78402 GUAIFENESIN
78403 GUAIFENESIN/PSEUDOEPHEDRINE
78404 GUAIFENESIN/PHENYLPROPANOLAMINE
78405 HYDROCODONE/HOMATROP
Stratum 785: Leukotriene Modifiers
78501 MONTELUKAST SODIUM
78502 ZAFIRLUCAST
EC 79A: Topical Agents
Stratum 79A0: Dermatological Agents
79A001 MUPIROCIN/BACTROBAN
79A002 BETAMETHASONE DIPROPIONATE
79A003 NYSTATIN
79A004 TRETINOIN
Stratum 79A1: Ophthalmic Preparations
79A101 DORZOLAMIDE
79A102 LATANOPROST
79A103 PILOCARPINE
79A104 TIMOLOL
Stratum 79A2: Otic Preparations
79A201 HYDROCORTISONE
Stratum 79A3: Nasal Preparations
79A301 MOMETASONE
EC 79B: Psycho-Therapeutic Agents
Stratum 79B0: Anxiolytics, Sedatives, and Hypnotics
79B001 ALPRAZOLAM
79B002 BUSPIRONE
79B003 DOXEPIN
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79B004 TEMAZEPAM
79B005 ZOLPIDEM TARTRATE
Stratum 79B1: Anti-Depressants
79B101 AMITRIPTYLINE
79B102 BUPROPION
79B103 CITALOPRAM
79B104 FLUOXETINE HCl
79B105 IMIPRAMINE
79B106 NORTRIPTYLINE
79B107 PAROXETINE
79B108 SERTRALINE
79B109 SERZONE
79B110 TRAZODONE
79B111 VENLAXAFINE
Stratum 79B2: Anti-psychotics
79B201 LITHIUM
79B202 OLANZAPINE
79B203 RISPERIDONE
Group 8: Other Non-Durable
80001 AMBULANCE PRIVATE INSURANCE
80002 AMBULANCE UNINSURED/PUBLIC INSURANCE
80003 DISPOSABLE SUPPLIES
80004 OTHER
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Chapter 3
Disease Treatment Prices
This chapter addresses the productivity and efficiency of medical care markets by
constructing medical care output prices for twelve of the most costly health condi-
tions in the United States. The analysis uses the 1996-2003 Medical Care Expen-
diture Panel Survey (MEPS), a nationally representative dataset of medical care
expenditures. The construction of disease accounts and disease treatment prices
facilitate a regional and dynamic treatment cost analysis. The dynamic analysis
assesses whether the prices or the mix of input services used to treat a disease has
changed over time. The regional analysis assesses whether treatments of the same
condition use different resource intensity across regions. The organization of med-
ical care spending into disease accounts facilitates the ability to sensibly attribute
health outcomes to the disease treatments considered.
3.1 Measuring Medical Care Prices
3.1.1 Difficulties in Price Measurement
That medical care should be treated as an input into health has been known for some
time. Thirty years ago, Michael Grossman (1972) introduced his seminal theoretical
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model that focused on medical care as the key health production input. Forty years
ago, Anne Scitovsky (1964) had argued for the creation of national disease accounts.
Despite having the conceptual framework for relating medical care to health for some
time, success at empirically incorporating either of these ideas into national accounts
has been limited. Currently, none of the national accounts relate medical care inputs
to health outputs. However, newly available data and renewed interest has led to
recent progress in the methods used to implement this conceptual framework.
The difficulties in applying these concepts are fundamental. The empirical
relationship between medical care services and health outcomes is complicated by
the difficulty in measuring initial health, health outcomes, medical care input prices,
and the productive relationship between medical care and health outcomes. Trans-
action prices for medical care are difficult to collect and may differ dramatically from
listed charges because of insurance negotiation, bad debt, and the provision of free
or discounted care. Medical care inputs and health outputs are both extremely het-
erogeneous and accounting for this heterogeneity can be difficult. Moreover, even
if health outcomes and medical care input prices could be perfectly measured, a
productivity analysis requires that inputs are associated with outputs, which in this
case relates medical care services to health outcomes. However, none of the govern-
ment statistics such as the National Health Accounts, the Producer’s Price Index
(PPI) and the Medical Care component of the Consumer Price Index (mCPI) relate
the input services they consider to the health outputs they produce. Consequently,
these statistics cannot enable even a cursory productivity evaluation.
The major innovation of the last decade has been the method in which to
empirically implement these concepts. The literature is fast coming to the consensus
that a disease-specific empirical implementation of medical care productivity evalua-
tion is the proper approach. For example, Cutler et al (1996) examines heart attack
treatments, Berndt et. al (1997) examines depression treatment, Evans (2005) ex-
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amines AIDS treatment and other studies have examined psychoses (Duggan, 2005)
and automobile injury treatments (Doyle, 2005). This cursory survey of the liter-
ature suggests that any future empirical assessment of medical care productivity
likely begins by attributing medical care services to the specific diseases they are
used to treat. An examination of the productivity of medical care as a whole should
account for the spending by all insurance types including the privately insured, the
publicly insured, and the uninsured, and should also include the spending from all
regions of the economy. The direction of this research suggests that steps should
be taken to organize the construction of ”disease accounts” from a nationally rep-
resentative dataset in order to attribute the medical care spending in the United
States to disease treatments, thereby enabling future research related to the topic
of medical care productivity.
The disease specific nature of medical care productivity arises because of the
heterogeneity of disease characteristics. Diseases vary dramatically in their dura-
tion, treatment protocols and health consequences. For instance, diabetes treatment
is a very complex chronic condition that may involve a lifetime of hospital visits,
insulin shots, and other drug regimens. In contrast, upper respiratory infections are
acute conditions that can be very simple to treat and may involve a trip to the doc-
tor’s office and a week’s worth of antibiotics. The health response to treatment can
also vary dramatically across diseases. Diseases may be preventable with vaccine,
curable, treated indefinitely but never cured, or have no available effective treat-
ment. The differences in these outcomes may change over time with technological
advancement. Related to the potential outcomes of the treatment are the health
consequences of the disease itself. Some diseases may increase mortality risks but
are not physically debilitating, such as high cholesterol. Other conditions may be
physically debilitating but do not change the risk of death, such as arthritis. Other
conditions, such as diabetes, can be both debilitating and mortal.
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Although attributing observed health outcomes to medical care productivity
requires the specification of a structural relationship between medical care services
and health outcomes, the ”disease accounts”, presented here, provide a cursory pro-
ductivity assessment by facilitating a ”back of the envelope” calculation of regional
health outcome price levels and their changes over time in the aggregate.
3.1.2 Methodology of Treatment Price Measurement
Disease treatments are defined as the medical care service bundles consumed by in-
dividuals for the purpose of treating disease type d. Disease d is determined by the
three-digit ICD-9 code associated with the medical care event. Disease treatment
prices are defined as regional price levels over the period 1996-2003 using the MEPS.
The medical care services used in disease treatment are referred to as Entry-Level-
Items (ELIs). Input service type heterogeneity is controlled using a variant of the
Country Product Dummy variable (CPD) model described in detail by Summers
(1973). The CPD model is a hedonic pricing model that has been used extensively
to estimate cross-country purchasing power parities. This paper follows Kokoski,
Cardiff and Moulton (1994) in implementing a CPD model to construct price lev-
els across geographic regions in the United States for medical care services. The
services are organized into a hierarchy of two aggregation levels, where the most
aggregated service level is the disease treatment. As an example, the treatment of
depression is a commodity aggregate of the pharmaceutical products Fluoxetine HCl
and Paroxetine HCl, Psychiatrist office visits, Psychologist office visits, and other
ELI-level services used in the treatment of ICD-9 code 311 Depressive Disorders.
Implementation proceeds as follows. The price of an event i that belongs to
ELI v is estimated using the following hedonic regression:
lnP vi = α0 +
K∑
k=2
βvkRki +
J∑
j=1
γvjCji (3.1)
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In equation 1, βvk and γ
v
j are estimated coefficients, P
v
i is the total expenditures
paid for the event i, and Rki is a region-year dummy variable that is one if the
event occurred in region-year k, and zero if it did not. Cji is the jth characteristic
of event i. The characteristics included in the hedonic regressions vary by ELI but
often include disease and insurance type indicators as well as demographic variables
such as age and gender. The price of the vth service in region-year k relative to the
reference area is exp(βˆvk).
In order to construct disease price levels for region-year k, lnP dk , the ag-
gregation procedure employs a bilateral Tornquist comparison of ELI items. Using
the following procedure, the Tornquist bilateral price comparison of region-year j
to region-year k for ELI v uses the following weighted geometric average of the V
ELI-level prices that are used to treat condition d.
lnP djk = (1/2)
V∑
v∈d
(wdvj + w
d
vk) ln(P
v
j /P
v
k ) (3.2)
In Equation 2, wdvj and w
d
vk represents ELI v’s fraction of total disease d expenditure
in regions j and k, respectively. If there are K region-years, then this procedure
results in a KxK matrix of bilateral prices. These bilateral prices are used to con-
struct a multi-lateral price index for each disease-level region year using the Elteto,
Koves, and Szulc (EKS) method described by Dreschler (1973), and implemented in
Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982). The multi-lateral price for a region-year,
lnP dk , is determined by taking the weighted share of the K bilateral prices such
that:
lnP dk =
K∑
j=1
sdj lnP
d
jk (3.3)
where sdj is the share of spending in region-year j on total disease d spending.
This procedures is conducted for twelve of the most costly disease types found in a
representative sample of the United States population.
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3.1.3 Observed Care versus Defined Care
The method used to define the bundle of services used to treat a disease implicitly
defines the treatment protocol using the observed service shares. However, the
observed services may be endogenous, because the bundle may depend on the relative
prices of the services in the bundle. For example, a physician may prescribe an
unnecessary treatment if the relative price of that treatment is high and the patient
is insured against the full cost of the procedure.
In order to control for this issue one could use pre-defined protocols as defined
by medical science to define the relative quantities of care used in the determina-
tion of a treatment. However, many legitimate and highly substitutable protocol
options are available for the treatment of a single disease, and the protocol used in
practice varies for a multitude of reasons usually not observed in the MEPS data.
For instance, the treatment of depression may involve combining drugs with visits
to psychiatrists and psychologists. The observed combination of drugs and visits
depends on whether the patient responds better to the physician sessions or drugs,
and potentially the aversion of the patient to taking drugs. The dispersal of med-
ical knowledge also plays an important role in determining the protocol for many
conditions.
Many of these unobserved changes are orthogonal to price, and we would
like to incorporate them in our price index. We proceed with the assumption that
these aspects of treatment are more important components of treatment than are
the potential ”churning” and ”moral hazard” aspects of care introduced using the
strict-protocol method.
3.1.4 Methodology of Health Outcome Measurement
There are two types of health outcome metrics used to measure output. The health
measures are the age-adjusted mortality rate and the probability that an individual
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has a disease-specific negative health outcome. Age-adjustment mortality rates for
disease type j are calculated using the direct method which is described with the
following equation:
Mj =
n∑
i=1
rji · (pi/P ) (3.4)
The following list defines notation:
• Mj is the age-adjusted mortality rate of disease j per 100,000 people.
• rji is the mortality rate of disease j per 100,000 people in age-group i.
• pi is the fraction of the population in age-group i.
• n is the total number of age-groups
• P =∑ni=1 pi represent the total population, which is the sum of all age groups
i = 1, ..., n.
For the mortality statistics reported here, the age distribution of the popu-
lation used is that of the 2000 census. Eleven age-groups are used for the mortality
calculations that include less than 1, 1-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64,
65-74, 75-84, and 85 and over.
The probability that an individual has a disease-specific negative health out-
come is calculated for changes in observed health indicators. For instance, the
observed indicator may be an indicator for whether mobility decreased during the
period. The observed health indicators, I, are modelled as being directly related to
a latent health variable, h∗. The relationship between latent health and the health
indicator may either be increasing or decreasing in health. To fix ideas consider
indicators that are decreasing in health. If the indicator variable takes on only two
values, such as whether health deteriorated, then the indicator function is defined
as follows:
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• if h∗ < h then I=1
• if h∗ >= h then I=0
This binomial function describes the relationship between latent health and
health outcomes. Latent health is modelled as a function of demographic character-
istics such as age, sex, income, region, insurance type, race, and most importantly,
year. In order to be consistent with the other measures of health, latent health
depends on age as measured by eleven dummy variables representing the age-groups
listed above. The probability that a health outcome occurs depends on patient
characteristics, and the total expenditure spent on treatment. The probability that
an observed health outcome occurs for an indicator function is defined using the
following equation:
Pr(h∗ < h) = Φ(α+
L∑
l=1
γlZli +
2003∑
t=1997
Yti < υi) (3.5)
In this equation, demographic characteristics denoted by the variable Z and time de-
noted by Y determine health. This equation depends on eight year dummy variables,
Y , and l demographic variables, Z, that include the eleven age dummy variables,
and six insurance type dummy variables. If υ = (h− ) is distributed standard nor-
mal then Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution function, and this relationship
can be estimated as a probit using standard techniques. The predicted probability
of the health outcome for a specific individual evaluated at different years is the
health measure used in the analysis.
3.2 Disease Costs
The MEPS reports the medical care consumption for every individual in a nation-
ally representative individual level survey. The total medical care expenditures are
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associated with each type of medical care service consumed by each respondent.
The reported expenditures include and distinguish between all payments made by
and in behalf of the individual such as payments made by the family, private in-
surance, public insurance such as Medicare and Medicaid, workman’s compensation
and automobile insurance. All expenditures are associated with a medical care event
such as a prescription or a hospital stay. In addition to expenditure information,
each event is associated with the medical condition the service was used to treat.
The survey asks each respondent to describe the condition, and these descriptions
are used by professional coders hired by the MEPS to assign ICD-9 codes to each
medical care event in the survey.
The MEPS conducts a follow-up component to the survey which surveys the
medical care provider in order to determine the expenditures received for each event
reported by the individual respondents. This follow-up component accounts for
charity care, bad debt, provider discounts, insurance discounts and other potential
sources of discrepancies between reported list charges and the actual expenditures
received by the provider. The follow-up component also allows the survey to collect
information about events not reported by the survey respondent.
3.2.1 Annual Treatment Costs
There are no government statistics that allow for the simple decomposition of med-
ical care cost changes over time into medical care input price changes, changing
treatment algorithms for conditions, condition prevalence changes, or many other
health and technological changes important in evaluating medical care sector pro-
ductivity. This type of decomposition analysis begins by considering the changing
aggregate costs for the treatment of identical medical conditions over time.
Table 1 presents the national annual aggregate treatment costs, and the
fraction of total medical care costs that are represented by each disease. The cost
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Table 3.1: National Treatment Costs (in billions)
Disease Chapter 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Infectious 7.66 7.62 7.46 11.51 7.94 9.73 12.71 12.87
% of Year Exp. 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.018 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.015
Neoplasms 32.26 33.96 34.82 31.24 37.65 41.09 43.09 41.88
% of Year Exp. 0.052 0.056 0.058 0.050 0.058 0.057 0.054 0.049
Endocrine 16.40 18.14 19.16 21.48 23.16 33.14 32.82 36.80
% of Year Exp. 0.027 0.030 0.032 0.034 0.036 0.046 0.041 0.043
Blood Conditions 2.56 3.43 1.42 2.06 2.56 3.40 4.13 2.93
% of Year Exp. 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003
Mental Health 23.49 24.35 25.64 30.48 27.54 33.10 32.94 34.03
% of Year Exp. 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.049 0.043 0.046 0.042 0.040
Nervous System 35.57 33.75 35.91 34.40 35.38 39.62 46.35 48.33
% of Year Exp. 0.058 0.056 0.059 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.058 0.057
Circulatory 69.98 76.59 77.89 73.59 78.47 78.77 80.02 96.73
% of Year Exp. 0.114 0.127 0.129 0.117 0.122 0.109 0.101 0.114
Respiratory 36.09 34.74 35.72 39.08 37.71 42.85 46.48 43.47
% of Year Exp. 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.062 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.051
Gastro-Intestinal 26.68 24.38 25.30 26.99 27.88 35.40 41.92 43.57
% of Year Exp. 0.043 0.041 0.042 0.043 0.043 0.049 0.053 0.051
Genito-Urinary 19.27 19.66 18.31 19.07 21.69 25.05 29.66 30.25
% of Year Exp. 0.031 0.033 0.030 0.030 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.036
Preg. + Peri-Natal 50.31 30.63 33.32 34.20 41.17 44.76 46.45 50.16
% of Year Exp. 0.082 0.051 0.055 0.054 0.064 0.062 0.059 0.059
Skin 8.71 8.72 9.38 9.32 11.14 11.84 14.22 13.07
% of Year Exp. 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.015
Musculo-Skeletal 33.60 30.91 33.29 34.70 37.82 41.93 49.67 56.99
% of Year Exp. 0.055 0.051 0.055 0.055 0.059 0.058 0.063 0.067
Injuries 38.61 37.07 34.01 41.47 36.56 40.75 42.56 46.39
% of Year Exp. 0.063 0.062 0.056 0.066 0.057 0.056 0.054 0.054
Preventative+Other 133.32 129.63 135.49 142.54 144.33 159.50 172.15 178.60
% of Year Exp. 0.216 0.215 0.224 0.227 0.224 0.220 0.217 0.210
Multiple Conditions 81.50 87.99 76.70 75.38 73.72 83.68 98.32 115.34
% of Year Exp. 0.132 0.146 0.127 0.120 0.114 0.115 0.124 0.135
Total 616.0 601.6 603.8 627.5 644.7 724.6 793.5 851.4
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statistics are organized by ICD-9 chapter headings. All costs are discounted by the
Urban Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) and reported in year 2000 dollars. Some
services are associated with either multiple ICD-9 codes or are not associated with
any ICD-9 codes. For instance, spending on dental care and durable supplies are
not associated with ICD-9 codes by the MEPS. Some of these services are assigned
to a relevant ICD-9 chapter. For example, eyeglasses are assigned to nervous system
spending and dental care is assigned to other ’other’ spending. Missing ICD-9 codes
not assigned to relevant ICD chapter headings are listed here as ’preventative’ care.
If spending is associated with multiple ICD-9 codes, then spending for those services
are associated with ’multiple conditions’. Almost 90% of multiple condition spending
involves either endocrine or circulatory condition treatments.
Table 1 reports that total treatment expenditures, in real terms, remained
relatively flat from 1996 to 1999, and actually decreased between 1996 and 1997.
However, the flat spending period of the mid 1990s changed to sharply rising ex-
penditures in the early part of the 2000s. Medical care expenditures have increased
35% since 1999. Although the costs of most chapter heading conditions follow sim-
ilar patterns to the overall cost pattern, some differences arise. Pregnancy and
peri-natal condition spending experience large cost declines between 1996 and 1997.
Combined costs in these chapters fall from $50 billion in 1996 to $30 billion in 1997
and this drop appears to drive the decrease in total medical care spending in those
years. This decrease is so dramatic that the 1996 spending level for these services
are never again achieved, even after the rapid medical expenditures growth in the
2000s. Although the magnitude of the spending drop for these conditions is quite
large relative to other disease type spending, the pattern is not inconsistent. Many
of the other conditions experience either flat spending or mild decreases in medical
care expenditures over the mid 1990s. There are some important differences, how-
ever. Endocrine conditions, mental health conditions and circulatory conditions all
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experience steady increases in real spending throughout the entire period, but still
experience faster increases in the later part of the period.
Despite the increases in total spending since 1999, the fraction of spending
represented by any one condition has remained stable for nearly all of the conditions
considered throughout the whole period. Notable exceptions to this pattern include
endocrine conditions and pregnancy services. Endocrine conditions have steadily
increased as a fraction of total medical care spending from 2.7% of spending in 1996
to 4.3% of spending in 2003. Pregnancy and peri-natal services fall from 8.2% of
care in 1996 to less 6% of care in 2003, but most of this change occurs in the one
year between 1996 and 1997.
3.2.2 Disease Prevalence
Evaluating efficiency in medical care markets begins by understanding why medical
care costs have been rising since 1999. The national costs of treating a condition
can be defined as the product of the number of people receiving treatment and the
price of the treatment. Understanding the nature of the observed increasing med-
ical care costs begins by understanding how the prevalence of conditions is changing
over time. Table 2 reports the prevalence rates for diseases observed in the United
States. Prevalence rates are defined as the percent of the total population with a
disease. The population includes all ages, sexes, ethnicity types and races observed
in the non-institutionalized United States population. The reported conditions are
organized by and include the ICD-9 chapter headings. The reported three-digit level
conditions are the most costly conditions in each of the major heading categories.
The reported prevalence of the three-digit ICD-9 code conditions, such as hyper-
tension, represent the weighted percentage of individuals that either report having
hypertension during the year, or report seeking treatment for hypertension.1 The
1Although documentation suggests that an individual can report having a condition without
seeking treatment, there are no individuals in the survey that have a condition without seeking
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prevalence of the major chapter conditions, such as circulatory conditions, is the
percentage of people in the sample who report or sought care for at least one of the
3-digit ICD-9 code conditions identified with the major chapter.2
The prevalence rates vary substantially across disease types. Peri-natal con-
ditions (premature babies) represent the least prevalent conditions at less than 1% of
the population. These conditions are uncommon because the conditions are uniquely
found in a narrowly defined age demographic, namely newborns aged less than one
year old. In contrast, respiratory conditions are the most prevalent condition in the
United States. Roughly 40% of the population has at least one respiratory condi-
tion in any given year. Respiratory conditions include common acute conditions
such as influenza, and upper respiratory infections (i.e. the common cold) that are
typically short in duration and cheap to treat. However, the chronic respiratory
conditions that represent the most costly conditions within the group each make
up a small fraction of all respiratory conditions. In fact, the most common 3-digit
level condition considered is hypertension, a circulatory condition, not a respiratory
condition. Hypertension, or high blood pressure, aﬄicts between 10 and 14 per-
cent of the population whereas the most common respiratory condition considered
is allergic rhinitis which represents between 6.7-9.5% of the population.
The vast majority of major chapter conditions considered have very little
change in their prevalence rates over the period. Neoplasms, blood conditions,
gastro-intestinal conditions, genito-urinary conditions, musculo-skeletal conditions,
injuries and other conditions experience either no change or no discernible pattern
in prevalence rates over the period. In addition, very few of the conditions appear to
be declining in prevalence over time. Infectious diseases and respiratory conditions
are much less common in 2003 than they were in 1996 and 1997, but the differences
treatment for that condition.
2By definition, the prevalence sum of 3-digit ICD-9 prevalence rates is greater than or equal to
the major chapter prevalence rates.
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Table 3.2: Disease Prevalence
Disease Type 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Infectious 0.2971 0.2202 0.1954 0.2014 0.1909 0.1892 0.1940 0.1956
008 Intestinal Inf. 0.1870 0.1218 0.0982 0.1141 0.0999 0.0901 0.0970 0.0980
042 H.I.V. 0.0005 0.0004 0.0009 0.0008 0.0003 0.0007 0.0008 0.0005
079 Viral NOS 0.0370 0.0244 0.0222 0.0229 0.0223 0.0276 0.0252 0.0233
Neoplasms 0.0521 0.0518 0.0507 0.0502 0.0521 0.0551 0.0585 0.0579
162 Trachea/Lung 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014
174 Female Breast 0.0023 0.0032 0.0039 0.0041 0.0038 0.0042 0.0042 0.0033
239 Unspecified 0.0119 0.0095 0.0094 0.0081 0.0072 0.0082 0.0091 0.0098
Endocrine 0.1237 0.1293 0.1299 0.1369 0.1483 0.1613 0.1651 0.1682
250 Diabetes 0.0359 0.0389 0.0414 0.0431 0.0444 0.0459 0.0496 0.0505
272 Lipoid 0.0302 0.0378 0.0421 0.0457 0.0555 0.0639 0.0743 0.0814
Blood Conditions 0.0177 0.0160 0.0151 0.0164 0.0184 0.0197 0.0202 0.0196
Mental Health 0.1520 0.1563 0.1579 0.1547 0.1600 0.1752 0.1858 0.1875
296 Psychoses 0.0031 0.0036 0.0049 0.0047 0.0048 0.0058 0.0065 0.0059
300 Neurotic 0.0244 0.0248 0.0251 0.0251 0.0298 0.0351 0.0463 0.0490
311 Depressive 0.0470 0.0549 0.0544 0.0533 0.0551 0.0609 0.0678 0.0688
Nervous System 0.2521 0.2310 0.2143 0.1989 0.1931 0.2068 0.2034 0.2094
354 Mononeuritis 0.0073 0.0073 0.0072 0.0058 0.0061 0.0079 0.0068 0.0077
365 Glaucoma 0.0130 0.0119 0.0113 0.0114 0.0107 0.0118 0.0127 0.0126
366 Cataract 0.0154 0.0156 0.0140 0.0138 0.0134 0.0155 0.0160 0.0166
382 Otitis Media 0.0667 0.0599 0.0521 0.0492 0.0478 0.0493 0.0445 0.0420
Circulatory 0.1569 0.1648 0.1671 0.1669 0.1705 0.1778 0.1963 0.2010
401 Hypertension 0.1016 0.1093 0.1127 0.1145 0.1214 0.1261 0.1367 0.1431
410 A.M.I. 0.0050 0.0068 0.0059 0.0050 0.0051 0.0040 0.0051 0.0056
414 Heart Disease 0.0043 0.0035 0.0029 0.0031 0.0035 0.0036 0.0035 0.0039
427 Dysrhythmia 0.0114 0.0123 0.0132 0.0144 0.0127 0.0135 0.0144 0.0148
428 Heart Failure 0.0044 0.0054 0.0051 0.0051 0.0046 0.0060 0.0064 0.0067
429 Heart Disease 0.0209 0.0233 0.0226 0.0236 0.0241 0.0220 0.0224 0.0217
436 C.V.A. (stroke) 0.0077 0.0081 0.0077 0.0069 0.0073 0.0065 0.0075 0.0075
444 Arterial Embolism 0.0025 0.0035 0.0025 0.0031 0.0037 0.0030 0.0036 0.0044
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Disease Prevalence (cont.)
Disease Type 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Respiratory 0.4798 0.4200 0.4002 0.3973 0.3923 0.4108 0.3946 0.4007
473 Sinusitis 0.0702 0.0597 0.0480 0.0511 0.0523 0.0557 0.0554 0.0540
477 Allergic Rhinitis 0.0715 0.0670 0.0726 0.0773 0.0750 0.0911 0.0955 0.0941
486 Pneumonia NOS 0.0177 0.0169 0.0154 0.0159 0.0147 0.0168 0.0169 0.0183
492 Emphysema 0.0048 0.0054 0.0054 0.0052 0.0056 0.0060 0.0056 0.0046
493 Asthma 0.0385 0.0427 0.0421 0.0418 0.0437 0.0470 0.0512 0.0491
786 Other 0.0367 0.0368 0.0338 0.0320 0.0304 0.0353 0.0382 0.0380
Gasto-Intestinal 0.1682 0.1493 0.1421 0.1327 0.1416 0.1545 0.1701 0.1781
530 Esophagus 0.0072 0.0077 0.0111 0.0152 0.0227 0.0293 0.0371 0.0464
536 Stomach 0.0367 0.0330 0.0311 0.0240 0.0259 0.0305 0.0307 0.0277
553 Hernia 0.0121 0.0116 0.0110 0.0110 0.0100 0.0099 0.0096 0.0107
575 Gallbladder 0.0027 0.0039 0.0035 0.0034 0.0031 0.0032 0.0044 0.0044
Genito-Urinary 0.1260 0.1174 0.1026 0.1024 0.1102 0.1160 0.1131 0.1123
586 Renal Failure 0.0013 0.0016 0.0012 0.0009 0.0012 0.0016 0.0021 0.0019
Pregnancy 0.0441 0.0445 0.0407 0.0429 0.0493 0.0510 0.0475 0.0507
V22 Normal Preg. 0.0243 0.0233 0.0224 0.0228 0.0261 0.0240 0.0232 0.0247
Skin 0.1313 0.1175 0.1140 0.1086 0.1131 0.1220 0.1278 0.1254
Musculo-Skeletal 0.1985 0.2028 0.1996 0.1932 0.1959 0.2125 0.2283 0.2298
716 Arthropathies 0.0506 0.0513 0.0506 0.0524 0.0543 0.0907 0.0644 0.0617
719 Joint Disorders 0.0323 0.0300 0.0315 0.0322 0.0316 0.0000 0.0389 0.0417
Peri-Natal 0.0017 0.0009 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009 0.0009
Injuries 0.1994 0.2029 0.1855 0.1729 0.1718 0.1813 0.1793 0.1835
722 Intervertebral 0.0100 0.0132 0.0135 0.0129 0.0136 0.0132 0.0168 0.0161
724 Back Disorder 0.0543 0.0603 0.0582 0.0548 0.0557 0.0595 0.0651 0.0664
820 Fractured Femur 0.0013 0.0014 0.0019 0.0019 0.0015 0.0015 0.0019 0.0017
959 Injury 0.0369 0.0422 0.0360 0.0349 0.0395 0.0357 0.0399 0.0382
Other 0.1844 0.1578 0.1379 0.1446 0.1586 0.1621 0.1468 0.1505
780 Gen. Symptoms 0.0744 0.0673 0.0605 0.0595 0.0633 0.0724 0.0759 0.0796
79
in prevalence rates for those conditions appears to be explained by outliers. The
prevalence rate of infectious diseases falls 10 points in the two years between 1996
and 1998, and then remains remarkably stable over the next six years. Similarly,
the prevalence rate for respiratory conditions falls 7 points over the same period and
then remains steady for the rest of the period. The sharp drop in infectious disease
prevalence appears to be explained by the concurrent drop in intestinal infection
prevalence. Almost all of the change in infectious diseases can be attributed to the
change in this one disease. The explanation for the sharp change in respiratory
conditions is less clear. None of the costly chronic conditions underwent a change
that would explain the overall prevalence rate change in respiratory conditions. The
drop in respiratory conditions appears to have occurred in less costly but more
prevalent respiratory conditions not listed. Nervous system conditions may be the
only major chapter disease type that experiences a steady decline in prevalence over
the period. The prevalence rate of nervous system conditions declines at a steady
two points per year from 1996 to 1999.
Although few conditions are declining in prevalence over the period, a number
of conditions experience prevalence increases. Circulatory conditions and endocrine
conditions experience the largest rate of increased prevalence, an approximate 4.5
point increase from 1996 to 2003. The two most costly endocrine conditions, Dia-
betes Mellitus and Disorders of Lipoid Metabolism (high cholesterol), both experi-
ence prevalence rate increases over the period. Lipoid disorders has the fastest rate
of increase of any condition considered, rising from 3.0% of the population in 1996 to
more than 8.0% of the population in 2003. Diabetes also increases over the period,
albeit not as quickly as Lipoid disorders. Diabetes aﬄicts 3.5% of the population in
1996 and increases to 5.0% of the population in 2003. Circulatory conditions expe-
rience a more uneven rise in prevalence rates than the endocrine conditions. A small
fraction of the population experiences any one of the acute circulatory conditions
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Table 3.3: Age Distribution
Age Group 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Age < 2 0.0288 0.0275 0.0272 0.0273 0.0283 0.0278 0.0257 0.0245
Age 2-6 0.0747 0.0753 0.0740 0.0742 0.0733 0.0695 0.0678 0.0678
Age 7-12 0.0890 0.0891 0.0893 0.0908 0.0875 0.0862 0.0867 0.0861
Age 13-18 0.0876 0.0869 0.0893 0.0849 0.0861 0.0870 0.0872 0.0873
Age 19-29 0.1523 0.1492 0.1468 0.1465 0.1462 0.1463 0.1477 0.1491
Age 30-39 0.1584 0.1567 0.1526 0.1519 0.1519 0.1461 0.1418 0.1379
Age 40-49 0.1500 0.1512 0.1515 0.1504 0.1511 0.1529 0.1532 0.1538
Age 50-64 0.1325 0.1381 0.1438 0.1485 0.1506 0.1581 0.1642 0.1670
Age 65-75 0.0694 0.0685 0.0673 0.0652 0.0668 0.0656 0.0646 0.0656
Age < 75 0.0572 0.0575 0.0581 0.0602 0.0582 0.0605 0.0612 0.0608
considered, such as acute myocardial infarction (heart attack), or CVA (stroke), and
the prevalence rate of these acute conditions remains stable throughout the period.
However, the increased prevalence of hypertension (high blood pressure) has been
dramatic, and its increase explains almost all of the increase in circulatory condition
prevalence. Hypertension prevalence has increased from 10% of the population in
1996 to over 14% of the population in 2003. Mental health conditions also experience
prevalence increases, although they are milder increases than either circulatory or
endocrine condition increases. The total increase in mental health condition preva-
lence is 3.5 points over the full period. The change in mental health prevalence is
largely due to the increasing prevalence of both neurotic and depressive disorders.
Many of the changes in prevalence rates of the population may be thought to
be associated with changes in the age distribution. Hypertension, lipoid disorders
and diabetes are conditions that typically affect individuals late in life. Even de-
pression may be thought to be more prevalent in the aged. In addition, the decrease
in Otitis Media, middle ear infections uncommon in adults but common in young
children, appears to explain much of the change in nervous system conditions. Table
3 presents changes in the age distribution of the population over this period. As can
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be seen, the fraction of the population in the oldest age groups has grown signifi-
cantly over the period. The age group that is 50 and older has grown from 25% of
the population in 1996 to 29% of the population in 2003. This demographic trend
is important in explaining the changes in the prevalence of hypertension, lipoid dis-
orders and diabetes that are concentrated in this age group. However, the changing
prevalence of otitis media does not appear to be due to changes in the age distrib-
ution of the population. The fraction of the population under 12 does fall over the
period, but the fall in the youngest demographic group occurs late in the period,
whereas the fall in otitis media prevalence occurs between 1996 and 1999.
3.2.3 Cost Per Person
The second step in understanding the rising costs of medical care is to gain an
understanding of treatment prices. A rough, but straightforward measure of resource
allocation is the per person cost of treatment. This measure provides an overview of
how economic resources are allocated among diseases, and provides a starting point
for an analysis of treatment costs in the economy. However, per person treatment
costs should not be thought of as treatment prices for they do not control for service
intensity, service type dynamics or patient characteristics.
Table 4 presents the per person treatment costs for many of the most costly
conditions in the United States. The per person costs are constructed by dividing
the weighted sum of expenditures spent treating a condition by the weighted sum
of people who report having the listed condition. All expenditures are reported in
2000 dollars discounted using the overall Consumer Price Urban (CPI-U) Index.
Changes in per person costs represent changes relative to the overall inflation rate
as measured by the CPI-U.
Immediately apparent from Table 4 is the degree of treatment cost hetero-
geneity between disease groups. For example, lung cancer costs nearly $10,000 per
82
Table 3.4: Cost Per Person
Disease Type 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Overall
Infectious 94 358 166 336 120 260 202 202 213
008 Intestinal 28 38 33 34 42 42 45 51 38
042 H.I.V. 3,219 5,192 3,548 6,088 2,280 6,902 6,951 8,417 5,562
079 Viral 140 100 94 150 126 112 217 171 140
Neoplasms 2,315 3,925 2,740 3,233 2,581 3,165 2,658 2,693 2,905
162 Trachea/Lung 11,263 6,007 11,297 10,807 11,643 8,310 8,582 9,962 9,740
174 Breast 2,633 4,478 3,211 1,722 3,051 5,250 3,827 3,858 3,543
239 Unspecified 1,083 2,273 1,249 1,372 1,223 1,132 1,467 1,813 1,456
Endocrine 291 873 348 638 200 477 302 331 423
250 Diabetes 819 864 716 835 909 1,239 1,081 1,070 957
272 Lipoid 462 403 389 434 400 471 457 551 457
Blood 972 7,342 1,413 4,191 632 2,871 1,354 1,650 2,450
Mental Health 462 389 483 562 329 343 400 297 403
296 Psychoses 1,823 1,768 1,394 940 1,222 2,632 1,489 1,239 1,562
300 Neurotic 426 398 503 426 401 382 422 411 418
311 Depressive 520 529 487 499 542 576 524 556 531
Nervous System 508 465 641 614 589 573 787 682 605
354 Mononeuritis 651 799 1,008 502 800 932 629 1,057 812
365 Glaucoma 407 422 506 483 381 482 551 647 489
366 Cataract 1,077 999 1,130 1,081 940 827 1,207 798 1,003
382 Otitis Media 134 138 179 146 170 160 176 186 159
Circulatory 1,436 1,394 1,536 1,307 1,311 1,160 1,097 1,220 1,296
401 Hypertension 393 378 391 464 428 472 489 511 446
410 A.M.I. 10,172 7,062 4,282 6,495 6,611 6,583 7,978 7,656 7,067
414 Ischemic 3,380 3,974 1,532 2,031 3,920 2,425 1,571 2,182 2,653
427 Dysrhythmia 2,103 920 1,306 920 1,023 1,390 1,339 971 1,226
428 Heart Fail. 2,782 2,314 3,813 4,785 2,524 3,476 2,156 1,879 2,909
429 Heart Dis. 1,435 1,629 1,248 1,362 1,374 1,431 1,712 1,239 1,429
436 C.V.A. 4,484 4,006 4,416 3,150 4,907 4,267 3,138 4,303 4,084
444 Arterial Emb. 4,071 2,769 4,795 4,570 4,751 3,809 2,731 2,490 3,629
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Cost per Person (cont.)
Disease Type 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Overall
Respiratory 261 240 327 312 274 244 327 241 277
473 Sinusitis 105 116 171 219 127 162 199 160 155
477 Allergy 168 175 219 216 222 258 272 253 228
486 Pneumonia 1,665 1,269 1,632 1,650 2,127 1,055 1,571 927 1,464
492 Emphysema 1,142 2,596 2,644 876 1,582 1,417 754 918 1,493
493 Asthma 427 350 298 425 399 501 504 536 436
786 Other 544 355 604 422 473 499 653 597 523
G.I. 522 502 851 753 614 602 668 555 627
530 Esophagus 598 655 619 545 434 549 635 714 607
536 Stomach 269 205 208 245 251 295 382 392 281
553 Hernia 1,030 973 764 1,050 777 1,592 1,067 1,209 1,056
575 Gallbladder 3,967 2,412 1,596 3,759 2,182 2,733 3,532 3,441 2,962
Gen.-Urinary 525 552 1,020 879 662 643 928 800 744
586 Renal Fail. 3,498 3,729 9,770 8,609 8,647 7,210 7,999 5,613 6,744
Pregnancy 4,058 2,436 4,176 3,787 3,016 2,951 2,956 2,988 3,260
V22 Preg. 5,832 3,750 4,872 4,630 4,829 5,470 4,730 5,450 4,959
Skin 201 233 791 783 357 255 487 281 414
Musc-Skel 578 597 852 578 529 548 680 671 631
716 Arthropathy 399 336 333 249 348 476 380 491 388
719 Joint Dis. 577 455 440 357 595 - 661 728 559
722 Intervert. 1,186 1,440 1,147 1,418 1,313 1,159 1,335 1,287 1,289
724 Back Dis. 441 275 279 341 359 392 401 489 375
Peri-Natal 9,643 38,084 203,342 33,767 38,460 6,510 64,737 18,057 37,363
Injuries 731 829 1,135 908 808 780 942 841 870
820 Frac. Femur 7,481 7,156 6,214 4,691 7,899 5,376 7,241 6,083 6,448
959 Injury 709 618 415 733 527 651 678 666 625
Other 1,268 1,755 2,456 1,837 1,662 1,685 2,203 1,957 1,830
780 Symptoms 295 218 294 312 274 367 441 383 329
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person per year, whereas intestinal infections are less than $40 per person per year.
Within chapter cost heterogeneity is nearly as important as the between chapter
cost heterogeneity. For instance, infectious diseases includes both the cheapest treat-
ment considered, intestinal infections, and one of most expensive disease treatments,
H.I.V..
Treatment costs per person have generally experienced an upward trend.
Twelve of the sixteen major chapter headings experience higher real per person
treatment costs in 2003 than in 1996. Two of the four chapter heading groups that
experienced a decline in per person costs over the full period are pregnancy and
respiratory conditions. Both of these conditions have seen real cost increases since
1997. Only circulatory and mental health conditions have experienced a steady
decline in real per person costs over the period.
Although real treatment costs have been rising over the period, the changes
have been typically mild, but the magnitude depends on the condition considered.
The ICD chapter with the largest per person cost increases are peri-natal condi-
tions, the least prevalent conditions considered, and infectious disease, the cheapest
condition considered. However, endocrine conditions, which are both expensive and
prevalent conditions, also experience significant increases in per person costs over
the period. Within chapter variance in per person disease costs are as important
as the between chapter cost differences. For instance, many of the acute circulatory
conditions, such as acute myocardial infarction (heart attack) and stroke, have per
person costs that remain flat or even decrease over the period. However, hyperten-
sion, which is also a circulatory condition, experiences a substantial increase in the
per person costs over the period.
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Table 3.5: Treatment Technology - Input Shares
Office Office Inpatient Out-
Disease Drugs Doctor Non-Dr /E.R. patient Other
Infectious Disease 0.301 0.245 0.029 0.341 0.057 0.028
008 Intestinal Infection 0.100 0.385 0.020 0.429 0.044 0.022
042 H.I.V. 0.425 0.079 0.017 0.297 0.061 0.121
079 Viral Infection NOS 0.048 0.240 0.018 0.673 0.011 0.010
Neoplasms 0.036 0.193 0.046 0.504 0.193 0.027
162 Trachea/Lung 0.014 0.111 0.044 0.609 0.120 0.102
173 Skin Neoplasm 0.006 0.589 0.017 0.154 0.172 0.061
174 Female Breast 0.082 0.214 0.058 0.275 0.344 0.026
239 Unspecified Neoplasm 0.014 0.198 0.035 0.535 0.163 0.056
Endocrine 0.65 0.111 0.026 0.157 0.047 0.009
250 Diabetes Mellitus 0.360 0.151 0.023 0.213 0.039 0.215
272 Lipoid Disorder 0.852 0.074 0.026 0.006 0.026 0.017
Blood Conditions 0.178 0.169 0.051 0.477 0.122 0.004
Mental Health 0.438 0.133 0.105 0.201 0.05 0.072
296 Affective Psychoses 0.331 0.139 0.093 0.316 0.053 0.067
300 Neurotic Disorders 0.455 0.157 0.083 0.185 0.012 0.108
311 Depressive Disorder 0.446 0.150 0.113 0.225 0.030 0.037
Nervous System 0.142 0.213 0.048 0.134 0.145 0.318
354 Mononeuritis Upper Limb 0.024 0.310 0.100 0.062 0.473 0.030
365 Glaucoma 0.399 0.353 0.022 0.022 0.082 0.122
366 Cataract 0.022 0.404 0.017 0.037 0.518 0.002
382 Otitis Media 0.117 0.503 0.024 0.156 0.138 0.061
Circulatory 0.236 0.071 0.015 0.608 0.056 0.014
401 Hypertension 0.635 0.152 0.018 0.108 0.023 0.064
410 Acute Myocardial Infarct 0.030 0.044 0.008 0.870 0.026 0.022
414 Ischemic Heart Disease 0.096 0.072 0.012 0.716 0.084 0.020
427 Cardiac Dysrhythmia 0.153 0.119 0.028 0.603 0.085 0.013
428 Heart Failure 0.073 0.048 0.005 0.768 0.045 0.062
429 Heart Disease 0.181 0.096 0.016 0.569 0.077 0.062
436 C.V.A. (stroke) 0.032 0.027 0.012 0.774 0.052 0.103
444 Arterial Embolism 0.040 0.051 0.011 0.824 0.056 0.018
All Conditions 0.159 0.149 0.047 0.406 0.093 0.146
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Treatment Technology (cont.)
Office Office Inpatient Out-
Disease Drugs Doctor Non-Dr /E.R. patient Other
Respiratory 0.410 0.355 0.035 0.078 0.122 0.000
473 Chronic Sinusitis 0.323 0.393 0.040 0.119 0.125 0.000
477 Allergic Rhinitis 0.609 0.215 0.131 0.022 0.022 0.000
486 Pneumonia 0.018 0.054 0.005 0.896 0.013 0.014
492 Emphysema 0.150 0.051 0.008 0.690 0.042 0.059
493 Asthma 0.445 0.141 0.020 0.339 0.025 0.029
786 Other Respiratory 0.043 0.114 0.017 0.728 0.094 0.004
Gastro-Intestinal 0.249 0.091 0.012 0.508 0.137 0.004
530 Diseases Of Esophagus 0.673 0.081 0.008 0.136 0.101 0.001
536 Stomach Function 0.387 0.111 0.020 0.360 0.115 0.008
553 Abdominal Hernia 0.146 0.114 0.009 0.422 0.302 0.007
575 Gallbladder Disorder 0.007 0.068 0.007 0.745 0.171 0.002
Genito-Urinary 0.155 0.2 0.068 0.348 0.228 0.002
586 Renal Failure 0.022 0.202 0.194 0.288 0.291 0.002
Pregnancy 0.03 0.105 0.019 0.819 0.025 0.002
V22 Normal Pregnancy 0.003 0.111 0.018 0.844 0.022 0.002
Skin Conditions 0.254 0.313 0.042 0.261 0.111 0.019
Musculo-Skeletal 0.182 0.193 0.12 0.324 0.146 0.036
716 Arthropathies NOS 0.337 0.186 0.055 0.273 0.086 0.062
719 Joint Disorder NOS 0.049 0.179 0.097 0.434 0.202 0.040
722 Intervertebral Disc 0.069 0.184 0.144 0.440 0.152 0.011
724 Back Disorder NOS 0.090 0.247 0.226 0.308 0.123 0.005
Peri-natal 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.963 0.008 0.009
Injury 0.031 0.171 0.077 0.542 0.131 0.049
820 Fractured Femur 0.004 0.020 0.003 0.877 0.006 0.090
959 Injury NOS 0.029 0.213 0.128 0.488 0.133 0.010
Other 0.062 0.039 0.015 0.08 0.03 0.774
780 General Symptoms 0.172 0.108 0.027 0.586 0.081 0.027
All Conditions 0.159 0.149 0.047 0.406 0.093 0.146
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3.2.4 Disease Treatment Technology
How input services are used to treat conditions helps determine the role of technology
in explaining medical care costs. Disease treatment employs a heterogeneous bundle
of medical care services such as drugs, office visits, hospital stays, and durable and
non-durable supplies to treat conditions. Table 5 presents an overview of the input
services employed to treat the most costly diseases in the United States. As can
be seen from Table 5, approximately half of all medical care expenditures occur in
the hospital as either E.R., inpatient, or outpatient care. Drugs and office-based
physician care represent 16% and 15% of total expenditures, respectively, which are
the largest expenditure shares other than hospital. Other services such as durable
and non-durable supplies, dental care, and home health care together represent
approximately 15% of total medical care spending, but that spending is highly
concentrated in nervous system conditions and other diseases. Non-doctor visits
represent the smallest fraction of total medical care expenditures.
The relative intensity of input services varies significantly across diseases.
For instance, more than 65% of endocrine treatment expenditures are on drugs,
whereas no other chapter spends more than 45% of treatment expenditures on
drugs. Pregnancy and peri-natal conditions each spend more than 80% of treat-
ment expenditures on inpatient and E.R. services. Only 60% of circulatory care
spending is represented by inpatient and E.R care despite the fact that circulatory
care is the second most hospital intensive chapter. Input service intensity hetero-
geneity exists within chapters, as well. Hypertension is a drug intensive treatment
that spends 80% of its total treatment expenditures on drugs. However, none of
the other circulatory conditions considered spend more than 30% of total spending
on drugs. Mental health spending also experiences within chapter variance in ser-
vice intensity. Depressive and neurotic disorders are drug intensive treatments that
spend more than 50% of total treatment expenditures on drugs, whereas psychoses
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treatment spends less than 40% of total treatment expenditures on drugs.
The service intensity is difficult to predict, but is disease specific. For in-
stance, observable characteristics of the disease, such as the per person cost or the
disease prevalence, do not help determine the service intensity of the condition. One
might believe that expensive conditions are hospital intensive. However, intestinal
infections, the cheapest condition considered, is a relatively hospital intensive condi-
tion. Moreover, H.I.V. treatment, one of the most expensive conditions, is not very
hospital intensive. One might assume that prevalent conditions are treated out-
side of the hospital. However, arthropathies (arthritis) and emphysema are fairly
prevalent hospital intensive conditions.
3.3 Treatment Prices - A Disease Comparison
Disease treatment prices are constructed using the procedure described in Section
2 in order to control for service intensity, service type dynamics, and patient char-
acteristics. This procedure implicitly uses index theory to construct a commodity
aggregate for the price of a disease treatment. The commodities are medical care
service inputs that are used in the treatment of a disease. The price of each medical
care input service is constructed by controlling for the types of activities that occur
during an event, demographic characteristics of the individual, and the insurance
type that paid for the event. Service intensity is identified by constructing the share
of expenditures spent on a specific service that is used in the treatment of a disease.
As section 3 has demonstrated, diseases vary dramatically in per person costs
and the technologies used to treat them. These differences persist within aggregate
categories of related diseases as defined by the ICD system. In order to account
for these types of heterogeneity in the construction of disease prices the diseases
are defined as narrowly as possible. The most specific definitions available on the
MEPS are 3-digit ICD-9 codes. The 3-digit conditions considered are chosen from
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each of the chapter headings. The chosen diseases are often either the most costly
or most prevalent condition within each of the ICD-9 chapter headings.
3.3.1 Naive Estimates
Table 6 presents a summary of the treatment price increases for several diseases.
The results in Table 6 assume that treatment outcomes have not changed at all over
the period. Presented along the rows are the average annual price changes over the
period for each of the regions. For example, stomach infections in the Northeast
have undergone a 33.6% increase that is equivalent to a 4.2% per year price increase
averaged over the period 1996 to 2003.
Information concerning the total costs of the disease considered is also listed
among the results presented in Table 6. This information includes the cost per
person of the disease in 2000 dollars, the percent of total spending represented by
this disease as a fraction of total ICD-9 chapter spending, and the annual average
total costs of the disease in billions of dollars deflated to the year 2000. For example,
stomach infections cost $1.29 billion per year, which is approximately $38 per person,
and represents slightly more than 15% of total spending on infectious diseases. The
percent of total spending represented by the disease considered is presented in order
to provide a measure for how representative the disease is in each chapter.
Table 6 demonstrates that the rate of price increases are also very hetero-
geneous across diseases. For example, consider three costly conditions: pregnancy,
diabetes, and hypertension. These three conditions face vastly different price condi-
tions. The rates of increase vary across diseases and the regions face different price
increases across diseases. For example, diabetes faces the highest price increases
in the Midwest, but hypertension has the highest rate of increase in the West and
pregnancy faces the fastest rate of increase in the Northeast.
The most costly diseases have neither the lowest nor the highest rates of
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Table 3.6: Summary of Disease Treatment Prices
Stomach Skin Depr- Otitis Hyper-
Variable Infections Cancer Diabetes ession Media tension
Chapter Infectious Neoplasms Endocrine Mental Nervous Circul-
Disease System Health system atory
Northeast Increase 0.0425 0.0782 0.0396 0.0316 0.0904 0.0378
Midwest Increase 0.0583 0.0543 0.0567 0.0437 0.0659 0.0390
Southeast Increase 0.0473 0.0537 0.0503 0.0371 0.0508 0.0392
West Increase 0.0446 0.0429 0.0521 0.0477 0.0451 0.0411
Non-MSA Increase 0.0407 0.0352 0.0398 0.0339 0.0414 0.0257
Annual Costs
(billions) 1.29 1.45 17.63 10.49 2.42 18.63
Cost per Person 38 957 531 159 446
% of Chapter 0.1531 0.0397 0.7478 0.3725 0.0650 0.2396
Heart Stomach Preg-
Variable AMI Disease Asthma Disorder nancy Arthritis
Chapter Circu- Circu- Respir- Gastro- Pregnancy Musculo-
latory latory atory Intestinal skeletal
Northeast Increase 0.0596 0.0642 0.0459 0.0402 0.0552 0.0423
Midwest Increase 0.0473 0.0419 0.0460 0.0250 0.0454 0.0408
Southeast Increase 0.0582 0.0458 0.0468 0.0384 0.0461 0.0378
West Increase 0.0605 0.0460 0.0437 0.0309 0.0448 0.0429
Non-MSA Increase 0.0271 0.0279 0.0440 0.0279 0.0235 0.0247
Annual Costs
(billions) 11.98 11.59 6.09 2.61 34.14 7.67
Cost per Person 7,067 1,429 436 281 4,959 388
% of Chapter 0.1540 0.1491 0.1643 0.0848 0.8859 0.1967
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change over the period. Rather, Otitis Media faces the highest rate of price in-
crease and stomach disorder treatment experiences some of the lowest price in-
creases. Treatment prices for Otitis Media increase at a rate faster than 6.5% per
year for two regions - the Northeast and the Midwest. No other conditions face
rates of increase of at least 6.5% per year in more than one region. Moreover, Otitis
Media prices in the Northeast increase at a rate of 9% per year which is 1.2% per
year faster than the next highest rate of increase - skin cancer in the Northeast.
In contrast, Stomach disorders do not experience price increases greater than 4%
per year. Stomach disorder treatment prices in the Midwest face price increases as
low as 2.5% per year. However, 2.5% per year is not the slowest rate of increase
observed. Pregnancy services in the non-MSA region experiences a rate of increase
less than 2.4% per year.
Overall, regional price differences and the magnitude of price increases de-
pend on the disease, but some patterns appear. The Northeast appears to face some
of the highest price increases for several conditions. The Northeast region has the
highest or second-highest rate of increase for eight of the fourteen conditions con-
sidered, which is greater than any other region. On the other hand, the non-MSA
region never has the highest rate of increase and has the lowest rate of increase for
nine of the fourteen conditions considered.
3.3.2 Accounting for Health Outcomes
Although the treatment prices presented in Table 6 account for heterogeneity in the
types of services used to treat disease, they fail to account for whether changes in
services are yielding different health outcomes over time. Failing to account for these
changes implicitly ignores quality improvements of these services over time. The
observed technological changes may be advancing the health of society, and an index
of disease treatments should account for these health improvements. Accounting
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for health improvements requires health outcome measures of each of the diseases
considered.
Table 7 provides aggregate health outcome trends for several of the diseases
considered. Under some (admittedly strong) assumptions, the association of the out-
come measure with the disease whose treatment we consider suggests that changes
in these measures over time identify the productivity of medical treatment.3 Simply
stated, these measures represent medical care output.
The outcome measures considered are disease specific. For six conditions
that include stomach infections, skin cancer, diabetes, acute myocardial infarction
(heart attacks), heart disease, and hypertension we consider the age-adjusted mor-
tality. The description for how the age-adjustment was performed for mortality is
described in Section 2. Similarly, the age-adjusted suicide and infant mortality rates
are used to evaluate depression and pregnancy, respectively. For all of the condi-
tions considered here, mortality statistics are taken from vital statistics records and
published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2005).
Asthma and arthritis use slightly different health measures. For asthma
we use the percent of adults who experience an asthma attack within the past
twelve months among self-reported asthmatics. Reported results are calculated and
tabulated by the CDC (2005) from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey
(BRFSS) over the period 1996-2002. For arthritis, the health measure is constructed
by the author from the MEPS. The reported measure is the probability that an
individual’s mobility will increase within the year conditional on initial health and
demographic characteristics such as age, sex, race, income and insurance status.
Initial health is measured as whether an individual had any activity limitation prior
to the initiation of arthritis treatment within the year. Mobility is measured as
whether the individual walks a mile, walks up stairs, bends down, or grabs a pen
3see Heidenreich and McClellan (2001) for a discussion of this issue especially with respect to
heart attacks.
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Table 3.7: Health Outcomes
Disease 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Age-adjusted Mortality Per 100,000
Stomach Infections - - - 0.37 0.45 0.51 0.77 -
Skin Cancer - - - 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 -
Diabetes 23.8 23.7 24.2 25.0 25.0 25.3 25.4 25.3
Depression (Suicide) 11.5 11.2 11.1 10.5 10.4 10.7 10.9 10.8
A.M.I. - - 71.8 69.2 67.1 63.9 60.5 -
Heart Disease 212.1 203.6 196.9 194.6 186.8 177.8 170.8 162.9
Hypertension - - - 14.74 15.41 16.03 16.62 -
Pregnancy (Infant 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.9 6.8 7.0 -
Mortality)
Asthma Attack within Last Year
Asthma 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.3 -
Probability of Mobility Deterioration for Arthritics
Arthritis 0.335 0.379 0.372 0.351 0.397 0.371 0.369 0.393
with difficulty. Mobility changes are measured as changes in the mobility status
from the earliest wave in the year to the latest wave in the year.
Of the conditions that use mortality as the health outcome measure, stomach
infections are the least deadly of all the conditions. Less than one person per 100,000
dies as a result of contracting a stomach infection. However, since 1999 the rate of
mortality rate of this condition has more than doubled from .37 in 1999 to .77 in
2002. Hypertension has a much higher mortality rate than do stomach infections,
but experiences a similar trend rising from 14.74 to 16.62 per 100,000.
In contrast to stomach conditions, heart disease is clearly the most fatal
disease of the conditions considered. The age adjusted mortality of heart disease is
always more than 150 per 100,000. However, the mortality rate from this disease
has fallen dramatically over the period from 212 per 100,000 in 1996 to 163 in 2003.
Moreover, the mortality rate of this disease has not experienced a single year of
increase over this period. Acute Myocardial Infarctions have also seen significant
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decreases in mortality, falling from 71.8 per 100,000 in 1998 to 60.5 per 100,000 in
2002.
The suicide rate, a health outcome used to measure the efficacy of depression
treatment, fell over the period 1996-2000 from 11.5 to 10.4. However, since 2000
the suicide rate has increased, if only slightly, from 10.4 to 10.8 per 100,000. The
other health conditions examined have very flat trends over the period. Diabetes
experiences a mild mortality rate increase over the period, whereas infant mortality
falls slightly and skin cancer mortality remains exactly the same. The number of
asthma attacks and the percent of people gaining mobility for arthritis also have
not changed much over the period.
The values presented in Table 8 represent the average annual percentage
change in treatment prices over the period. Price changes labelled as outcome in-
corporate changes in health outcome measures, whereas price changes labelled naive
do not account for health outcomes. Both the naive and the outcome-based mea-
sures are determined relative to the earliest period for which the outcome measure
is available. For instance, if the outcome-based measure is the age-adjusted mor-
tality, then the price increase is defined as the percent increase of treatment prices
needed to maintain the same level of age-adjusted mortality observed in the earli-
est period - often the year 1996. The outcome-based measures are constructed by
first determining the ratio of age-adjusted mortality rates in the given year to the
age-adjusted mortality rate of the earliest year observed. For example, this ratio
for diabetes mortality is 1.063 in 2003. This ratio is then multiplied by the naive
price for the relevant year. The reported changes are the percentage change of this
product over the period where outcomes are observed.
The importance of health outcomes are very important for determining the
price of disease. For instance, some diseases, such as heart disease and acute my-
ocardial infarction, have had improved health outcomes over the period, which has
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Table 3.8: Price Increases for Outcome-Based Measures
Dep- Heart
Region Statistic Diabetes ression Disease Arthritis Asthma
MSA Northeast Naive 0.039 0.032 0.064 0.042 0.046
Outcome 0.050 0.022 0.020 0.071 0.018
MSA Midwest Naive 0.057 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.046
Outcome 0.068 0.033 0.003 0.068 0.022
MSA Southeast Naive 0.050 0.037 0.046 0.037 0.047
Outcome 0.061 0.027 0.006 0.065 0.023
MSA West Naive 0.052 0.048 0.046 0.043 0.044
Outcome 0.063 0.037 0.006 0.072 0.018
Non-MSA Naive 0.049 0.042 0.037 0.033 0.056
Outcome 0.060 0.032 -0.001 0.060 0.029
Hyper- Skin Preg-
Region Statistic AMI tension Infection Cancer nancy
MSA Northeast Naive 0.042 0.030 0.013 0.066 0.055
Outcome 0.004 0.066 0.297 0.066 0.029
MSA Midwest Naive 0.063 0.044 0.082 0.111 0.045
Outcome 0.021 0.082 0.440 0.111 0.016
MSA Southeast Naive 0.069 0.052 0.094 0.113 0.046
Outcome 0.026 0.090 0.467 0.113 0.037
MSA West Naive 0.050 0.018 0.055 0.049 0.045
Outcome 0.010 0.053 0.386 0.049 0.026
Non-MSA Naive 0.050 0.032 0.071 0.058 0.029
Outcome 0.011 0.068 0.418 0.058 0.024
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mitigated much of the treatment price increases observed over the period. However,
other conditions such as hypertension and arthritis have had deteriorating outcomes
over the period, and thus accounting for health outcomes has exacerbated any price
increases in those treatments. The importance of health outcomes is so severe that
it can reverse the ranking of diseases. For instance, heart disease as measured by the
naive estimate faces faster price increases in the Northeast than any other disease.
However, after accounting for health outcomes, heart disease treatment is second
only to AMI as having one of the lowest rates of increase.
The price changes calculated using this method attributes the entire change
in observed health outcomes to the quality of medical care services over time. At-
tributing the entire fraction of observed changes to medical care productivity relies
on strong assumptions about the demographic and behavioral compositional changes
of society. For these results to be attributed to medical care, changes in diet, smok-
ing habits, and environmental factors such as the safety of working environments
must also not have changed.
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3.4 Treatment Prices - Dynamic & Regional Analysis
The following sections examine the price levels and price increases for each of the
twelve conditions considered. The analysis evaluates whether certain regions have
higher price levels than other regions of the country and whether the price increases
found in the previous section are uniform over the period. These sections also offer
some insight as to why the observed price changes occur by examining the dynamics
of medical care technology for each disease. All results are presented under the
assumption that outcomes remain constant over the period.
3.4.1 Chapter 1: Infectious Disease
Infectious diseases include communicable or transmissible diseases as well as a few
diseases of unknown but possibly infectious origin. Infectious diseases include most
amoebic, parasitic, bacterial, protozoal, and viral infections, but exclude influenza,
acute respiratory infections, and certain localized infections. Intestinal infections are
infections found in the stomach that are not due to other specific parasitic, bacterial,
viral or other type organism elsewhere listed. Although intestinal infections are
fairly cheap to treat, the prevalence of the condition is responsible for it being the
most costly infectious disease in the United States. Intestinal infections represent
the most prevalent infectious disease considered, and they consequently represent
more than 15% of infectious disease spending. Although the prevalence of these
conditions has fallen off since 1996, the prevalence rate has remained stable since
1998.
The treatment of stomach infections is surprisingly hospital intensive. More-
over, the share of hospital spending that includes outpatient, inpatient, and emer-
gency room services, has increased over the period from 35.7% of spending to more
than 43% of spending. Much of this increase has occurred since 2000. Drugs and
physician office visits make up the bulk of the other spending on this treatment, each
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Table 3.9: Stomach Infection Treatment Shares
Anti- G.I. Other Inpatient/ Out- Doctor Non-Doctor
Year Infective Agent Hormones Rx ER patient Office Office
1996 0.086 0.006 0.155 0.032 0.292 0.066 0.348 0.015
1997 0.047 0.010 0.085 0.038 0.540 0.013 0.253 0.014
1998 0.043 0.022 0.106 0.036 0.276 0.088 0.414 0.015
1999 0.091 0.013 0.158 0.047 0.293 0.011 0.368 0.018
2000 0.056 0.010 0.187 0.036 0.323 0.060 0.315 0.012
2001 0.060 0.022 0.177 0.029 0.410 0.012 0.276 0.015
2002 0.067 0.024 0.151 0.043 0.313 0.042 0.329 0.032
2003 0.047 0.020 0.145 0.050 0.410 0.023 0.290 0.014
Table 3.10: Stomach Infection Treatment Prices
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 0.994 0.956 0.983 0.927
1997 0.973 1.042 0.993 1.111 0.958
1998 1.078 1.053 1.028 1.099 0.942
1999 1.316 1.135 1.048 1.157 1.058
2000 1.101 1.137 1.121 1.169 1.062
2001 1.176 1.271 1.205 1.308 1.141
2002 1.259 1.368 1.313 1.285 1.235
2003 1.341 1.459 1.318 1.335 1.310
representing more than 25% of spending. The make-up of this spending does not
appear to have changed systematically over the period. The share of anti-infective
medications fell in half from 1996 to 1997, but has remained stable since 1997. G.I.
agents have grown from less than 0.5% of spending to slightly more than 2% of
spending.
Treatment prices for infectious disease treatment have risen by between 4.3%
and 5.8% per year. The Midwest experienced the highest rate of increase of any
region, whereas the Northeast region, faces the lowest price increases in the country.
These two regions, the Midwest and the Northeast, have some of the highest price
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levels in the country despite having such different rates of increase. The Northeast
and the Midwest regions both begin and end the period with the highest price levels
in the country, swapping places over the period. The non-MSA region, in contrast,
has the lowest price levels of any region, beginning and ending the period with the
lowest price levels of any region.
The price increases have been uneven over the period. Four of the five regions
experience rates of increase that are higher after 2000 than they are prior to 2000.
The rate of increase is twice is fast in the later part of the period than it is in the
earlier part of the period for the Northeast and the Midwest, regions that experience
some of the highest price levels in the country.
3.4.2 Chapter 2: Neoplasms
The ICD chapter, neoplasms, are the group of conditions that include what are
commonly referred to as cancers. Neoplasms are new and abnormal growths of
tissue that serve no life sustenance or procreation purpose. Some neoplasms become
progressively worse and may metastasize by spreading to other organs. Neoplasms
that become worse are referred to as malignant. Those neoplasms that are unlikely
to become worse or metastasize are generally regarded as benign.
The general idea behind neoplasm treatment is to remove the neoplasm,
whether it is benign or malignant. If a neoplasm becomes worse it is defined as
cancerous and can be quickly fatal. The severity of cancer depends upon, among
other things, the location of the growth. In particular, the severity depends upon
the importance of the tissue containing the cancer. Therefore, neoplasms are iden-
tified using whether the growth is either benign or malignant and the location of
the growth such as the lung, the breast, the prostrate or the skin. Removal of a
neoplasm can involve drugs, radiation, intravenous chemicals, and/or surgery. The
removal process may involve destroying healthy tissue as well as cancerous tissue.
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Moreover, the process may involve the removal of an organ vital for life sustenance
such as a lung or the liver. The seriousness of these diseases and the nature of
the treatment result in rather discrete consequences. The treatment either works
and the individual is cured, or the treatment fails, and the person dies. It is rare,
although not impossible, for an individual to contract a neoplasm and have the pa-
tient live on indefinitely contracting new neoplasms that are constantly treated one
after the other.
Neoplasms as a class are relatively common and represent a large fraction
of total medical care expenditures and deaths. However, the nature of treatment
and health outcomes suggests that individuals who had neoplasms in the past are
unlikely to continue treatment in the sample period. Therefore, a very small fraction
of the population receives treatment for a specific type of neoplasm located in a
specific tissue during any year of the sample. Unfortunately, treatment protocols
vary significantly across tissue types considered. These characteristics make using
the MEPS to price one of the representative diseases difficult, because pricing a single
three-digit ICD-9 code provides very small sample sizes, but aggregating neoplasms
treats unlike treatments as if they were the same. For these reasons, we choose to
price the most prevalent type of neoplasm, skin cancer, although treatment costs
for skin neoplasms are a small fraction of total neoplasm spending and both breast
and prostate cancers are more prevalent among their relevant populations. 4
Skin cancer treatment is an office visit intensive treatment. More than half
of expenditures are associated with physician visits. More than half of the expen-
ditures on office visits involve surgical procedures. Hospital expenditures represent
approximately 30% of total expenditures on skin cancer, also a large fraction of to-
tal expenditures. The dynamics of these inputs have not undergone any systematic
4The prevalence rate of prostate cancer is zero among women because they do not have a prostate,
and breast cancer is very uncommon among men. Hence, skin cancer is the most prevalent cancer
for the population as a whole.
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Table 3.11: Skin Cancer Input Shares
Dr Office Non-Surgery Non-Dr
Year IP/ER Outpatient Surgery Dr. Office Office Rx
1996 0.249 0.143 0.323 0.246 0.003 0.036
1997 0.018 0.257 0.344 0.304 0.010 0.067
1998 0.076 0.427 0.205 0.229 0.032 0.031
1999 0.144 0.225 0.291 0.244 0.038 0.058
2000 0.028 0.177 0.283 0.368 0.082 0.062
2001 0.105 0.153 0.405 0.238 0.043 0.056
2002 0.189 0.177 0.263 0.292 0.023 0.057
2003 0.063 0.163 0.280 0.405 0.028 0.061
Table 3.12: Skin Cancer Treatment Prices
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 1.240 1.244 1.226 1.240
1997 1.176 1.293 1.221 1.305 1.276
1998 1.219 1.344 1.389 1.386 1.422
1999 1.363 1.379 1.274 1.445 1.441
2000 1.415 1.399 1.544 1.639 1.440
2001 1.545 1.539 1.505 1.685 1.571
2002 1.515 1.749 1.626 1.517 1.560
2003 1.626 1.781 1.779 1.648 1.735
change over the period. Inpatient care has fallen as a share of expenditures while of-
fice visits and in particular surgical office visits have risen as a share of expenditures
from 1996 to 2003. However, these changes do not appear to point to a pattern, as
the changes over time have been erratic.
The treatment prices of skin cancer treatment have undergone high rates of
price increase that have varied significantly across regions. The Northeast region
has seen the highest rate of price increase at 7.8% per year, while the West region
has seen a much lower rate of increase of 4.3% per year that is nearly of half that
experienced in the Northeast. Much the increase in the Northeast region occurred
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in the one year between 1996 and 1997. Since 1997, however, the Southeast has seen
the highest rate of increase at over 6.5% per year, but the Northeast still has the
second highest rate of increase of any region at 5.5% per year.
Price levels also vary significantly across regions. The Midwest has one of
the highest price levels in the country, ending the period with the highest price level
and beginning the period with a price level second only to the Southeast. However,
the West also has high price levels, and has higher price levels than the Midwest in
five of the eight years considered. The Northeast, despite its high rate of increase,
experiences some of the lowest price levels in the country. They begin and end the
period with the lowest price level.
3.4.3 Chapter 3: Endocrine Conditions
The ICD chapter listed here as ”Endocrine conditions” includes nutritional, metabolic,
endocrine and metabolic disorders that are not due to neoplasms. The endocrine sys-
tem is characterized as a system of glandular organs. The organs that comprise the
endocrine system include the pancreas, hypothalamus, pituitary, thyroid, parathy-
roids, pineal body, adrenal glands, and reproductive glands, which are either ovaries
or testes depending on the sex of the individual. The endocrine system’s primary
function is the secretion of hormones into the bloodstream which are then used by
cells in the body to help maintain and regulate body functions. The type of body
functions maintained and regulated depend on the hormones considered. Disorders
of these conditions can be related to the cellular response to these hormones or the
ability of the glands to produce or regulate the secretion of these hormones.
Diabetes is a disease in which the body does not produce or properly use
insulin, which is a hormone needed to convert sugar, starches and other food into
energy. The pancreas is the organ primarily responsible for the production of insulin.
Diabetes has serious health consequences. Since diabetics have trouble converting
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Table 3.13: Diabetes Treatment Shares
Out- Dr Non-Dr
Year ER Inpatient patient Office Office
1996 0.008 0.331 0.129 0.206 0.034
1997 0.015 0.327 0.066 0.211 0.037
1998 0.012 0.285 0.056 0.272 0.046
1999 0.011 0.235 0.033 0.244 0.027
2000 0.008 0.217 0.059 0.239 0.025
2001 0.025 0.318 0.056 0.206 0.018
2002 0.005 0.233 0.036 0.224 0.054
2003 0.012 0.225 0.033 0.211 0.036
Anti- Cardio- Hor- Anti-
Year Lipid vascular mones Diabetic
1996 0.050 0.028 0.013 0.201
1997 0.070 0.021 0.020 0.233
1998 0.082 0.020 0.023 0.203
1999 0.105 0.027 0.019 0.299
2000 0.104 0.029 0.021 0.297
2001 0.111 0.025 0.017 0.225
2002 0.134 0.034 0.020 0.259
2003 0.165 0.035 0.016 0.267
sugars and starches to energy, diabetics can often have blood sugar levels that are
too high. The high blood sugar levels in turn contribute to kidney disease, blindness,
nervous system disorders, increased blood pressure, the possible loss of extremities,
and eventually death.
Diabetes is an expensive condition on a per person basis, costing approxi-
mately $1,000 per year, and is highly prevalent. Diabetes is easily the most costly
endocrine condition to treat in the United States, representing nearly 75% of all en-
docrine condition spending. Moreover, diabetes is becoming increasingly prevalent
over time. The rate of increase of diabetes prevalence is among the fastest in the
United States, making diabetes one of the most important diseases to consider.
The technology used to treat diabetes employs a diverse set of services.
104
Table 3.14: Diabetes Treatment Prices
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 0.948 0.930 0.941 0.894
1997 0.902 0.949 0.932 1.015 0.896
1998 1.023 1.009 0.967 1.036 0.961
1999 1.113 1.061 1.015 1.119 0.989
2000 1.147 1.102 1.075 1.136 1.075
2001 1.164 1.227 1.143 1.260 1.138
2002 1.221 1.272 1.237 1.251 1.197
2003 1.315 1.377 1.303 1.332 1.245
Drugs, hospital care, and office-based physician care each represent at least 20%
of treatment expenditures in any given year. However, the treatment technology
has changed dramatically over the period. Hospital care has fallen from 47% of
expenditures in 1996 to 27% of expenditures in 2003, while drug expenditures have
risen from 29% of expenditures in 1996 to 48% of expenditures in 2003. Much of
the fall in hospital care share has been due to the smaller share of inpatient and
outpatient care. Inpatient care has fallen from more than 33% of total expenditures
to less than 23% of expenditures, which is more than a 11 point change. The share
of outpatient care has been more uneven but nearly as dramatic. The share of out-
patient was nearly cut in half between 1996 and 1997 falling from 12.9% to 6.6%,
and since 1997 the share of outpatient care was cut in half again from 6.6% to 3.3%.
Taking the place of hospital care has been the employment of cardiovascular,
anti-lipid, and new anti-diabetic medications. Anti-lipid medications have expe-
rienced the largest share increase of any service rising from approximately 5% of
medical care in 1996 to 17% of medical care in 2003. The share changes of other
services have not been as steady as anti-lipid medications. However, 1999 witnessed
the introduction of two new anti-diabetic medications, Rosiglitazone and Pioglita-
zone, and the shares of total spending represented by anti-diabetic drugs reflect
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this introduction. 1999 and 2000 represent the largest share of diabetes treatment
spending on anti-diabetic medications. The shares have decreased since their peak,
however, and they finish the period at 26.7% of total spending. Cardiovascular
medications have undergone milder increases than both anti-diabetic and anti-lipid
medications, rising only 1 point over the period.
Diabetes treatment prices have risen by between 4 and 5.7 percent per year
over the period. The variation in both the regional price levels and the inflation
rates is fairly small. The West experiences the highest average price level over the
period, although they neither start nor end the period with the highest price level.
The Non-MSA region has the lowest price level, beginning and ending the period
with the lowest price level. The Midwest has experienced the highest rate of inflation
of any region at nearly 5.7% per year.
3.4.4 Chapter 5: Mental Health Conditions
Mental disorders include a vast array of conditions associated with brain functioning.
The conditions typically reveal themselves in the individual’s ability to function
socially. The most obvious mental health conditions include schizophrenia, mental
retardation and conditions with demonstrable cerebral disease, brain injury, or other
cerebral dysfunctions. Schizophrenia is the mental health condition most closely
associated with insanity, where the patient claims to see visions and hear voices that
are not there, and experiences a high degree of general confusion. Mental retardation
conditions are characterized by arrested or incomplete development of the mind,
that leads to impairment of skills that contribute to the overall level of intelligence,
and cognitive, language, motor, and social abilities. Mental health conditions also
include substance abuse and mood disorders. Substance abuse conditions are all
attributable to the use of one or more psychoactive substances, which may or may
not have been medically prescribed. Mood disorders affect mood changes which are
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either sudden or persistent. Systematic mood changes are usually accompanied by
changes in the overall level of activity of an individual. The onset of mood changes
can often be related to stressful events or situations and tend to be recurrent.
We examine the treatment price of depressive disorders. If a patient suffers
from depressive disorders they will have depressive episodes that exhibit lowering
of mood, reduction of energy, and decrease in activity. These episodes affect the
capacity for enjoyment, interest, reduce concentration, and are commonly associated
with marked tiredness. Depressives often have sleep that is disturbed, appetite
that is diminished, and self-esteem and self-confidence that are reduced. Finally,
depressives may have some ideas of guilt or worthlessness that are often present.
The lowered mood of a depressed individual varies little from day to day, and is
unresponsive to circumstances. Depressive disorders may be accompanied by waking
up in the middle of the night, slower reflexes, agitation, loss of appetite, weight loss,
and loss of libido.
In addition to these serious health consequences, depression treatment is the
costliest mental health condition and one of the costliest conditions in the United
States. Depression represents nearly one third of total mental health costs. Depres-
sion is the most prevalent mental health condition, and one of the most prevalent
chronic conditions in the United States aﬄicting between 5-7% of the population,
annually. Moreover, the rate of increase in prevalence has been among the fastest
of any condition in the United States.
The treatment of depression is fairly drug and hospital intensive. Drugs and
inpatient care together represent nearly 70% of all expenditures. Drugs alone repre-
sent 44% of nominal depression treatment expenditures. The treatment technology
has been changing over time. Depression treatment is becoming more drug intensive
and less hospital intensive over time. Inpatient care has fallen from 38% of expen-
ditures in 1996 to 13% of expenditures in 2003. Meanwhile, drugs have increased
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Table 3.15: Depression Input Shares
Year IP/ER Out- Doctor Non-Dr CNS Anti- Other
Year IP/ER patient Office Office Agents Depress Psych
1996 0.383 0.028 0.182 0.112 0.024 0.243 0.029
1997 0.379 0.041 0.139 0.108 0.025 0.266 0.040
1998 0.310 0.054 0.132 0.105 0.032 0.306 0.062
1999 0.410 0.009 0.128 0.100 0.026 0.270 0.057
2000 0.190 0.013 0.163 0.129 0.053 0.355 0.097
2001 0.230 0.026 0.161 0.121 0.048 0.354 0.060
2002 0.175 0.028 0.201 0.103 0.056 0.367 0.070
2003 0.126 0.051 0.172 0.120 0.066 0.387 0.079
Table 3.16: Depression Treatment Prices
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 0.928 0.921 0.908 0.876
1997 0.941 0.997 0.955 0.981 0.881
1998 1.000 0.975 0.973 0.968 0.911
1999 1.114 1.066 0.986 1.081 0.999
2000 1.111 1.056 1.018 1.106 1.107
2001 1.136 1.150 1.100 1.171 1.069
2002 1.131 1.183 1.142 1.170 1.118
2003 1.252 1.253 1.193 1.255 1.171
as a share of expenditures from less than 30% of expenditures in 1996 to more than
half of expenditures by 2003.
All three categories of drugs have seen increasing expenditure shares over this
period. The share of expenditures represented by Central Nervous System (CNS)
agents and other psychotherapeutic agents have nearly tripled over the period. CNS
agents have increased from 2.4% of expenditures to 6.6% of expenditures and other
psychotherapeutic agents have increased from 2.9% to 7.9% over the period. Anti-
depressant medications have also seen large share increases, rising from 24.3% of
expenditures in 1996 to 38.7% of expenditures in 2003.
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Depression treatment prices rise by between 3.2% per year, and 4.8% per
year. The Northeast region has the highest treatment prices for depression. The
Northeast begins the period with the highest depression prices, and ends the period
with the second highest depression prices despite a sharp decline in prices between
1996 and 1997. However, the Northeast experiences the slowest rate of price in-
creases over the period. The non-MSA region has the lowest treatment prices of
any region, beginning and ending the period with the lowest treatment prices of
any region. The West experiences the highest rate of price increase of any region
beginning the period with the second-lowest price level and ending the period with
the highest price level.
3.4.5 Chapter 6: Nervous System Conditions
Nervous system disorders include a heterogeneous array of conditions that affect the
nervous system. Nervous system conditions rarely or only indirectly affect cognitive
functioning, which differentiates them from mental health conditions that directly
affect cognition. The manifestation of nervous system conditions as health outcomes
takes a variety of forms. Epilepsy is characterized by random seizures that vary in
frequency and severity across individuals. Multiple sclerosis and Parkinson’s disease
limit the ability of the individual to perform physical activities, although for different
reasons. Deafness and cataracts, which are also nervous system conditions, directly
affect sensory perception.
The condition we choose to examine is Otitis Media. Otitis Media is an
interesting condition to examine in that it has several features that are unique among
the diseases considered here. First, Otitis Media prevalence has been declining over
the period, although it is one of the most prevalent conditions considered. Moreover,
the prevalence changes do not appear to be due to demographic changes. Second,
the condition is almost uniquely present among children, whereas many of the other
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Table 3.17: Otitis Media Input Shares
Inpatient/ Out- Anti- Anal- Non-Dr Dr. Office Dr. Office
Year ER patient Infective gesics Office Procedure Non-Proc.
1996 0.104 0.208 0.085 0.018 0.019 0.105 0.461
1997 0.191 0.156 0.062 0.010 0.020 0.078 0.482
1998 0.282 0.186 0.046 0.022 0.024 0.038 0.400
1999 0.139 0.121 0.087 0.014 0.043 0.091 0.505
2000 0.258 0.060 0.103 0.008 0.011 0.080 0.481
2001 0.208 0.130 0.112 0.029 0.037 0.071 0.412
2002 0.136 0.125 0.092 0.014 0.028 0.113 0.492
2003 0.195 0.124 0.069 0.018 0.021 0.117 0.457
conditions considered have at least some presence among adults and often the elderly.
Finally, despite the low cost per person, the condition remains one of the costliest
conditions to treat because of the high prevalence.
The treatment of Otitis Media is physician visit intensive. More than half
of all treatment expenditures are spent on Dr. office visits, and the nature of the
physician visit spending has changed over the period. The fraction of total disease
spending that involves a major surgical or non-surgical procedure has exhibited a
period of decline from 1996 to 1998, and then a period of increase from 1998 to
2003, while the fraction of total disease spending related to other physician office
spending has remained relatively flat over the period. The share of spending due to
major procedures performed at the office appears inversely related to the share of
spending on hospital care. In 1998 hospital care represents 46% of total spending
while physician procedure spending only represents 3.8% of spending, their peak
and trough, respectively. In 2002 hospital care represents the lowest share (tied
with 1999) of spending during the period, and office visit care represents the second
highest share of spending during the period. This pattern appears to suggest that
some of the major services used to treat otitis media might be performed either in
the hospital or in the physician’s office.
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Table 3.18: Otitis Media Treatment Prices
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 1.259 1.324 1.333 1.259
1997 1.302 1.360 1.284 1.423 1.287
1998 1.437 1.370 1.407 1.481 1.403
1999 1.511 1.482 1.421 1.616 1.488
2000 1.497 1.499 1.503 1.590 1.491
2001 1.583 1.655 1.616 1.762 1.589
2002 1.646 1.846 1.740 1.696 1.683
2003 1.724 1.923 1.862 1.814 1.786
Otitis Media treatment price increases range from 4.5% per year in the West
to 9% per year in the Northeast. Although the Northeast has a rate of increase
that is much higher than any other region, much of the increase occurs in one year.
Between 1996 and 1997 Otitis Media treatment prices in the Northeast increased
almost 30%. Moreover, the 1996 price level in the Northeast is 25% lower than
the price level of any other region in that year. All of these results suggest that
1996 price levels in the Northeast may be incredibly low, however prices continue
to increase at a brisk 4.6% per year pace throughout the rest of the period, as well.
The West begins the period with the highest price levels of any region, but
by 2002 both the Midwest and the Southeast face higher price levels than the West.
The Northeast regions faces the lowest price levels beginning and ending the period
with the lowest price levels.
3.4.6 Chapter 7: Circulatory Conditions
Circulatory conditions are any condition that represent a malfunction of the cir-
culation of blood throughout the body. Circulatory disorders are either related to
the functioning of the heart or the blood vessels that carry blood throughout the
body. Circulatory conditions represent by far the largest fraction of medical care
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spending of any of the ICD chapter heading categories. Circulatory spending is
twice as costly as the next costliest chapter heading. Treatment spending on cir-
culatory conditions alone represent more than 10% of total spending. Moreover,
the vast majority of spending on multiple conditions involves at least one and often
multiple circulatory conditions. Combining these spending categories suggests that
circulatory conditions represent nearly 20% of total medical care spending.
Circulatory conditions left untreated have dire consequences. Several of the
acute circulatory conditions, including Acute Myocardial Infarction (heart attack)
and C.V.A (Stroke), would often result in immediate death without medical atten-
tion. Chronic circulatory medical conditions, such as hypertension, complicate the
nature and severity of other conditions, such as diabetes, and increase the likeli-
hood of an acute circulatory condition. We consider the treatment prices of three
representative circulatory conditions: hypertension, A.M.I., and heart disease.
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Table 3.19: Hypertension Input Shares
Dr Non-Dr Anti- Misc.
Year Hospital Office Office lipid Agents
1996 0.160 0.200 0.016 0.025 0.026
1997 0.176 0.199 0.020 0.031 0.025
1998 0.135 0.254 0.019 0.047 0.019
1999 0.160 0.198 0.009 0.039 0.023
2000 0.186 0.189 0.015 0.058 0.024
2001 0.177 0.196 0.018 0.055 0.025
2002 0.144 0.215 0.029 0.065 0.041
2003 0.175 0.180 0.022 0.072 0.050
Cardio- ACE Beta Ca Channel
Year Vasc Inhibitor Blocker Blocker
1996 0.144 0.133 0.079 0.218
1997 0.160 0.121 0.077 0.190
1998 0.164 0.108 0.073 0.181
1999 0.212 0.115 0.067 0.177
2000 0.182 0.126 0.074 0.146
2001 0.180 0.122 0.079 0.147
2002 0.175 0.110 0.091 0.130
2003 0.200 0.100 0.087 0.114
Hypertension
Hypertension, or high blood pressure, is one of the most costly conditions to treat
in the United States. Hypertension represents nearly 20% of circulatory condition
spending, which is twice as costly as the next closest ICD chapter heading. The
cost of this condition is driven by its prevalence. Although relatively cheap to treat
on a per person basis, hypertension is the most prevalent chronic condition in the
United States and is also the most prevalent circulatory condition in the United
States. Hypertension has experienced the fastest rate of prevalence increase of any
medical condition considered, despite being listed as the most prevalent chronic
condition in 1996. The rise in the prevalence of this condition may be related to
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Table 3.20: Hypertension Treatment Prices
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 1.030 1.022 1.080 0.969
1997 1.023 1.087 1.024 1.204 0.954
1998 1.087 1.125 1.064 1.143 1.010
1999 1.197 1.198 1.098 1.255 1.105
2000 1.159 1.200 1.163 1.268 1.157
2001 1.264 1.351 1.270 1.389 1.225
2002 1.342 1.411 1.325 1.347 1.245
2003 1.372 1.482 1.377 1.450 1.276
the increasing fraction of the population that is entering into the oldest age groups.
For this reason, hypertension may continue to become more prevalent over time as
an increasing fraction of the population enters these age groups.
Hypertension treatment is extremely drug intensive. More than 60% of total
spending for hypertension is on drugs. The stability of input spending is stable over
this period. Hospital spending, office visit spending, and total drug spending remain
almost constant over the period. However, the distribution of drug spending has
changed fairly substantially over time. Anti-lipid spending has become an increas-
ingly important part of therapy. The share of total treatment spending devoted to
anti-lipid medications has increased from 2.5% in 1996 to 7.2% in 2003. This share
increase has come at the expense of cardiovascular medications which have dropped
in proportion from 57.4% of spending in 1996 to 50.2% of spending in 2003. Most of
the decrease in cardiovascular medications has come within calcium channel blocker
medications, whose share of total expenditures has fallen in half from 21.8% of total
expenditures to 11.4% of total expenditures.
Hypertension treatment prices have increased at a rate that varies between
4.0% and 5.5% per year. The Midwest region experiences the highest rate of increase
over the period, but the West begins and ends the period with the highest price
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levels. The non-MSA region is the lowest rate of increase of any region and has
among the lowest treatment price levels in the country, beginning and ending the
period with the lowest treatment price level. Four of the five regions experience
price increases that are slower between 1996-2000 than over the period 2000-2003.
Acute Myocardial Infarction
Acute Myocardial Infarctions (A.M.I.), commonly referred to as heart attacks, are
the second most costly circulatory conditions in the United States and one of the
five most costly health conditions in the United States, despite affecting less than
one percent of the population. AMI treatment has remained relatively the same
over time. Treatment is hospital intensive. Slightly more than 80% of expendi-
tures are represented by hospital care. The total fraction as well as the fractions
represented by different types of hospital care such as inpatient operations, other
inpatient care, outpatient care and Emergency Room care exhibit mild fluctuations
over the period, but remain relatively flat. The share of expenditures represented
by physician office visits rose to its peak of nearly 14% of expenditures in 1997, but
then fell dramatically in a single period, and never again represented more than
3.5% of total expenditures. This peak corresponds with the lowest share of hospital
expenditures during the entire period.
Treatment prices increases for AMI have been uneven over the period. In the
early part of the period from 1996 to 2000, treatment price increases were fairly mild
ranging from less than 1% per year in the Midwest to 3.4% in the West. However,
since 2000, the rate of increase has doubled and more than tripled in some areas
ranging from 4.9% per year in the non-MSA region to 9.6% per year in the Northeast
region.
The regions also face fairly different price levels and rates of increase over the
period. The Midwest region begins and ends the period with the highest price levels.
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Table 3.21: AMI Treatment Input Shares
Out- IP IP Non- Doctor Non-Dr
Year ER patient Operation Operation Office Office Rxs
1996 0.009 0.033 0.347 0.480 0.062 0.009 0.061
1997 0.025 0.048 0.186 0.532 0.139 0.004 0.065
1998 0.015 0.027 0.218 0.599 0.031 0.013 0.098
1999 0.020 0.018 0.322 0.520 0.029 0.002 0.089
2000 0.024 0.023 0.292 0.567 0.021 0.009 0.064
2001 0.067 0.036 0.260 0.509 0.032 0.031 0.066
2002 0.007 0.010 0.265 0.616 0.029 0.009 0.063
2003 0.025 0.038 0.140 0.697 0.032 0.003 0.065
Table 3.22: AMI Treatment Prices
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 1.169 1.034 1.028 1.104
1997 0.970 1.124 1.078 1.162 1.078
1998 1.071 1.039 1.030 1.056 1.089
1999 1.156 1.189 1.163 1.180 1.194
2000 1.067 1.199 1.208 1.157 1.207
2001 1.133 1.270 1.226 1.244 1.208
2002 1.299 1.365 1.384 1.318 1.361
2003 1.476 1.610 1.514 1.524 1.446
The Northeast begins the period with the lowest price level, and ends the period
with lower price levels than every region except the non-MSA region. The non-
MSA region experiences the lowest level of overall price increase for this treatment
at approximately 3.9% per year, whereas the West region experiences the highest
level of overall price increases of 6% per year.
Heart Disease
Heart disease is the second most prevalent circulatory condition considered, and
the third most costly circulatory condition. Heart disease is also among the top 10
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Table 3.23: Heart Disease Treatment Input Shares
In- Out- Anti- Cardio- Other Doctor Non-Dr
Year ER patient patient -Lipid vascular Rx Office Office
1996 0.012 0.544 0.082 0.020 0.189 0.050 0.087 0.016
1997 0.045 0.516 0.070 0.022 0.182 0.045 0.099 0.022
1998 0.006 0.469 0.087 0.040 0.213 0.055 0.116 0.011
1999 0.008 0.460 0.078 0.031 0.209 0.065 0.142 0.007
2000 0.006 0.524 0.090 0.038 0.182 0.060 0.084 0.016
2001 0.018 0.513 0.076 0.047 0.179 0.059 0.096 0.011
2002 0.012 0.509 0.064 0.046 0.159 0.065 0.128 0.017
2003 0.030 0.441 0.084 0.056 0.172 0.079 0.103 0.036
most costly conditions to treat in the United States. The treatment of heart disease
is hospital intensive. More than half of treatment expenditures are represented by
hospital care. The fraction of total heart disease treatment expenditures represented
by hospital care has fallen over the period from 63% of total expenditures in 1996 to
55% of total expenditures in 2003. However, the share of different types of hospital
services that comprise hospital care does not appear to exhibit a systematic pattern.
The share of total expenditures represented by drugs has increased from approxi-
mately 26% of total expenditures to 30.6% of expenditures. Much of this change
is accounted for by the increasing share of anti-lipid medications. Cardiovascular
medications increased as a share of treatment expenditures from 1996 to 1998, but
have since declined to a level lower than it began in 1996.
Heart disease treatment prices have seen uneven price increases that have
varied significantly across regions. The Northeast region has seen the highest rate
of increase at greater than 6.4% per year over the full period, whereas the non-MSA
region saw the lowest rate of increase at 3.7% per year over the same period. Most
of the increase in prices occurred after the year 2000 for every region. Rates of
increase after the year 2000 ranged from 4.0-7.2% per year, whereas price increases
were at a much milder 1.4-3.5% per year prior to 2000.
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Table 3.24: Heart Disease Treatment Input Shares
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 1.177 1.094 1.095 1.130
1997 1.017 1.167 1.117 1.179 1.074
1998 1.176 1.173 1.109 1.184 1.109
1999 1.272 1.268 1.227 1.276 1.226
2000 1.175 1.259 1.262 1.253 1.258
2001 1.257 1.358 1.314 1.356 1.282
2002 1.355 1.432 1.427 1.389 1.392
2003 1.514 1.571 1.495 1.498 1.463
Price levels were also very different across regions. The Midwest began and
ended the period with the highest price levels, whereas the Northeast had lower
price levels than any other region for 5 of the eight years, and finishing the period
with price levels were lower than every region except the non-MSA region.
3.4.7 Chapter 8: Respiratory Conditions
Respiratory conditions are the most prevalent conditions in the United States, af-
fecting nearly half of the United States population each year, and several of the
chronic respiratory conditions are increasing in prevalence over the period. For
these reasons alone, evaluation of respiratory condition treatment prices are inter-
esting from a medical care productivity perspective. However, the potentially causal
relationship between respiratory conditions and environmental factors such as air
pollutants may provide a broader motivation for the study of the treatment prices
for these conditions.
Asthma is the second most costly and third most prevalent chronic respira-
tory condition. Asthma represents approximately one-seventh of total respiratory
spending. The disease can affect anyone, but is especially important among chil-
dren. Asthma is therefore one of the few chronic conditions highly prevalent among
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Table 3.25: Asthma Treatment Shares
IP/ Out- Other Resp Anti- Broncho- Doctor Non-Dr
Year ER patient Rx Agent histamine dilator Office Office
1996 0.371 0.0364 0.048 0.0176 0.026 0.2408 0.224 0.0363
1997 0.393 0.0306 0.047 0.0226 0.056 0.2411 0.193 0.0177
1998 0.273 0.0163 0.048 0.0410 0.062 0.2127 0.320 0.0265
1999 0.360 0.0206 0.043 0.0530 0.070 0.2468 0.162 0.0447
2000 0.301 0.0307 0.039 0.0434 0.082 0.2951 0.193 0.0154
2001 0.363 0.0197 0.041 0.0587 0.088 0.2628 0.149 0.0171
2002 0.288 0.0596 0.043 0.0592 0.099 0.2308 0.194 0.0265
2003 0.305 0.0242 0.053 0.0716 0.104 0.2304 0.188 0.0236
children. The prevalence of this condition has increased from 3.8% of the population
in 1996 to 4.9% in 2003 despite a declining fraction of the population in the under
18 age group.
Asthma treatment uses drugs and emergency room visits as the primary
medical care inputs. Approximately 44% of asthma treatment spending is for drugs,
and more than 30% of treatment spending is on Emergency Room and hospital visits.
The hospital share of treatment spending has declined from 41% of spending to 33%
of spending over the period. Much of this decline has been due to a decline in the
share of Emergency Room visit spending. The drug share of treatment spending
has increased sharply over the period. The drug share of spending was 33% of
spending in 1996, and by 2000 the drug share of spending had risen to greater than
45% of spending. This share has remained relatively constant since 2000. Much
of the increase in drug spending has been on anti-histamines and other respiratory
medications, which have both experienced dramatic share increases over the period.
Antihistamines have risen from 2.6% of spending in 1996 to 10.4% of spending in
2003, and other respiratory medications have increased from less than 2% to 7.2% of
spending over the same period. Not all drugs have seen such an increase, however.
The share of spending on broncho-dilators, which represents the largest share of
119
Table 3.26: Asthma Treatment Prices
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 1.023 0.982 1.021 0.919
1997 1.013 1.078 1.014 1.101 0.960
1998 1.096 1.076 1.026 1.086 0.998
1999 1.147 1.150 1.074 1.159 1.088
2000 1.130 1.136 1.123 1.176 1.089
2001 1.214 1.264 1.239 1.290 1.144
2002 1.265 1.322 1.281 1.285 1.240
2003 1.367 1.399 1.350 1.376 1.328
drug spending for asthma treatment, has actually fallen as a share of spending from
24% in 1996 to 23% in 2003. Other medications, which are comprised primarily of
steroidal hormones, fell in the beginning of the period from nearly 5% of spending to
less than 4% of spending, but has rebounded since 2000 and now represents greater
than 5% of asthma treatment spending.
Asthma treatment prices have very small differences in price increases across
regions. Asthma treatment price increases range from a low of 4.4% per year in
the West to a high of 5.6% per year in the non-MSA region. Price levels also have
very small variation across regions. Although the non-MSA region has high rate of
price increase, it both begins and ends the period with the lowest price levels. The
Midwest both begins and ends the period with the highest price levels. However,
the West region has higher price levels than does the Midwest for five of the eight
years.
3.4.8 Chapter 9: Gastro-Intestinal Conditions
Stomach function disorders are the fourth most costly G.I. disorders, and one of the
two most prevalent G.I. disorders. Stomach function disorders began the period as
the most prevalent stomach disorder, but has fallen to the second most prevalent
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Table 3.27: Stomach Function Disorder Input Shares
Inpatient Out- Doctor Non-Dr Gastro- H2
Year /ER patient Office Office Agents Antagonists
1996 0.542 0.097 0.097 0.018 0.024 0.221
1997 0.353 0.139 0.140 0.012 0.104 0.253
1998 0.440 0.114 0.125 0.030 0.157 0.135
1999 0.432 0.098 0.131 0.004 0.189 0.146
2000 0.356 0.154 0.107 0.014 0.255 0.114
2001 0.312 0.110 0.131 0.017 0.301 0.129
2002 0.324 0.116 0.135 0.032 0.295 0.098
2003 0.238 0.182 0.140 0.028 0.323 0.088
G.I. disorder because of the prevalence increase of esophagus disorders.
Stomach function disorders have become less hospital intensive and more
drug intensive over the period. Hospital care has fallen from more than 60% of
expenditures to 42% of total expenditures over the period. Most of the decline
occurred in inpatient and emergency room care which fell from 54% of expenditures
to 23.8% of expenditures. Outpatient care actually experiences a 9 point share
increase since 1996, although 7 of the 9 point change occurs in the one year between
2002 and 2003.
Drug expenditures have increased from 24% of expenditures to 32% of ex-
penditures over the period. The increase in drug share was not uniform. Gastro-
intestinal agents including proton pump inhibitors have increased dramatically over
the period from 2.4% of expenditures to 32.3% of expenditures. H2 antagonists,
which had represented the largest share of drug expenditures in 1996, experience an
extremely dramatic decline over the period from 22.1% of expenditures in 1996 to
8.8% of expenditures in 2003.
Stomach function disorder prices experience increases of between 2.5% and
4.0% per year. Three of the five regions experience a price decline between 1996
and 1997, but all regions experience price increases between 1997 and 2003 that
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Table 3.28: Stomach Function Disorder Treatment Prices
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 1.144 1.047 1.102 1.000
1997 1.025 1.069 1.021 1.165 0.976
1998 1.155 1.128 1.085 1.147 1.047
1999 1.237 1.220 1.161 1.136 1.027
2000 1.174 1.157 1.187 1.137 1.015
2001 1.313 1.342 1.303 1.303 1.256
2002 1.316 1.351 1.353 1.318 1.261
2003 1.324 1.374 1.372 1.374 1.275
offset any decline that may have occurred during the first year of the period. The
Northeast region experiences the fastest rate of increase of any region, whereas the
Midwest experienced the lowest inflation rate of any region. The Midwest, however,
experiences some of the highest price levels of any region. They begin the period
with the highest price level and end the period with a price level second only to the
West region. The non-MSA region begins and ends the period with the lowest price
levels of any region, and faces the second lowest rate of increase of any region.
3.4.9 Chapter 11: Pregnancy
Pregnancy is one of the most studied medical care conditions by economists. Preg-
nancy services are important in that every person has some experience with them
(at least once in a lifetime), and the services are relatively expensive on a per person
basis in the United States. Pregnancy can also have important health consequences.
Complications during a pregnancy can affect the health status of at least one in-
dividual, and potentially multiple individuals (i.e. the mother and the child) for a
lifetime.
Pregnancy also offers implementation advantages over other conditions for
studying important economic questions. The population of pregnant individuals are
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Table 3.29: Pregnancy Input Shares
Inpatient Inpatient Out-
Year Operation Non-Oper ER patient
1996 0.465 0.326 0.009 0.039
1997 0.639 0.182 0.008 0.025
1998 0.511 0.323 0.007 0.036
1999 0.546 0.281 0.004 0.022
2000 0.561 0.264 0.012 0.023
2001 0.464 0.360 0.007 0.027
2002 0.430 0.356 0.011 0.019
2003 0.468 0.349 0.006 0.019
Dr. Office Dr. Office Non-Dr
Year Procedures Other Office Drugs
1996 0.011 0.126 0.021 0.004
1997 0.012 0.106 0.024 0.004
1998 0.012 0.098 0.009 0.003
1999 0.012 0.110 0.021 0.005
2000 0.016 0.103 0.015 0.005
2001 0.024 0.096 0.017 0.004
2002 0.015 0.142 0.022 0.005
2003 0.020 0.105 0.027 0.006
relatively homogeneous with respect to their ages and genders. Pregnancy is unlikely
to be misdiagnosed and most are reported, thus mitigating some sources of selection
bias. Moreover, the stage of development for treatment initiation is often known. In
addition, pregnancies potentially have significant variance in health outcomes and
offer several relevant health outcome variables that are continuous and comparable
across individuals. For these reasons, pregnancy provides a useful and important
example of a condition that allows economists to determine the relationship between
medical care, health status, and economic variables such as medical care prices,
income and insurance status.
Pregnancy services are very hospital intensive. Roughly 80% of total spend-
ing on pregnancy services is on hospital services. More than half of the hospital
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Table 3.30: Pregnancy Treatment Prices
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 1.124 1.007 1.045 1.054
1997 0.926 1.176 1.066 1.191 1.014
1998 1.087 1.109 1.004 1.126 1.020
1999 1.253 1.175 1.093 1.192 1.106
2000 1.039 1.186 1.173 1.143 1.109
2001 1.116 1.255 1.190 1.277 1.134
2002 1.253 1.302 1.323 1.286 1.285
2003 1.442 1.532 1.378 1.419 1.301
expenditures are associated with surgical operations such as C-sections. Although
no steady trends emerge in inpatient care, since 2001 the share of total expenditures
represented by operations has been lower than prior to 2001. Prior to 2001, four
of the five years had operation expenditures that represented more than half of all
pregnancy service expenditures. However, since 2001, the share of pregnancy service
spending represented by operations has fallen to between 43-46% of medical expen-
ditures. This drop in the operation share of total pregnancy service spending was
offset by inpatient care that did not involve an operation. Since 2001, non-operation
inpatient care has represented between 35-36% of care. Prior to 2001 non-operation
care represented between 18-33% of total expenditures.
Hospital outpatient care has also seen a decline in its share of expenditures.
The share of total expenditures represented by outpatient services has fallen in half
from 4% of expenditures in 1996 to 2% of expenditures in 2003. Many of the other
services have no discernible pattern over this period. Doctor office visits involving a
procedure have risen from 1% of care in 1996 to 2% of care in 2003, but this change
is hardly a trend. Less than 1% of spending is on pre-natal drugs, and this fraction
has not changed over the period.
Price increases for pregnancy services have been somewhat uneven. Prices
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rose very slowly at the beginning of the period. All five regions experience some
decline in prices between 1996 and 1998, and the West is the only region that does
not experience a decline that results in prices lower than their 1996 level. Since 2000,
prices have increased at a much faster rate. The rates of increase are very different
across regions. The Northeast region experiences price increases of 5.5% per year
which is much faster than the 2.9% annual increase in the non-MSA region. Price
levels are also very different across regions. The Northeast region begins the period
with the lowest price level of any region, but the high rate of increase causes the
Northeast to end the period with prices higher than three of the four other regions.
The non-MSA region finishes the period with the lowest price level, although it
began the period with price levels higher than every region but the Midwest. The
Midwest has the highest price levels of any region, and they begin and end the
period with the highest price level.
3.4.10 Chapter 13: Musculo-skeletal Conditions
Arthropathies are the costliest and most prevalent musculo-skeletal conditions in
the United States. There are several types of arthritic conditions that can aﬄict
individuals, such as rheumatoid and osteo- arthritis, neither of which are consid-
ered here. Rather, arthritis is defined as a broader and more general definition of
arthropathies, which are both more prevalent and likelier to aﬄict a younger popula-
tion. Although more likelier to aﬄict the young, arthropathies are still concentrated
among the old and its prevalence is increasing as the population ages.
Arthritis is rarely mortal, but can be a very debilitating and painful disease.
The pain can prevent people from doing fine tasks such as holding a pencil or typing
on a keyboard, and gross tasks such as walking up and down stairs or around the
block. The debilitating nature of the disease and the low risk of it causing death
provides a stark and interesting contrast with the health characteristics of other
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Table 3.31: Arthropathies Input Shares
Out- Non- Other Doctor Non-Dr
Year IP/ER patient Narcotic Steroidal Analgesic Office Office
1996 0.296 0.059 0.011 0.125 0.003 0.355 0.152
1997 0.263 0.074 0.017 0.127 0.014 0.338 0.166
1998 0.235 0.084 0.019 0.133 0.009 0.319 0.200
1999 0.052 0.126 0.026 0.196 0.132 0.178 0.290
2000 0.195 0.055 0.024 0.089 0.179 0.250 0.208
2001 0.216 0.091 0.017 0.041 0.138 0.307 0.189
2002 0.165 0.060 0.025 0.061 0.220 0.225 0.243
2003 0.165 0.095 0.022 0.048 0.212 0.260 0.198
conditions, such as hypertension, whose defining characteristics are correlations with
potential death. Moreover, some of the drug treatments which may be effective in
treating arthritis have been recently shown to come at an increased mortality risk.
This treatment characteristic may provide potential future research opportunities
for revealed preferences over risk, pain, mobility and mortality.
Arthritis treatment has undergone some dramatic treatment changes over
the period. In 1999, a new class of medications were introduced that are jointly re-
ferred to as Cox-2 inhibitors and listed as ’other analgesic’ medications in the shares
Table. The medication shares presented suggest that this introduction resulted in
a dramatic shift in the methods used to treat arthritis. After 1999, ’other anal-
gesic’ medications, led by the Cox-2 inhibitors, jump from representing less than
1% of treatment expenditures in 1996, to representing greater than 20% of treat-
ment expenditures by 2002. After the introduction of Cox-2 inhibitors, office visits,
hospital care, and non-steroidal medication services all experience very large drops
in expenditure shares.
Not surprisingly, treatment prices for arthritis reflect the shift in treatment
protocol that has occurred over the period. Treatment prices remain relatively flat
between 1996-1999. The rate of increase ranges from less than 1% per year in
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Table 3.32: Arthropathies Treatment Prices
MSA MSA MSA MSA Non-
Year Northeast Midwest Southeast West MSA
1996 1 1.050 1.031 1.048 1.037
1997 0.958 1.054 1.025 1.081 0.994
1998 1.031 1.059 1.039 1.074 1.005
1999 1.077 1.122 1.042 1.115 1.055
2000 1.093 1.103 1.090 1.195 1.116
2001 1.186 1.216 1.220 1.328 1.212
2002 1.332 1.294 1.276 1.320 1.241
2003 1.339 1.393 1.343 1.408 1.241
the Southeast and the non-MSA regions to slightly less than 2% per year in the
Northeast. Arthritis treatment prices actually fall between 1996 and 1997 in three
of the five regions. However, between 1999 and 2003 the rate of increase nearly
doubles. The rate of price increases range between 4.8% per year in the Northeast
and non-MSA regions to 5.7% per year in the Southeast region.
Price levels are relatively similar across regions. The West region begins the
period with a price level slightly lower than those in the Midwest, but finish the
period with the highest price level of any region. The non-MSA region begins the
period with higher price levels than the Northeast and the Southeast, but its low
inflation rate allows it to finish the period with the lowest price level of any region.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper constructs ”disease accounts” used to evaluate medical care production.
The disease accounts attribute medical care spending to disease treatments using
International Classification of Disease codes associated with medical care services
consumed by respondents to a nationally representative survey. We have demon-
strated that the prevalence, total costs, per person costs, and treatment technologies
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vary substantially across diseases. Moreover, we have shown that identical med-
ical care input services, such as anti-lipid medications, are used in the treatment
of several disease treatments, such as diabetes, hypertension and heart disease, in
varying proportions with potentially different health outcome results. These results
demonstrate the importance of considering the relationship between medical care
and disease treatment in understanding the nature of rising medical care costs.
The analysis has identified technological innovation as changes in medical
care input shares such as drugs, office-based surgical events, and inpatient operation
services. Technological advancements have had substantial effects on the nature of
disease treatment for many conditions. Moreover, technological advancements often
affect disease treatment prices.
Our dynamic analysis has demonstrated that the period examined has an
uneven rate of price increase for several diseases. The period from 1996 to 2000
experiences significantly lower price increases than does the period 2000 to 2003 for
several diseases including pregnancy and AMI treatment. These results are despite
relatively flat shares of input services used in the treatment of these conditions.
Our regional comparison finds that medical care treatment prices vary significantly
across regions. This regional variance is evident in both the price levels and the rates
of increase. The non-MSA region typically has lower price levels and lower inflation
rates than does the rest of the country, while the Northeast region, although typically
beginning the period with lower treatment prices than other regions, experiences
higher rates of increase than other regions and often ends the period with prices
that are among the highest in the country.
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Chapter 4
Insurance Type Differences in
Medical Productivity
Fifteen percent of GDP is currently represented by medical care services, and more
than 80% of these expenditures are paid by insurers in behalf of patients. The
types of insurance are heterogeneous, representing a patchwork of public and pri-
vate medical care insurance types. U.S. citizens may remain uninsured, purchase
private insurance, or if they qualify, obtain public insurance such as Medicaid for
the poor and Medicare for the elderly. The government share of total medical ex-
penditures is almost 40% of total medical care spending. This cursory view of the
market suggests that insurance in general, and government provided insurance in
particular, has a prominent role. The large role of the government in this mar-
ket suggests that whether the differences in insurance plan characteristics translate
into disease treatment differences, and how those potential differences translate into
health outcomes are important criteria for making policy decisions. However, the
effect of insurance on these important features of the medical care market is largely
unknown. This paper addresses these issues using the nationally representative
Medical Care Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) over the period 1996-2003. The
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paper empirically tests whether the input demands used in disease treatments differ
across insurance types. The differences are interpreted as one aspect of technological
differences in treating disease. These differences are mapped into health outcome
differences across insurance types using a production function model of health. The
production model maps medical care inputs to health outcomes, and facilitates an
explanation for the insurance effects on health outcomes.
4.0.1 Context
Economic studies examining medical care productivity in general, and the quality
effects of medical insurance in particular, have thus far been limited by both data
and conceptual limitations. The most important conceptual limitation hindering
progress has been the lack of a believable and relevant measure of health. Although
many publicly available data sources provide insurance information of the respon-
dents, few of these sources report an interpersonally comparable and objective car-
dinal measure of health useful in an evaluation of medical care productivity. Rather,
these sources provide health measures such as self-reported health status or activity
limitation indicators. These variables considered alone are either interpersonally
incomparable or largely inapplicable. For instance, self-reported measures beg the
question of whether a five for a woman is truly a worse health state than a three
for a man (or vice versa). Activity limitation variables used alone would rate an
active woman who recently sprained an ankle in worse health than an otherwise able
hypertensive woman nearing a heart attack. Many of the competing alternatives to
these measures are not much use, either. Studies that evaluate health in developing
countries employ stunting measures, and some studies in the United States and else-
where use birth weight to proxy for the health of newborns. However, the nature of
these measures suggests that they are inapplicable for the vast majority of United
States citizens.
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Although health measurement still appears as a looming issue for current and
future research, promising and dramatic advancement has occurred in the recent lit-
erature. This research has focused on the effectiveness of medical care in producing
disease treatment.1 A number of authors including Cutler (2001), Berndt, Busch,
and Frank, (2001), and Triplett (1999) have argued that the productivity of med-
ical care in the United States should be evaluated by how well medical care treats
disease. Moreover, they have empirically examined specific disease treatments in-
cluding depression treatment, and heart attack treatment. Although much of their
argument is framed as a discussion of how this type of evaluation affects price in-
dices and national accounts, the issues they raise have broader implications for any
research that evaluates medical care markets. The most relevant implication for
this paper is the view that disaggregated medical care services should be evaluated
as inputs into the treatment of disease. The evaluation of medical care services as
inputs into disease treatment production identifies the technology used to produce
the good consumed in the market, namely better health outcomes. By identifying
the technology used to produce disease treatment, one can then compare technolog-
ical changes over time, across heterogeneous individuals and as this paper exploits,
across insurance types.
Despite the large role of insurance in medical care markets, and the ability
of insurance to affect the technology employed to treat disease, few studies have
evaluated the quality of medical care offered by different insurance types using a
disease treatment framework. This omission has been largely due to data availabil-
ity. Many of the studies that employ the disease treatment framework use insurance
claims data. The nature of such data limits analysis to the evaluation of technolog-
ical changes over time experienced by an insured subgroup. The exceptions known
to this author include comparisons of Health Maintenance Organizations versus in-
1I use the word ”disease” in reference to any health condition that requires medical attention,
including conditions such as pregnancies that many would not consider to be a ”disease”.
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demnity private insurance plans in Massachusetts (see Cutler et. al. (2000) and
Altman et. al (2003)), Medicaid insurance versus other types of insurance on HIV
mortality Battacharya et. al. (2003) and the pregnancy studies mentioned earlier
(see Currie and Gruber (1996)). The MEPS data employed in this study is from
a nationally representative sample of households that allows comparisons of disease
treatments for many different types of conditions and across households of different
insurance types, including the uninsured.
The focus on disease treatment has not eliminated the need for a relevant
health measure applicable to the United States population. Health measures are nec-
essary to assess the quality of disease treatment in producing health. The necessary
measures would allow for comparisons over time and across individuals. However,
the focus on disease treatment has made some of the available health measures rele-
vant in context. This paper exploits the context of disease treatment and the panel
aspect of the MEPS to evaluate how treatments have affected health outcomes. The
measures employed are changes in disease co-morbidities and self-reported measures
that occur as a result of disease treatment.
4.1 The Economic Model
A health production model introduced by Michael Grossman (1972) facilitates a
comparison of insurance type disease treatment effects. The model assumes that
medical care and non-medical care services act as inputs into the production of
health. Medical care inputs include drugs, hospital stays, Dr. office visits, and
other medical care services. All of the medical care inputs are available in the
MEPS. Non-medical care health inputs include diet, exercise, and proper adherence
to medical care protocol. Non-medical care health inputs are largely unavailable
in the MEPS and are therefore controlled using demographic characteristics, such
as the income and education of the patient. Technological advancements in the
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production of health are identified in this model as time effects. The following list
specifies notation:
• m = (m1, ...,mK) is a 1xK vector of medical care service quantities
• Mr = f(m1, ...,mK) is a treatment. Treatments are discrete indicators that
are one for a specific set of non-zero medical care service quantities and zero
for any other set of medical care service quantities
• Z = (z1, ..., zJ) represent the J types of non-medical care health inputs and
time effects
• Θ = (θ1, ..., θR−1), β = (β1, ..., βR), γ = (γ1, ..., γJ) are parameter vectors to
be estimated in the demand and health production models
• Θˆ = (θˆ1, ..., θˆR−1), βˆ = (βˆ1, ..., βˆR), γˆ = (γˆ1, ..., γˆJ) are the estimated values
for the parameter vectors in the demand and health production models
• H = H(h1(M1, Z, t,Θ1), · · · , hD(MD, Z, t,ΘD)) a production function relating
inputs to disease treatments d = 1, · · · , D
Health production is modelled as if medical providers produce health subject
to available technologies, prices of services, and constraints imposed by the insurance
firm. We assume that medical providers act as perfect agents of the patient, and
thus act subject to the constraints imposed on them by the patient’s income in
addition to the institutional features of the insurance firm.
The formal analysis involves a series of modelling stages. The first stage
models the demand for medical care services. The demand for medical care services
is performed separately for patients of different insurance types. Medical care service
demand is modelled as an input demand into the production of health. Input de-
mands depend on prices of medical care, patient characteristics and insurance type.
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The second stage models the production of health. Health depends on medical care
treatments and demographic characteristics. The results from the first two stages
are combined and used to determine the expected health outcomes conditioned on
the service demands for the different insurance types. The insurance types are com-
pared with respect to the treatments chosen and the outcomes that occur as a result
of those treatments.
4.1.1 Medical Care Input Demand
Medical care service bundles are organized into treatments. Treatments are defined
by the set of non-zero medical care service expenditures used to treat a specific
disease. Treatments are discrete items that are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
All patients defined as having a specific disease are assigned to a single treatment.
The array of available treatments is disease specific and available to each insurance
type. As an example, depression has several treatments that include office visits
alone and office visits with prescribed drugs.
Treatment demand is modelled as a discrete choice by the insurance firm. An
insurance firm chooses to treat a patient with treatment r if treatment r is better
for the firm than all of the available treatments s 6= r. The probability that an
insurance firm chooses a specific treatment depends on the characteristics of the
individual and the prices faced by the insurance firm. The functional relationship
is given below:
Pr(M =Mr) = Λ((θ0r + θ′zrZ)− (θ0s + θ′zsZ) > (s − r)) ∀s 6= r (4.1)
If s ∀s are independent and distributed Weibull then Λ can be estimated
using a standard multi-nomial logit. The resultant probability that a specific treat-
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ment is chosen is estimated from this model and calculated as:
Pr(M =Mr) = Λˆr(·) = exp(θˆ0r + θˆ
′
zrZ)
1 +
∑R−1
s=1 exp(θˆ0s + θˆ′zsZ)
(4.2)
The probability of choosing each treatmentMr r = 1, ..., R is determined for
each insurance type l = 1, ..., L such that the technological protocol of the insurance
type is defined as Λˆl = (Λˆl1, · · · , ΛˆlR). The differences in technological protocol
across insurance types are determined by taking the difference in these probabilities.
4.1.2 Health Production
The relationship between health outcomes and medical care service inputs is deter-
mined by estimating a health production function. Health is modelled as a latent
variable, h∗i , that depends on the observed treatments, Mi = (M11i, · · · ,MLRi), and
non-medical care inputs Zi = (z1i, · · · , zJi). Imposing a functional form on latent
health implies the following equation:
h∗i = α+
L∑
l=1
R∑
r=1
βlrMlri +
J∑
j=1
γjzji = α+ β′Mi + γ′Zi + i (4.3)
In the health equation above, the relationship between health output and the medical
care service inputs is linear and dependent on the parameters γ = (γ1, ..., γJ), β =
(β1, ..., βLR). The vector of inputs used in determining health production depends
on the disease type considered. To allow for the possibility that treatment type
quality varies by insurance type, insurance is interacted with treatment type. This
type of interaction allows for the possibility of inferior physicians treating Medicaid
patients, or inferior hospital services provided to the Uninsured.
Many of the observed health outcomes are health indicators. For instance,
the observed outcome may be an indicator of whether an adverse health state oc-
curred during the period, or whether mental health improved. The observed health
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indicators, I, are modelled as being directly related to the latent health variable.
The relationship between latent health and the health indicator may either be in-
creasing or decreasing in health. To fix ideas consider indicators that are decreasing
in health. If the indicator variable takes on only two values, such as whether health
deteriorated, then the indicator function is defined as follows:
• if h∗ < h then I=1
• if h∗ >= h then I=0
This binomial function describes the relationship between latent health and
health outcomes. The relationship between the medical care service inputs and
health outcomes is determined by replacing the right-hand side of equation 3 with
h∗ in the above equation. The relationship between medical care services and health
outcomes is estimated by modelling the probability of observing the health outcome
that depends on latent health. The probability that a health outcome occurs de-
pends on treatments, patient characteristics, and the total expenditure spent on
treatment.
The effect of total medical care spending on health depends on the type
of condition considered. Medical spending is interacted with age for progressive
chronic conditions such as arthritis and hypertension. This interaction implicitly
models medical care treatment as an effort to delay the inevitable consequences of
persistent chronic conditions. For other types of conditions, such as depression,
the association of the disease with age is not straightforward. For these conditions
the effects of treatment enter independent of age. The effect of no treatment is
determined by considering the effects of trivial medical care spending on the worst
treatment for all diseases.2
In the binomial case, the probability that an observed health outcome occurs
2Trivial spending is defined as one dollar for depression and less than twenty dollars for hyper-
tension and arthritis.
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for an indicator function that decreases in health is defined using the following
equation:
Pr(h∗ < h) = Φ(α+
L∑
l=1
R∑
r=1
βlrMlri + γ′Zi < υi) (4.4)
If υ = (h − ) is distributed standard normal then Φ(·) is the cumulative normal
distribution function, and this relationship can be estimated with a probit using
standard techniques.
4.1.3 Health Outcome Differences Across Insurance Types
Observed differences in health outcomes between the insurance types can be sep-
arated into demographic, protocol and quality effects. Quality effects are defined
as the outcome differences between the insurance types for the same treatments.
Protocol effects are defined as the probability difference of observationally equiva-
lent individuals receiving different treatments for the same condition. Demographic
effects are the health outcome differences between the insurance samples that are
explained by differences in the sample treated.
Both treatment quality and protocol differences across observationally equiv-
alent individuals have several theoretical explanations. Physician quality may be
heterogeneous. Physicians may expend more effort for some patients as compared
to others. The drugs prescribed for a treatment considered in our analysis may have
adverse interaction effects with unobserved drugs prescribed for other conditions.
Patients may not be warned to avoid certain food types or behaviors, or they may
not adhere to warnings when given.3 Unobserved individual characteristics such
as smoking status, weight, or unobserved co-morbidities may also affect treatment.
Drugs may interact with health conditions not considered in the analysis. These
unobserved differences in individual heterogeneity may affect either the treatment
quality or protocol, or both.
3For instance, grapefruits commonly interact adversely with many drugs.
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In order to explain the outcome differences between insurance types the
results are decomposed using an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.
Fairlie (2003) describes the technique for limited dependent variable models. The
difference in probability of observing a health outcome is decomposed into quality,
demographic and protocol components for two insurance samples l and k. The total
difference between the samples is defined by the following equation:
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
Pr(I = 1|Mil, Zil, Θˆl)− 1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
Pr(I = 1|Mik, Zik, Θˆk) = Φl(·)−Φk(·) (4.5)
The above equation defines the total difference in the probability of observing a
the health outcome between insurance types l and k with sample sizes Nl and Nk,
respectively. In order to decompose the overall differences into components, one
must specify which group is the comparison group, l, and the compared group,
k.4 Private insurance is considered the comparison group in each analysis. The
component effects are determined by setting the predicted outcome difference equal
to the linear sum of the quality component, the demographic component, and the
protocol component. This equation is defined as following:
Φl(·)− Φk(·) = ( 1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
Φ(X ′ikβl)−
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
Φ(X ′ikβk)) + (4.6)
(
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
Φ(X ′ilβl)−
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
Φ(Xˆ ′ikβl)) +
(
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
Φ(Xˆ ′ikβl)−
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
Φ(X ′ikβl))
Equation 6 introduces some notation. Xl are the observed demographic and
treatment characteristics for individual i with insurance type l. Xˆk is the vector of
predicted treatments for an individual with characteristics Xk if they were to have
4The decomposition is sensitive to the comparison group chosen.
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insurance type l as determined by Equation 2.
The first term on the right hand side is the quality component. The quality
component is identified by holding the demographics and treatment protocols con-
stant across groups and comparing the changes in quality effects. This difference
is performed by assigning the quality effects of insurance type l to the sample of
insurance type k and comparing the predicted outcomes to the predicted outcomes
of insurance type k’s own quality effects. The second term on the right-hand side is
the demographic component. The demographic component is identified by holding
the quality and protocol effects constant and comparing the predicted outcome dif-
ferences that occur as a result of different sample compositions. The third term on
the right-hand side is the protocol component. The protocol component is identified
by holding the demographic and quality types constant and comparing the outcomes
of the observed protocols for insurance type k with the outcomes from the predicted
protocols of the insurance type k sample if they were to have received the protocol
of an insurance type l individual.
4.2 Data
The data requirements necessary to estimate the differences in disease treatment
outcomes across insurance types are demanding. The data must include detailed
information on medical care insurance, medical care services and enough detailed
health information to construct disease treatments and evaluate their outcomes. The
data employed to estimate this relationship is the 1996-2003 Medical Expenditure
Panel Surveys (MEPS). The MEPS reports demographic, health and medical care
expenditure information for approximately 30,000 individuals per year.5 The MEPS
has a complicated data structure that links individuals from a nationally represen-
5Specifically, the sample sizes are 1996: 22,601; 1997: 34,551; 1998: 24,072; 1999: 24,618; 2000:
25,096; 2001: 33,556; 2002: 39,165; 2003: 34,215
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tative household survey to medical ”events” that are defined by the survey. The
MEPS defines events as one of eight possible interactions of a patient with a medical
care provider. The nature of the event depends on the service provider and includes
a hospital stay, a home health month, a filled prescription, a dental care visit, and
a physician visit. The reported expenditures associated with each event includes
and distinguishes between all payments made by and in behalf of the individual or
household member for services defined by the event type. Chapter 2 provides a full
description of these event types. The participants are interviewed five times over a
2.5 year period in order to report every medical event that occurs within a two-year
window. The resultant panel reports all expenditures made beginning on January
1 of the first interview year and ending on December 31 of the following year for
everyone in the survey. All other time dependent information on the survey depends
on the date of the interview round.
The medical care insurance information includes whether the individual is
covered by private insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, veteran’s insurance, other public
insurance, or remains uninsured. The survey also provides further detail related to
the type of private insurance held by the individual. This information includes an
identifier for the policyholder and plan characteristics such as whether the insurance
was provided through the job, supplemental insurance information, and the out-of-
pocket insurance premiums paid by the family. The survey identifies all insurance
plans, both private and public, that cover the individual.
The MEPS reports several categories of health indicators for every individ-
ual in the sample. The indicators include both objective and subjective measures
of health. All years of the survey include the objective three-digit International
Classification of Disease version 9 (ICD-9) code indicator for everyone in the survey.
These codes are obtained by professional coders interpreting descriptions of ailments
made by the survey participants. Individuals may be associated with multiple ICD-9
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codes. Some conditions are associated with additional health information including
the date at which the individual first contracted the condition, whether the individ-
ual is still receiving treatment for the condition, and a subjective measure of how the
condition affects the individual’s overall health. All surveys also include yes/no indi-
cators for whether the individual has limitations in daily activities. Included among
these indicators are whether the individual has difficulty lifting 10 pounds, difficulty
walking up 10 stairs, and difficulty grasping with their fingers. Early surveys include
height and weight bio-metric information for children. This information is omitted
in later surveys which instead reports the body mass index for both children and
adults. Finally, all surveys include subjective measures (integer ratings from 1-5) of
overall and mental health.
In addition to the medical care insurance, medical care expenditure and
health information provided by the MEPS, the MEPS also reports detailed labor
supply and demographic information for each individual. This information includes
geographic region, educational attainment, marital status, age, sex, race, ethnicity,
and total income.
4.3 The Sample
The comparison of insurance type quality differences must account for sample differ-
ences. The various insurance types cover different demographic populations, which
may be responsible for observed treatment differences across insurance types. For
instance, two insurance groups may have different treatment protocols for the same
disease. One insurance group may also represent a younger population than the
other group. If different treatment protocols are prescribed to individuals of dif-
ferent ages then observed treatment differences may be due to age effects across
populations rather than systematic quality differences between the insurance types.
Controlling for these differences requires accounting for demographic characteristics
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in the demand for treatments.
Assessing the sample differences begins with categorizing individuals into
disease and insurance types. Three insurance types are considered: the privately
insured, the uninsured, and the publicly insured (Medicaid). Whether an individual
is covered by an insurance type at all during the year determines the category of
insurance assigned to an individual. The classification algorithm follows a hierarchy.
The privately insured are defined as anyone who has private insurance, regardless of
other insurance coverage. The Medicaid population is defined as those individuals
with Medicaid insurance and no private insurance, and the uninsured are defined as
those individuals without any insurance at all. Individuals who are covered by public
insurance, but are not covered by either Medicaid or Medicare are omitted from the
sample because of small sample sizes. Individuals with any type of Medicare coverage
are also omitted from the sample. Age is important in determining treatment, and
the age distributions of Medicare and other insurance populations rarely overlap.
The dissimilar age groups causes quality comparisons between Medicare insurance
and other types of insurance to be difficult.
Disease types are assigned to both individuals and medical care ”events”
using the International Classification of Disease version 9 (ICD-9) codes. ICD-
9 codes present different levels of specificity and are classified in a manner that
allows for aggregation to like conditions. The most specific code presented in the
MEPS data is the three-digit code that identifies more than 500 diseases. The most
aggregate parsing of diseases are the eighteen major chapter headings.6 Events are
associated with specific diseases only if the disease, as specified by the ICD-9 code, is
directly associated with the event. Events associated with more than one disease are
6The conditions originally classified into the major chapter headings fourteen and sixteen are
re-classified into other relevant chapters. When the relevant chapter is unclear to the author, the
category is re-classified into Chapter 18. For instance, the three digit ICD-9 ”V01 Communicable
disease contact” was originally in Chapter 16, and is re-classified into Chapter 1 Infectious Disease.
However, ”V19 Family History Other Condition”, also classified in Chapter 16 is re-classified into
Chapter 18.
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Table 4.1: Demographics by Disease
Depr- Hyper-
Variables Diabetes ession tension Arthritis Total
Private Insurance N=133,734
Age 49.55 40.43 50.57 50.40 31.51
Under 16 0.014 0.038 0.004 0.009 0.240
Female 0.470 0.690 0.508 0.598 0.504
No Degree + < 16 0.194 0.176 0.137 0.165 0.366
HS Diploma 0.488 0.431 0.514 0.511 0.355
Bachelor’s Plus 0.312 0.392 0.346 0.320 0.277
Nonwhite 0.305 0.139 0.241 0.186 0.240
Receives Disability 0.053 0.053 0.037 0.054 0.010
> 16 Income (2000 Dollars) 31,209 30,971 35,871 33,522 33,177
Prevalence* 0.025 0.050 0.079 0.033 0.638
Medicaid N=33,523
Age 47.39 35.19 48.28 48.32 18.27
Under 16 0.025 0.107 0.009 0.030 0.566
Female 0.707 0.717 0.667 0.697 0.569
No Degree + < 16 0.630 0.610 0.590 0.655 0.820
HS Diploma 0.314 0.329 0.348 0.303 0.156
Bachelor’s Plus 0.049 0.058 0.056 0.040 0.022
Nonwhite 0.595 0.423 0.580 0.538 0.604
Receives Disability 0.636 0.450 0.580 0.612 0.127
> 16 Income (2000 Dollars) 6,811 7,792 7,367 6,948 7,597
Prevalence* 0.030 0.069 0.055 0.033 0.092
Uninsured N=36,350
Age 50.03 39.57 51.04 51.00 30.98
Under 16 0.000 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.170
Female 0.523 0.603 0.598 0.629 0.447
No Degree + < 16 0.467 0.382 0.429 0.445 0.510
HS Diploma 0.367 0.463 0.433 0.441 0.372
Bachelor’s Plus 0.152 0.149 0.134 0.104 0.112
Nonwhite 0.538 0.309 0.478 0.432 0.488
Receives Disability 0.154 0.151 0.158 0.191 0.034
> 16 Income (2000 Dollars) 14,971 14,169 15,549 13,845 16,129
Prevalence* 0.025 0.051 0.051 0.026 0.118
*The prevalence total is the fraction of the U.S. population that is insured.
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considered as a treatment in all of the listed conditions. Individuals are assigned to
a three-digit disease category if they are associated with any event that is associated
with the disease category during the year.
Table 1 lists the demographic characteristics for a nationally representative
sample of several important diseases. Table 1 presents the age, sex, education,
income, and race, by disease for the insurance types under consideration. These
characteristics have all been shown to be correlates of health and have some the-
oretical justification in the explanation of health differences. Income may provide
access to health-promoting leisure activities (exercise), and nutritious food types.
The reported income is the CPI-deflated sum total of all income sources including
wages, assets, sales and rental income for individuals older than 16 years of age.
Education has been shown to be negatively correlated with tobacco and alcohol
consumption, and may indicate adherence to medical care protocols and familiarity
with the efficacy of non-medical inputs into health. Education is reported as the
highest degree attained by the individual. Sex, race and age are reported because
genetic and age differences may explain health differences by themselves, and they
may indicate different medical care protocol needs.
The characteristics are reported separately for each of the different insurance
types. Comparing the demographic characteristics along the far right column reveals
dramatic differences across insurance types. Medicaid recipients represent a higher
proportion of women than does either private insurance or the uninsured. The
uninsured represent a higher proportion of men than either the privately insured or
the Medicaid populations. The average age of Medicaid recipients is much younger
than the average age of either the uninsured or the insured populations. Much of
the age difference between Medicaid insurance and other types of insurance can be
explained by the fraction of children covered by the insurance types. More than fifty-
five percent of the Medicaid population is children, whereas the uninsured and the
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privately insured are mainly comprised of adults. The average age of the uninsured
and the privately insured are both close to thirty years old, but the fraction of the
privately insured that are children is much higher than the fraction of the uninsured
that are children.
The socio-economic status differences across insurance types are large. Pri-
vate insurance represents a more educated and wealthier group of individuals than
either the Medicaid or uninsured populations. More than 80% of the privately
insured have at least a high school diploma, whereas less than half of Medicaid pa-
tients and slightly more than half of the uninsured have a high school diploma. The
income differences across insurance types are large. Privately insured adults make
approximately twice the income of uninsured adults, and more than four times the
income of Medicaid adults. In addition to these explicit socio-economic indicators,
the uninsured and Medicaid populations have much higher minority populations
than does the privately insured. More than half of the Medicaid population and
nearly half of the Uninsured populations are non-white, whereas less than 30% of
the privately insured are non-white. Minorities may have different access to care,
due either to physician discrimination or urban location, as well as different genetic
differences that necessitate different treatments.7
The distribution of health outcomes depends on the health measure consid-
ered. The fraction of individuals receiving disability insurance suggests that the
Medicaid and uninsured populations are in unambiguously worse health than are
the privately insured. Of the privately insured with one of the health conditions
considered, less than ten percent receive disability insurance. In contrast, greater
than fifteen percent of the sick uninsured receive disability and greater than half of
the sick Medicaid population receives disability insurance. However, one may need
to be identified as disabled in order to qualify for Medicaid insurance, thus distort-
7Non-white includes ethnic Hispanics.
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ing the intuition behind this measure. An alternative measure, the prevalence of the
specific conditions, tells a slightly different story. The same fraction of the privately
insured and the Uninsured have diabetes, and the same fraction of Medicaid indi-
viduals and the privately insured have arthritis. Both Medicaid and the Uninsured
have lower prevalence rates of hypertension than does the privately insured, and the
uninsured fairs better than both the Medicaid and privately insured populations for
arthritis. Thus, these prevalence measures suggest that the health differences of the
two samples may not be that different.
The conditions considered often affect older members of society. The average
age of individuals with a condition is older than the full sample average age for all
of the conditions considered and for each insurance type. Moreover, the conditions
considered disproportionately affect adults. However, the average age is not constant
across diseases, and appears to be an important determinant of the type of condition
treated. Hypertension, diabetes and cancer (Neoplasms) aﬄict an older population
than depression and ’other conditions’. ’Other conditions’ includes conditions that
aﬄict the young such as asthma, pregnancy, otitis media and influenza. Many of
the conditions considered appear to disproportionately affect women.
Socio-economic status does not vary dramatically across disease types within
insurance types. Income levels and education levels remain fairly constant across
disease types. However, cancer presents itself as an exception to this rule. Cancer
patients appear to be disproportionately well-educated and wealthy relative to the
population as a whole and the populations of other disease types. This effect for
cancer is persistent across insurance types. Race appears to play a role in determin-
ing health, but the effect of race is not consistent. Whites appear to be more prone
to arthritis, cancer and depression, whereas non-whites are more prone to diabetes.
Finally, a caveat should be mentioned. The observed differences in disease
prevalence may have an alternative explanation than prevalence. The disease mea-
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sure is a report by the individual of conditions for which they have sought care or
untreated illness descriptions.8 Women or the privately insured may be more likely
to seek care earlier than other groups, and may therefore be more aware of their
health conditions. For this reason, the differences in prevalence may be due to the
awareness of their disease rather than the prevalence.
Due to sample size issues, the method used to categorize individuals into in-
surance types does not account for transition dynamics. For instance, an individual
may be classified as privately insured, although they may be uninsured for part of
the period. The classification procedure chosen here defaults individuals into the
privately insured insurance type. This procedure implicitly defines the Medicaid and
uninsured groups as those individuals who persistently have non-private insurance.
Table 2 provides information on the persistence of insurance types for those
individuals classified as having Medicaid and private insurance. For the full sample
of individuals, 80% of individuals classified as privately insured report having private
insurance for 12 months of the year, and 90% of individuals classified as having
private insurance report being privately insured for more than half the year. Less
than 5% of the privately insured ever report having Medicaid during the year. Some
individuals report being privately insured at some point during the year, although
they do not report having private insurance in any specific month. However, this
group always represents less than 2.5% percent of individuals.
The persistence of private insurance for each disease considered is at least as
long as it is for the full sample. This observation suggests that within the disease
types considered the insurance classifications are at least as accurate as the entire
sample. For instance, the persistence statistics for depression are similar to the
sample as a whole with regards to persistence duration and the fraction holding
Medicaid insurance. However, hypertension and arthritic patients are less likely
8More than 90% of those with a reported condition have sought care for the condition.
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Table 4.2: Insurance Transition
Months Privately Insured Months Insured by Medicaid
Whole Sample
0 months 0.020 0.0
1 - 2 0.037 0.076
3 - 6 0.065 0.125
7 - 9 0.052 0.104
10 - 11 0.040 0.070
12 months 0.802 0.659
% with Medicaid 0.043 -
Depression
0 months 0.022 0.0
1 - 2 0.035 0.064
3 - 6 0.061 0.110
7 - 9 0.051 0.087
10 - 11 0.042 0.067
12 months 0.805 0.703
% with Medicaid 0.042 -
Hypertension
0 months 0.003 0.0
1 - 2 0.019 0.056
3 - 6 0.037 0.096
7 - 9 0.034 0.080
10 - 11 0.028 0.054
12 months 0.887 0.739
% with Medicaid 0.019 -
Arthritis
0 months 0.005 0.0
1 - 2 0.022 0.050
3 - 6 0.043 0.098
7 - 9 0.033 0.074
10 - 11 0.025 0.056
12 months 0.883 0.743
% with Medicaid 0.021 -
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to have Medicaid insurance and more likely to have longer duration periods than
the full sample of privately insured. Between 94-95% of hypertension and arthritic
patients classified as having private insurance are privately insured for more than
half of the year, and more than 88% of these patients have private insurance for 12
months of the year.
The persistence duration of Medicaid insurance is shorter than that of private
insurance persistence duration. Only 65.9% of Medicaid patients have Medicaid for
all 12 months, and approximately 3/4 of the population hold Medicaid for at least
half the year. As was true with the privately insured, individuals with a condition
have longer persistence durations than does the Medicaid sample as a whole. Also
consistent with the privately insured, depression patients have the shortest Medicaid
duration periods of the conditions considered. More than 85% of individuals with
hypertension and arthritis have Medicaid insurance for more than six months during
the year, and nearly 3/4 of this population has Medicaid for the full 12 months of
the year. Unlike the privately insured, all of those classified into the Medicaid
population can identify at least one month where they had Medicaid. Moreover,
none of the Medicaid population has private insurance, because those individuals
would be classified into the private insurance population.
4.4 A Description of Treatments
Diseases can vary significantly in their treatment complexity, protocols and health
consequences. For instance, diabetes treatment is very complex, and may involve
a lifetime of hospital visits, insulin shots, and other drug regimens. In contrast,
upper respiratory infections can be very simple to treat and may involve a trip to
the doctor’s office and a week’s worth of antibiotics. The response to treatment may
also vary across diseases. The known conditions have a wide spectrum of potential
outcomes that differ by disease. Diseases may be preventable with vaccine, curable,
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Table 4.3: Per Person Disease Costs
Condition Private Medicaid Uninsured
Depression 1001 1547 947
Hypertension 602 1061 587
Arthritis 656 684 513
Diabetes 1107 1879 1349
treated indefinitely but never cured, or have no available treatment. The differences
in these outcomes have changed over time with technological advancement. Related
to the potential outcomes of the treatment are the health consequences of disease
treatment. Conditions may vary significantly in how they affect health. Some
diseases may increase mortality risks but are not physically debilitating, such as high
cholesterol. Other conditions may be physically debilitating but do not change the
risk of death, such as arthritis. Other conditions, such as diabetes, are potentially
both debilitating and mortal.
The treatment outcomes are related to the nature of the disease, and are
consequently also very heterogeneous. Disease treatments may be able to address
some of the undesirable properties of the disease, but not others. For instance,
diuretic drugs may help with the uncomfortable aspects of hypertension, but may
not address the mortality risks associated with the disease. In some cases medical
care services may worsen some aspects of health while treating other aspects. For
instance, some arthritic drugs have been shown to increase mortality, although they
are effective at relieving pain and morbidities. Cancer treatment often employs
therapies that increase morbidities in an attempt at lowering mortality.
4.4.1 Cost Per Disease
Although the nature of disease treatment is extremely complex, a good starting point
for comparing the nature of them begins by comparing the average total costs per
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person across diseases. The following analysis considers three disease treatments
- arthritis treatment, depression treatment, and hypertension treatment. These
conditions represent three of the ten most prevalent chronic conditions in the United
States, and two of the ten most costly conditions to treat in the United States. All
three conditions have effective treatments available that involve multiple medical
care services.
The costs associated with a specific ICD-9 code include all of the expendi-
tures paid to a medical care provider made by and in behalf of the patient with
the condition. The expenditures included in this calculation are limited to those
expenditures associated with the medical events that specifically list the three digit
ICD-9 code as the reason for the event. Therefore, an individual who has both
diabetes and hypertension and visits the physician for a checkup is included in the
total cost of hypertension only if the checkup specifically lists hypertension as the
reason for the visit.9 Medical events that are never associated with ICD-9 codes
are not included in the per person cost of specific conditions. The costs of specific
diseases, as determined by the ICD-9 code, are calculated by summing the total
annual expenditures included in the treatment of the disease and dividing the sum
by the total number of individuals receiving treatment for that condition within the
year. All costs are associated with the calendar year in which they were accrued.
Individuals with a disease include only those individuals who had some positive
spending on the disease within the year. 10 The costs in each year are weighted to
reflect a nationally representative sample, and are deflated by the annual Consumer
Price Index-Urban presented in year 2000 dollars.
The per person treatment costs of the conditions considered are economically
9The costs associated with events that list multiple conditions as the reason for the event are
included in the treatment costs of all the conditions listed.
10This may significantly affect the cost per person, as some individuals may have a disease and
receive treatment, but spend zero dollars on treatment because of bad debt or the receipt of charity
care.
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important.11 Diabetes treatment, the most expensive condition considered, is more
than $1,000 per person per year. Arthritis treatment, the least expensive condition
considered, is less than $700 per person per year. These differences in costs suggest
that either the treatment complexity differs across diseases, or that the prices of the
inputs used to treat the diseases are different, or both.
Comparison of treatment costs for the same condition across insurance types
reveals some striking evidence in the cost per person of treating diseases. Table 3
reveals that on average, Medicaid insurance pays the most for disease treatments
per patient per year for every condition considered. The uninsured pay less for
treatment costs than does either the privately insured or Medicaid patients for all
of the conditions considered except diabetes. The size of these differences can be
quite large. Medicaid pays at least 50% more than does private insurance for all
treatments other than arthritis treatment. Private insurance pays up to 30% more
than the uninsured, but does pay less for diabetes treatment.
The reasons for these differences are not revealed by examining aggregate
cost differences. Treatment cost differences across diseases and between insurance
types have many potential sources including differences in treatment algorithms,
severity of the conditions treated, and potential treatment compliance. In the case
of the uninsured, the differences in costs may potentially reflect the provision of free
or discounted care by service providers to the uninsured, or bad debts incurred and
not paid in full during the survey period. Explaining the reason for the observed
differences requires identifying these effects.
11The relative size of these cost differences is economically important but small relative to other
medical conditions that could have been considered. In contrast to the cost differences observed
between the conditions considered here, H.I.V. treatment can be upwards of $4,000 per person per
year and upper respiratory infections may be less than $50 per person per year.
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4.4.2 Disease Treatment Types
The reasons for why differences in the costs of disease treatments are observed is
addressed by examining the medical care services used in the treatment of disease.
Protocol differences across insurance types are defined as input service differences
used in disease treatment. Table 4 examines aggregate protocol and cost differences
in disease treatments. The disease treatment protocols are defined as bundles of
input services specific to treat a disease and are listed in Table 4 under the column
heading ”Treatment”. The treatments are defined by whether individuals have some
positive spending on a particular bundle of medical care service events associated
with the disease. The treatments represent an exhaustive list of potential treatments
available to the patient.
The number and types of treatment are specific to the disease but represent
four broadly defined categories of services: hospital care, office visits alone, drugs
alone and combinations of non-hospital services. A hospital treatment is defined
as any treatment that includes a hospital stay or visits to either the emergency
room or an outpatient facility located within the hospital.12 Treatments that in-
clude office visits may involve visits to either physician or non-physician offices.
The drugs considered depend on the disease. Arthritis drugs include Non-steroidal
anti-inflammatory medications such as Ibuprofen, narcotics such as codeine, and
other analgesics such as Cox-2 inhibitors. Depression drugs include Selective Sero-
tonin Re-uptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) such as Fluoxetine HCl (Prozac), and other
anti-depressants such as Wellbutrin. Depression also considers anxiolytics, and
anti-convulsant medications such as Diazepam. Hypertension drugs include Beta-
adrenergic blocking agents (Beta-blockers) such as Atenolol, and Angiotensin Con-
verting Enzyme (ACE) Inhibitors such as Lisinopril. Anti-hypertensive medications
12Events must be associated with an ICD-9 code for the expenditures to be included in the share
calculations. For this reason, the caveats associated with how expenditures were allocated to cost
per person calculations also apply to Table 3 as well.
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Table 4.4: Treatment Costs and Utilization
Treatment Per Person Costs Utilization Rate
716 Arthropathies
Hospital 2756 0.095
Office Only 325 0.230
Office + Other Rx 802 0.090
Office + ”Ibuprofen” 463 0.136
”Ibuprofen” 186 0.170
Other Rxs Only 360 0.127
Other Non-hospital 644 0.153
311 Depression
Hospital 6588 0.054
Office Only 481 0.128
Office + SSRI 798 0.183
Office + Other Rx 1055 0.113
SSRI Only 423 0.232
All Non-hospital 318 0.110
SSRI + Other Rx 1432 0.181
401 Hypertension
Hospital 2713 0.050
Office Only 258 0.080
Other Card Rxs 361 0.182
ACE Inhibitor 301 0.070
Beta Blocker 217 0.053
Office + ACE 482 0.063
Office + Card Rxs 618 0.185
Office + Beta Blkr 917 0.045
Office + ACE + Card 839 0.049
Office + Rxs 809 0.103
Other Treatments 604 0.121
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are often supplied in combination with each other and/or diuretics in a class of drugs
referred to as ’Combination therapies’. Combination therapies are considered to-
gether with ’other’ medications used to treat hypertension. The other medications
may include other anti-hypertensive medications such as Amlodipine (a calcium
channel blocker), or medications used to treat the confounding effects that hyper-
tension has on other conditions such as high cholesterol. These drugs include the
HMG-COA reductase inhibitors such as Atorvastatin. Chapter 2 provides a com-
plete list of the items considered in each of the service categories.
The disease treatment technology is defined by the input services used to
treat disease. The utilization rates that define the fraction of people who receive
the specified treatment for the associated disease are presented in Table 4. The
utilization rates suggest that the treatments are not very hospital intensive. Less
than 10% of all treatments for any of these conditions involve hospital care. In
contrast, at least 50% of all treatments involve an office visit, and more than 65%
of treatments involve the use of drugs. The intensity of these broad service types
depend on the disease considered.
Treatments vary significantly in their costs within a condition. Hospital
treatment stands out as being the most costly type of treatment. Hospital care is
consistently the most expensive type of treatment for each of the diseases considered,
and the costs of hospital treatment are up to 20 times higher than the costs of
other types of treatments. Service combination therapy is typically more expensive
than treatments that are intensive in only one type of service. Whether drug-only
treatments or office-only treatments are more costly depends on the disease.
Tale 5 presents disease treatment costs by insurance types. Table 5 reveals
that the costs of identical treatments for identical diseases varies across insurance
types. The size of these differences can be dramatic. For instance, the privately
insured hospital treatments for depression are $2500 dollars more expensive than
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are hospital treatments for depressed Medicaid patients. Private insurance is not
always more expensive than Medicaid insurance, however. Office visit treatments
for hypertension can be close to $500 more expensive for Medicaid patients than are
privately insured office visits.
Note that the direction of these ”costs” is inconsistent across insurance types.
Table 3 suggests that Medicaid patients are more costly to treat for identical con-
ditions, but Table 5 suggests that the difference in these costs is not necessarily
derived from the costs of individual treatments. Moreover, the observed differ-
ences in the use and cost of these services by insurance types may represent quality
differences, differences in demographic composition across insurance type popula-
tions, the initial health of the individuals receiving treatment, or the behavioral
differences of the patients receiving treatment. Identification of quality differences
on health outcomes requires controlling for these other possibilities and measuring
health outcomes without confounding the demographic and initial health effects with
treatment effects. The evidence provided in Tables 1, 3 and 5 suggest that these
differences are potentially important in determining treatments and outcomes.
4.5 Explaining Treatment Differences
4.5.1 The Demand for Medical Care Service Inputs
The analysis explaining differences in treatments across insurance types begins with
the estimation of input demands. These differences provide protocol differences
across insurance types. The protocol differences from this estimation are used in
the next section to decompose the health consequences of treatment into protocol,
quality, and demographic differences across insurance types.
Medical care input demand is modelled using Equation 2. The demand for
treatments is defined as the probability that a treatment is used. Each individual
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Table 4.5: Treatment Costs by Insurance Type
Treatment Private Medicaid Uninsured
716 Arthritis
Hospital 2818 2648 2270
Office Only 329 348 257
Office + Other Rx 780 748 1152
Office + ”Ibuprofen” 461 517 375
”Ibuprofen” 195 142 158
Other Rxs Only 374 319 246
Other Non-hospital 664 620 505
311 Depression
Hospital 7872 5393 5381
Office Only 514 496 283
Office + SSRI 817 740 796
Office + Other Rx 1006 1257 838
SSRI Only 433 386 364
All Non-hospital 303 385 260
SSRI + Other Rx 1357 1827 1167
401 Hypertension
Hospital 2499 4012 2118
Office Only 226 598 223
Other Card Rxs 366 351 316
ACE Inhibitor 305 290 257
Beta Blocker 221 176 208
Office + ACE 484 522 429
Office + Card Rxs 625 686 499
Office + Beta Blkr 869 1366 953
Office + ACE + Card 823 1110 717
Office + Rxs 778 1101 775
Other Treatments 597 688 599
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Table 4.6: Medical Care Service Demands
Treatment Private Medicaid Uninsured
Arthritis
Hospital 0.102 0.226 0.182
Office Only 0.288 0.303 0.061
Office + Other Rx 0.153 0.077 0.014
Office + ”Ibuprofen” 0.073 0.052 0.005
”Ibuprofen” 0.067 0.112 0.114
Other Rxs Only 0.234 0.111 0.439
Other Non-hospital 0.083 0.118 0.185
Depression
Hospital 0.039 0.190 0.022
Office Only 0.191 0.187 0.218
Office + SSRI 0.140 0.226 0.121
Office + Other Rx 0.162 0.061 0.024
SSRI Only 0.206 0.096 0.407
All Non-hospital 0.132 0.062 0.069
SSRI + Other Rx 0.131 0.179 0.139
Hypertension
Hospital 0.033 0.136 0.075
Office Only 0.084 0.055 0.133
Other Card Rxs 0.137 0.100 0.087
ACE Inhibitor 0.079 0.142 0.074
Beta Blocker 0.074 0.056 0.093
Office + ACE 0.089 0.064 0.044
Office + Card Rxs 0.177 0.095 0.078
Office + Beta Blkr 0.032 0.042 0.012
Office + ACE + Card 0.041 0.116 0.020
Office + Rxs 0.167 0.086 0.066
Other Treatments 0.086 0.108 0.318
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can demand one, and only one of these treatments. All treatments are available to
all individuals regardless of insurance type. The probability of choosing one of the
disease treatments is estimated separately for each insurance type using maximum
likelihood. The determinants of demand are specific to the disease considered, but
always include demographics of the patient such as age, sex, race, education, and
income of the patients. Both linear and quadratic age terms are included in every
treatment demand function. Unobserved technological effects are controlled using
the year of treatment.13
Although we control for the initial health of the patient by measuring out-
comes using changes in health status over the year, we also include related health
measure controls in the estimation procedure to account for the condition severity.
The measures chosen vary across conditions. For hypertension and arthritis de-
mands, we implicitly consider the medical history of the patient. For hypertension,
medical history is defined as whether the patient has a co-morbid condition prior to
receiving hypertension treatment. Such a definition is interpreted as having a re-
occurring chronic medical condition. For arthritis, the medical history is defined as
whether the patient has an activity limitation in the first survey round of the year.
Depression includes controls for whether the individual has a neurotic or psychotic
condition in addition to depression. The predicted probabilities for each insurance
type and each disease is presented in Table 5 for an initially healthy fifty year-old
white male with a high school diploma, and at least $30,000 of personal income in
the West region 2003.
Table 7 reports the demands for disease treatments by insurance type. The
comparison of private insurance service demand with Medicaid service demand finds
that Medicaid insurance is more likely to use hospital services than private insurance.
Private insurance is also more likely to use both office visit services and drug only
13How time enters into the demand equations depends on the treatment considered.
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services than Medicaid patients. All of these results are consistent across disease
types.
The one consistent pattern between the uninsured and the privately insured is
that the uninsured are consistently less likely to visit the office than are the privately
insured. Other than the office visit demand, the relationship between the demands
of the uninsured and the privately insured depends on the disease considered. For
instance, the uninsured has a larger demand for hospital services than the privately
insured in the treatment of hypertension and arthritis, but has a lower demand
for hospital services in the treatment of depression. A larger proportion of the
uninsured consume drug-only services than the privately insured in the treatment
of depression and arthritis. However, the uninsured have smaller drug-only demands
in the treatment of hypertension.
Demographic characteristics play a large part in determining the types of
treatment sought. The size and direction of the results varies across insurance
types. The most important demographic characteristics are age, income, education,
sex, and race. The pattern among these groups is that young, poor minorities de-
mand hospital treatment more frequently than other demographic groups. In order
to demonstrate the importance of these demographic characteristics in explaining
treatment, Table 6 presents the demand for services by insurance type for a 60-year
old highly educated white man in the highest income group against the demands
of a 30-year old uneducated minority man in the lowest income group for the three
diseases considered. Note the hospital treatment demand for the young minority
in the low income group is a much higher fraction of all treatments than it is for
the older white man in the highest income group for Medicaid patients and the pri-
vately insured. This result holds for all conditions. The uninsured also exhibit this
pattern for arthritis, but the uninsured who are young and poor are less likely to
use hospitals in the treatment of depression and hypertension. Despite controlling
160
for the importance of these effects, the pattern of Medicaid patients using hospital
services more intensively than the privately insured and the uninsured remains for
both groups.
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4.5.2 Health Production Differences Across Insurance Types
In order to identify the effects of treatment on health production, the panel nature
of the data is exploited. The MEPS surveys individuals in episodes called ’rounds’
at least twice within a year. The survey collects health information by round for
several health indicators, and collects ICD-9 code information by the date of the
event. The health measures employed in the health production analysis are changes
in health status that have occurred after the initiation of treatment for the condition
considered.
The health measure for arthritis is defined as whether the individual expe-
rienced an improvement (deterioration) of physical functioning within the period.
The survey asks in the first, third and fifth survey rounds whether an individual has
a physical functioning limitation. If the individual does have a physical limitation
the survey follows up the question with a series of related questions that inquire
as to whether the performance of the activity involves ”1 No difficulty”, ”2 Some
difficulty”, ”3 A lot of difficulty” or whether the individual is ”4 Unable to do” the
activity. Improvements (deteriorations) are defined by the author in a hierarchical
fashion. If the individual status changed from either having a physical functioning
to not having one or vice versa, the implied health change was used. If the individ-
ual already had a physical functioning limitation and improved or deteriorated in
walking a mile, the health change for the difficulty walking a mile was used. If no
change occurred for the walking a mile measure, then the author used changes in
the difficulty measure for bending, reaching, standing for 20 minutes and stepping
up stairs, in that order. The medical history of arthritis is defined by the activity
limitation which is a variable distinct from the physical functioning variables.
The health measure used for hypertension is a measure of the changes in
whether one had a related ICD-9 event. Hypertension has been shown by medical
science to be causally related to the ICD-9 codes 410 Acute Myocardial Infarction,
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413 Angina Pectoris, 414/ 429 Heart Disease, 427 Cardiac Dysrhythmia, 428 Heart
failure, 436 CVA (stroke), 444 Arterial Embolism, 459 Other Circulatory Disease,
and 785 Cardiovascular Symptoms.14 If treatment for any one of these conditions
occurred after hypertension treatment is initiated then the individual is defined
as having a co-morbid event. If the individual was diagnosed with the condition
before hypertension treatment was initiated then the individual is flagged as having
a medical history of these conditions.
The health measure used for depression is defined as changes in the self-
reported mental health measures. Self-reported health is provided in each round
of the survey, and at least twice during the year. If mental health improved or re-
mained unchanged, but was not reported as always in the lowest health state, then
mental health is recorded as did not deteriorate. If mental health either deterio-
rated or remained at the lowest provided level, then mental health was said to have
deteriorated.
Each of the health measures provided are indicators for whether health
changed during the period after treatment was initiated. The effect of treatment
type on health is estimated using Equation 4. Treatments are defined as dummy
variables, and interacted with the insurance types. The interaction with the in-
surance types allows private insurance physicians to be a different quality than are
Medicaid physicians and the physicians seen by the uninsured. Other covariates in-
clude medical history, age, sex, education, and income. Time is included to control
for technological change. None of the other covariates are interacted with insurance
type.
Total medical care expenditures is included in all three health production
functions, but the nature of its entry depends on the type of condition. For progres-
14The list of conditions was constructed by examining the twenty most common co-morbidities
seen alongside hypertension in the MEPS and consulting with a practicing physician on whether
the condition in question was causally related to hypertension.
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Table 4.8: Health Effects by Insurance Types
Std. Std. Std.
Treatment Private Error Medicaid Error Uninsured Error
Hypertension
No Treatment 0.215 0.215 0.215
Hospital 0.117 (0.0007) 0.174 (0.0018) 0.157 (0.0020)
Office Only 0.077 (0.0004) 0.085 (0.0014) 0.094 (0.0013)
Other Card Rxs 0.075 (0.0002) 0.101 (0.0010) 0.106 (0.0009)
ACE Inhibitor 0.070 (0.0003) 0.068 (0.0014) 0.076 (0.0013)
Beta Blocker 0.114 (0.0006) 0.061 (0.0028) 0.108 (0.0022)
Off. + ACE 0.048 (0.0002) 0.072 (0.0016) 0.061 (0.0011)
Off. + Card Rxs 0.079 (0.0003) 0.131 (0.0009) 0.035 (0.0003)
Off. + Beta Blkr 0.137 (0.0008) 0.165 (0.0031) 0.131 (0.0027)
Off. + ACE + Card 0.083 (0.0005) 0.214 (0.0032) 0.129 (0.0023)
Off. + Rxs 0.140 (0.0006) 0.169 (0.0016) 0.126 (0.0015)
Other Treatments 0.149 (0.0006) 0.159 (0.0014) 0.174 (0.0015)
Depression
No Treatment 0.521 0.521 0.521
Hospital 0.423 (0.0033) 0.501 (0.0038) 0.457 (0.0021)
Office Only 0.341 (0.0017) 0.351 (0.0027) 0.495 (0.0014)
Office + SSRI 0.347 (0.0015) 0.412 (0.0028) 0.365 (0.0013)
Office + Other Rx 0.359 (0.0019) 0.374 (0.0030) 0.382 (0.0013)
SSRI Only 0.313 (0.0014) 0.391 (0.0032) 0.346 (0.0012)
All Non-hospital 0.321 (0.0018) 0.399 (0.0037) 0.407 (0.0014)
SSRI + Other Rx 0.365 (0.0017) 0.461 (0.0028) 0.417 (0.0014)
Arthritis
No Treatment 0.730 0.730 0.730
Hospital 0.524 (0.0010) 0.580 (0.0010) 0.631 (0.0009)
Off. Only 0.494 (0.0037) 0.524 (0.0010) 0.545 (0.0009)
Off. + Other Rx 0.441 (0.0061) 0.700 (0.0062) 0.553 (0.0017)
Off. + ”Ibuprofen” 0.571 (0.0040) 0.471 (0.0008) 0.560 (0.0007)
Ibuprofen 0.552 (0.0039) 0.636 (0.0009) 0.614 (0.0008)
Other Rxs Only 0.624 (0.0044) 0.685 (0.0010) 0.663 (0.0008)
Other Non-hospital 0.487 (0.0026) 0.605 (0.0010) 0.591 (0.0009)
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sive and degenerative chronic conditions such as hypertension and arthritis, total
medical care expenditures enter in two ways. It is interacted with age and included
as a health shifter. This modelling form imposes that medical care treatment acts
by halting the aging process and also allows for medical care to be detrimental
to health for certain age groups who are unlikely to be treated for the condition.
Medical care expenditures are entered directly into the production function for de-
pression because depression is not characterized as a progressive or degenerative
condition. The no treatment alternative presented in Table 8 is defined as trivial
medical care spending on treatments without health production.
Table 8 reports the predicted probability of a health outcome for three con-
ditions under different treatment regimes for an individual with specific characteris-
tics.15 The treatment effect on health outcomes are reported separately by insurance
types. Table 8 reveals that all types of medical care treatment are effective in pro-
ducing health. The no treatment option always results in either worse or no better
health outcomes than any treatment alternative. The difference between the no
treatment option and the available treatments depends on the condition, but the
effects can be large. For instance, hypertension patients without treatment have a
21.5% chance of contracting a related co-morbid condition, whereas the privately
insured who take ACE inhibitors have a 5% chance of contracting these types of
conditions. More than half of the untreated depressed get worse, and nearly 75%
of the untreated arthritics deteriorate within the year. However, treatments can
reduce these probabilities to less than 32% and 47% for depression and arthritis,
respectively. The standard errors for these probabilities suggest that the observed
differences across insurance types are statistically significant.
The efficacy of treatment differs across insurance types. The most consistent
pattern that appears across insurance types is the persistent inferiority of Medicaid
15The characteristic chosen is an average-aged white, Western male, in 2003 without a history of
related medical conditions.
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treatment relative to either the uninsured or the privately insured treatments. The
inferiority of Medicaid is true for most treatments and all conditions, with the
possible exceptions being the drug only treatments for hypertension. The differences
between the insured and the uninsured are present, but are typically not as large as
they are between private insurance and Medicaid insurance. Different treatments
for the same disease appear to exhibit different levels of efficacy.
Comparing the efficacy levels of the different treatments within the same
disease fails to account for the endogenous nature of treatment. Which treatment
is received depends on individual characteristics. To account for the endogenous
nature of the treatment received, the insurance types are compared against each
other and the differences in health effects are decomposed into quality, demographic
and protocol components. Table 9 presents the overall health differences between
the insurance types decomposed into these component effects. Two key results
appear from the decomposition. The first result is that protocol differences explain
very little of the variation in health outcomes between the insurance types. In
other words, that Medicaid takes individuals to the hospital more frequently than
does private insurance explains very little of the differences in health between the
samples. The second key result is that quality differences often play a large role
in explaining the differences in the insurance types. For arthritis and depression,
more than half of the difference in health outcomes is explained by the quality
differences of the insurance types. In other words, the hospitals used to treat the
privately insured are more effective than are the hospitals used to treat the Medicaid
patients. This large quality result is also true for hypertension when comparing the
privately insured to Medicaid, but there appears to be no quality effect between
the insured and the uninsured for hypertension. The demographic effect explains
the observed sample differences that are not explained by either the protocol or the
quality effects. Demographic effects vary across diseases. These effects are quite
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Table 4.9: Overall Health Effects Decomposed
Insurance Quality Demographic Protocol Total Effect
Arthritis
Medicaid -0.0441 -0.0962 -0.0034 -0.1437
Uninsured -0.0517 -0.0332 -0.0050 -0.0900
Depression
Medicaid -0.0596 0.0007 -0.0097 -0.0686
Uninsured -0.0576 -0.0023 -0.0040 -0.0639
Hypertension
Medicaid -0.0265 -0.0203 -0.0029 -0.0497
Uninsured -0.0050 -0.0073 -0.0016 -0.0139
important for arthritis, and explain much of the difference between Medicaid and
the privately insured for hypertension, but explain very little of the insurance type
differences for depression.
4.6 Sample Selection into Insurance Types
The sample of individuals may differ across insurance types in ways that are un-
observed to the econometrician but correlated with the variables of interest. For
instance, Medicaid patients and the uninsured may delay seeking treatment for mild
conditions, and thus initiate treatment for conditions only after they have progressed
to a point of greater severity than that of the privately insured. For this reason, the
privately insured may be healthier in unobserved ways than are the non-privately
insured. Moreover, the uninsured and Medicaid patients may be less likely to com-
ply with their treatment than the privately insured in ways that are unobserved,
potentially exacerbating the unobserved health differences across samples.
These unobserved differences between the samples may affect both the de-
mand and the health production results. The demand for services may be affected
because the types of medical care services used in treatment depend on the initial
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health of the individual. For example, individuals with severe health conditions
may be more likely than other relatively healthy individuals to seek hospital treat-
ment. Health production results may be affected because the response to treatment
may depend on the initial health of the individual. Unobserved differences, such as
those described above, are often corrected using instrumental variable techniques.
This technique is valid if instrumental variables are available that are correlated
with insurance status but uncorrelated with unobserved health. Although poten-
tial instruments exist, such as spousal occupation and spousal insurance status,
implementation of these techniques are complicated by the discrete nature of the
insurance decisions and the treatment and health measures. Short of using instru-
mental variable techniques, an analysis to determine the size and direction of the
uncorrected biases is useful.
4.6.1 Selection and Health Production
Consider health production. The direction of the effect of prior illness on treat-
ment efficacy is ambiguous, a priori. Individuals with prior health conditions may
respond either better or worse to treatment than individuals without prior health
conditions. For instance, sicker patients would respond better to treatment if being
sicker provides more room for improvement and thus allows for a higher probability
of improvement. Sicker patients would respond worse to treatment if the illness
severity hardens the response to treatment. In addition, the ambiguity of the treat-
ment efficacy response to initial health may materialize differently across diseases.
However, despite the theoretical ambiguity of unobserved health effects on treat-
ment efficacy, the results of the decomposition analysis, thus far, yield a similar
pattern across diseases. Namely, protocol effects are unimportant whereas quality
effects are important in explaining health differences across insurance types.
The effects of observed initial health conditions may provide some insight
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Table 4.10: The Effect of Initial Health on Health Outcomes
Treatment Private Medicaid Uninsured Private Medicaid Uninsured Difference
Depression
No Psych condition Psych Condition
Hospital 0.426 0.503 0.460 0.410 0.488 0.445 -0.015
Office Only 0.339 0.348 0.492 0.299 0.308 0.448 -0.040
Office + SSRI 0.336 0.404 0.351 0.286 0.349 0.299 -0.050
Office + Other Rx 0.376 0.397 0.401 0.286 0.305 0.308 -0.090
SSRI Only 0.315 0.396 0.350 0.216 0.286 0.245 -0.099
All Non-hospital 0.331 0.414 0.416 0.303 0.383 0.385 -0.028
SSRI + Other Rx 0.352 0.441 0.401 0.357 0.446 0.406 0.005
Hypertension
No Old Problem Old Problem
Hospital 0.118 0.176 0.159 0.042 0.070 0.061 -0.076
Office Only 0.078 0.086 0.094 0.025 0.028 0.032 -0.053
Other Card Rxs 0.076 0.102 0.107 0.024 0.035 0.037 -0.052
ACE Inhibitor 0.071 0.069 0.077 0.022 0.021 0.025 -0.049
Beta Blocker 0.115 0.061 0.109 0.041 0.019 0.038 -0.074
Office + ACE 0.048 0.073 0.062 0.014 0.023 0.019 -0.035
Office + Card Rxs 0.080 0.132 0.035 0.026 0.048 0.009 -0.054
Office + Beta Blkr 0.138 0.166 0.132 0.051 0.065 0.049 -0.087
Office + ACE + Card 0.084 0.215 0.130 0.027 0.092 0.048 -0.057
Office + Rxs 0.141 0.170 0.127 0.053 0.067 0.046 -0.088
Other Treatments 0.150 0.161 0.175 0.057 0.063 0.070 -0.093
Arthritis
No Limitation Condition Limitation
Hospital 0.524 0.580 0.631 0.807 0.843 0.873 0.283
Office Only 0.494 0.524 0.545 0.878 0.893 0.902 0.384
Office + Other Rx 0.441 0.700 0.553 0.839 0.952 0.898 0.398
Office + ”Ibuprofen” 0.571 0.471 0.560 0.890 0.835 0.885 0.319
”Ibuprofen” 0.552 0.636 0.614 0.875 0.915 0.905 0.323
Other Rxs Only 0.624 0.685 0.663 0.859 0.893 0.882 0.236
Other Non-hospital 0.487 0.605 0.591 0.830 0.895 0.888 0.343
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as to how unobserved health status may affect our results. Table 10 presents the
probability of health deterioration for individuals with and without observed disease-
specific health conditions. The results in Table 10 suggest that depressed and hy-
pertensive patients who have initial health conditions respond better to treatment
than individuals without related health conditions. In contrast to depression and
hypertension, arthritic patients with prior health conditions respond worse to treat-
ment than individuals without prior health conditions. These results provide some
evidence of the ambiguity for how initial health affects the response to treatment.
The differences in these results may occur as a result of the outcome measure
chosen. The outcome metrics for depression and arthritis are measured as changes
relative to the initial period. The better depression outcomes for the sicker patients
may represent lower health levels, but higher probabilities of change. The worse
arthritis outcomes likely represent both lower health levels and lower probabilities
of change. However, the outcome metric for hypertension represents the probability
of contracting a related chronic condition after receiving hypertension treatment.
The probability differences of this measure unambiguously represent higher levels
of health for patients who are initially sick with chronic health conditions. These
results suggest that sicker hypertensive individuals may either be more responsive
to treatment, or are better at complying with physician advice in unobserved ways.
Sick hypertensive patients may comply better to advice because they are more keenly
aware of the consequences if they do not.
For further intuition for how observable health metrics affect treatment ef-
ficacy, we consider how disability status affects our overall results. Individuals are
classified as disabled if they receive disability payments by the government for any
reason. Therefore, disability status is not necessarily associated with the severity
of the condition considered but could be associated with some other health effect
not considered in the analysis. For this reason, disability status provides a reason-
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Table 4.11: Decomposition Controlling for Disability
Quality Demographic Protocol Total
Hypertension
Medicaid -0.0153 -0.0336 -0.0015 -0.0503
Uninsured -0.0022 -0.0105 -0.0012 -0.0140
Arthritis
Medicaid -0.0451 -0.0935 -0.0044 -0.1430
Uninsured -0.0520 -0.0326 -0.0052 -0.0898
Depression
Medicaid -0.0400 -0.0209 -0.0077 -0.0686
Uninsured -0.0495 -0.0109 -0.0033 -0.0636
ably good observable metric for how unobserved health differences may affect our
results. Table 11 presents the health decomposition described in section 2 repeated
when one includes controls for disability status in both the health production and
service demand equations. Comparing the results in Table 11 with those of Table 9,
the same qualitative results are retained. Protocol health effects remain very small
and quality effects explain at least 30% of the total difference between Medicaid
insurance and private insurance for every disease considered.
Although our qualitative results are retained across samples, the results add
ambiguity to our intuition for how unobserved health may bias our results. The
disease-specific effects suggest that failing to control for unobserved health would
bias the quality differences that exacerbate differences for arthritis, but attenuate
differences for hypertension and depression. The results for disability suggest exactly
the opposite intuition. Failure to control for disability status exacerbates the quality
differences between insurance types for hypertension and depression treatments, but
does not affect the quality effects for arthritis treatment.
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Table 4.12: The Effect of Initial Health on Service Demand
Private Medicaid Uninsured Private Medicaid Uninsured
Depression
No Psych condition Psych Condition
Hospital 0.039 0.190 0.022 0.037 0.159 0.031
Office Only 0.191 0.187 0.218 0.062 0.041 0.142
Office + SSRI 0.140 0.226 0.121 0.049 0.141 0.046
Office + Other Rx 0.162 0.061 0.024 0.228 0.097 0.058
SSRI Only 0.206 0.096 0.407 0.079 0.067 0.364
All Non-hospital 0.132 0.062 0.069 0.167 0.140 0.037
SSRI + Other Rx 0.131 0.179 0.139 0.377 0.354 0.321
Hypertension
No Old Problem Old Problem
Hospital 0.033 0.136 0.075 0.066 0.215 0.061
Office Only 0.084 0.055 0.133 0.044 0.014 0.068
Other Card Rxs 0.137 0.100 0.087 0.078 0.058 0.048
ACE Inhibitor 0.079 0.142 0.074 0.034 0.091 0.061
Beta Blocker 0.074 0.056 0.093 0.103 0.050 0.110
Office + ACE 0.089 0.064 0.044 0.027 0.012 0.008
Office + Card Rxs 0.177 0.095 0.078 0.101 0.041 0.029
Office + Beta Blkr 0.032 0.042 0.012 0.036 0.042 0.007
Office + ACE + Card 0.041 0.116 0.020 0.037 0.150 0.022
Office + Rxs 0.167 0.086 0.066 0.300 0.106 0.083
Other Treatments 0.086 0.108 0.318 0.173 0.220 0.503
Arthritis
No Limitation Condition Limitation
Hospital 0.102 0.226 0.182 0.146 0.231 0.126
Office Only 0.288 0.303 0.061 0.182 0.241 0.047
Office + Other Rx 0.153 0.077 0.014 0.155 0.102 0.007
Office + ”Ibuprofen” 0.073 0.052 0.005 0.059 0.058 0.002
”Ibuprofen” 0.067 0.112 0.114 0.054 0.087 0.070
Other Rxs Only 0.234 0.111 0.439 0.219 0.081 0.320
Other Non-hospital 0.083 0.118 0.185 0.184 0.200 0.427
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4.6.2 Selection and Service Demand
Service type demand might be thought to consist of three broad types of service de-
mands: hospital treatment, office-based treatment, and drug-only treatment. How
unobserved health status affects the demand for services likely depends on the mar-
ginal productivity and prices of these services. Many believe, a priori, that hospital
treatment may provide the greatest marginal productivity of any of the available
treatment regimens, and would thus expect that lower initial health states should
increase the demand for their services. However, for some sick patients hospitals
may not be the most productive service. Even if hospitals are more productive
at treating sicker patients, economic theory suggests that individuals may fail to
choose factor-inputs with the highest marginal productivity when relative prices do
not reflect their relative productivity.
Table 12 provides some evidence that initial health has an ambiguous effect
on the demand for services. The disease and insurance type considered have impor-
tant influences over how prior medical conditions affect treatment demand. Table
12 reveals that hypertensive and arthritic patients with disease-specific health prob-
lems are less likely to be treated with drug-only treatments than are patients without
these health conditions. However, whether drug-only care is substituted for hospital
or office-based care depends on the insurance type of the individual. The uninsured
substitute from drug care to office-based care, whereas Medicaid patients and the
privately insured substitute from drug care to hospital care. The pattern for de-
pression is much different than it is for the other conditions. Depression patients
are more likely to seek drug-only care and are less likely to consume office-based
care when they also have neurotic conditions. Hospital care for the neurotically
depressed does not change much for either the privately insured or the uninsured,
and actually drops for the sicker Medicaid patients.
Controlling for disability status in the service demand equations reveals sim-
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Table 4.13: The Effect of Disability on Service Demand
Private Medicaid Uninsured Private Medicaid Uninsured
No Disability Disability
Depression
Hospital 0.036 0.142 0.015 0.074 0.219 0.048
Office Only 0.196 0.271 0.229 0.108 0.136 0.183
Office + SSRI 0.140 0.225 0.123 0.134 0.222 0.117
Office + Other Rx 0.161 0.051 0.026 0.179 0.068 0.021
SSRI Only 0.211 0.126 0.441 0.145 0.073 0.322
All Non-hospital 0.132 0.058 0.059 0.130 0.064 0.092
SSRI + Other Rx 0.124 0.127 0.107 0.230 0.218 0.217
Hypertension
Hospital 0.032 0.135 0.069 0.050 0.135 0.096
Office Only 0.087 0.061 0.140 0.048 0.051 0.107
Other Card Rxs 0.140 0.110 0.088 0.090 0.089 0.082
ACE Inhibitor 0.079 0.117 0.081 0.070 0.163 0.049
Beta Blocker 0.075 0.077 0.084 0.058 0.035 0.125
Office + ACE 0.089 0.067 0.044 0.088 0.062 0.044
Office + Card Rxs 0.177 0.105 0.076 0.182 0.088 0.084
Office + Beta Blkr 0.031 0.040 0.012 0.046 0.044 0.015
Office + ACE + Card 0.041 0.105 0.020 0.054 0.127 0.019
Office + Rxs 0.163 0.086 0.067 0.225 0.085 0.062
Other Treatments 0.086 0.099 0.319 0.088 0.120 0.318
Arthritis
Hospital 0.102 0.179 0.184 0.169 0.195 0.091
Office Only 0.288 0.381 0.064 0.193 0.339 0.052
Office + Other Rx 0.153 0.087 0.014 0.143 0.089 0.018
Office + ”Ibuprofen” 0.073 0.050 0.005 0.104 0.061 0.008
”Ibuprofen” 0.067 0.105 0.108 0.067 0.111 0.107
Other Rxs Only 0.234 0.115 0.444 0.140 0.060 0.361
Other Non-hospital 0.083 0.082 0.182 0.185 0.146 0.364
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ilar patterns to the disease-specific health controls with respect to drug-only care.
Table 13 reveals that the disabled are less likely to consume drug-only care if they
have arthritis or hypertension, but are more likely to consume drug-only care if
they have depression. However, the patterns for hospital care and office-based care
differ for the disabled as compared to the disease-specific health conditions. The
treatment of hypertension remains virtually unchanged for Medicaid patients who
become disabled. However, disabilities increase the probability that Medicaid and
privately insured patients receive hospital treatment for all three conditions. Hos-
pital treatment is consumed in lieu of drug-only care for all conditions except the
depressed who substitute hospital care for office-based care. The disabled uninsured
are also more likely to receive hospital care for depression and hypertension, but
substitute away from hospital care and into office-based care for arthritis.
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4.6.3 Summary of Selection Results
Although the qualitative results for treatment efficacy and service demand differ-
ences across insurance types are maintained when one controls for observed initial
health and disability status, the effects of unobserved characteristics may add bias
to the results. The effects of unobserved characteristics are theoretically ambiguous,
and the empirical results presented in Tables 10-13 suggest that the sign and mag-
nitude of the biases associated with unobserved health status are difficult to obtain.
With regards to the efficacy of treatments in the production of health, the direc-
tion of the disease-specific health measure effects suggest that the reported quality
differences may be a lower bound for some conditions. However, the addition of
disability status controls attenuates the quality differences across insurance types.
With regards to the demand for service types conditional on having a con-
dition, sicker individuals do not always consume hospital services more intensively
than less sick individuals. Whether sicker individuals consume hospital services
more intensively depends on the condition considered and the insurance type. The
uninsured show a particular tendency to consume office-based care more intensively
when they are sick, and the sicker depressed are always more likely to take drugs.
Although there are significant differences in the types of services consumed by in-
dividuals with different insurance types, health conditions, and initial health states
that may affect the cost of treatment, the differences never translate into overall
health differences across samples.
4.7 Conclusions
This paper uses a nationally representative sample of medical care expenditures
to address whether insurance type matters in the treatment of disease for several
prevalent health conditions in the United States. The analysis decomposes the
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differences between insurance type samples into protocol, demographic, and quality
effects. However, identification of the protocol and quality differences across samples
is complicated by potential sample differences. Medicaid patients are more likely
to be disabled and to have prior health conditions relative to the privately insured
and the uninsured. In addition, unobserved health differences between the samples
may affect both the demand for treatments and the response of individuals to those
treatments. The analysis attempts to control for these differences and sign the
potential bias associated with unobserved differences across samples.
The results of the demand estimation suggest that treatment protocols differ
significantly across insurance types. The most consistent pattern in demand across
insurance types is the higher propensity of Medicaid patients to use hospital treat-
ment relative to both the privately insured and the uninsured. In addition to the
hospital pattern, the privately insured are also more likely to use drug and office
visit treatments than does Medicaid insurance. These differences can be economi-
cally important. In contrast, the observed differences in hospital treatment demand
between the uninsured and the privately insured is inconsistent across diseases, and
for some conditions can be explained by demographic differences across samples.
Although the patterns between Medicaid patients and privately insured pa-
tients are consistent across diseases when controlling for observed health conditions
and demographic statistics, the large health differences across samples suggest that
unobserved health differences may explain some of the results. The unobserved dif-
ferences are especially important if one believes that Medicaid patients are ”sicker”,
or different in other ways that make them more likely to use hospital services. The
direction of the bias associated with failure to control for these changes is hard
to define and potentially works against the substance of the results. Reassuringly,
protocol differences appear to explain very little of the health differences across sam-
ples. However, the protocols have vastly different costs, and may help explain cost
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differences across samples.
The results of the health production estimation suggest that treatment quali-
ties differ significantly across insurance types. These results control for initial health,
disability status, and demographic characteristics. The most consistent pattern is
that Medicaid recipients receive worse care than does the privately insured. The
uninsured also appear to receive worse care than the privately insured, although
the magnitudes of the differences are smaller. The treatment quality differences are
able to explain an economically important fraction of the observed health differ-
ences between the samples. Theoretically, this result may occur if there is selection
of physicians across insurance types such that Medicaid and uninsured patients see
inferior physicians (i.e. less experienced). This result could also occur if identi-
cal physicians provide less care to Medicaid and uninsured patients in unobserved
ways (i.e. spend less time with the patients). The result is consistent with previous
literature that suggests physicians are less likely to treat Medicaid patients.
The large differences in observed health differences across samples suggests
that unobserved health differences may weaken the conclusions in the production
estimation. The observed health differences between the samples are quite large
and economically important. If the unobserved health differences are as large as
the observed health differences then the samples may be quite different, indeed.
Unfortunately, the sign of the potential bias cannot be determined by the results
thus far, and may potentially weaken the conclusions if one believes that Medicaid
patients are sicker in unobserved ways that make them less responsive to treatment.
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Appendix 2: Estimated Coefficients
The tables listed in this appendix present estimated demand coefficients,
productivity coefficients and their standard errors. The demand estimates report
standard errors in parentheses. Demand estimates are presented alongside χ2 sta-
tistics that test the hypothesis of joint significance of the given variable in all of
the treatment equations and their associated p− values. Several abbreviations are
used in the presentation of these statistics including ”Ibup.” for Ibuprofen, ”Oth.”
for other, ”Off.” for office, ”Neur.” for neurotic conditions, ”Psych” for psychotic
conditions, ”BB” for Beta Blocker, ”ACE” for ACE inhibitor, ”Card” and ”Card
Rxs” for other cardiovascular medications, ”Priv.” for private insurance, ”Mdcd.”
for Medicaid insurance, and ”Unins.” for the uninsured.
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Table 4.14: Arthritis Demand Coefficients - Private Insurance
Variable Hospital Office Off. + Oth. Off. + Ibup. Ibuprofen Other χ2
Intercept 0.9638 2.285 -2.1464 1.8652 1.3547 -2.6014 138.43
(0.470) (0.389) (0.651) (0.429) (0.436) (0.565) < .0001
Past -0.434 -1.2535 -0.7843 -1.0027 -0.9981 -0.861 62.08
Condition (0.199) (0.188) (0.219) (0.203) (0.192) (0.200) < .0001
Age -0.0106 -0.0311 -0.0123 -0.0121 -0.0222 -0.0182 9.6
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 0.1424
Age2 1.04e-04 1.78e-04 2.31e-04 2.30e-05 3.23e-04 4.11e-04 17.95
(1.37e-04) (1.13e-04) (1.37e-04) (1.26e-04) (1.20e-04) (1.24e-04) 0.0064
High -0.0227 0.4198 0.1224 0.0897 0.1847 0.8137 24.1
School (0.200) (0.171) (0.205) (0.180) (0.179) (0.198) 0.0005
College 0.2444 0.8186 0.273 0.2168 0.3306 0.5889 23.05
(0.227) (0.191) (0.230) (0.207) (0.204) (0.227) 0.0008
Female -0.1316 -0.4437 -0.1694 -0.3636 -0.2152 -0.1629 14.73
(0.163) (0.132) (0.162) (0.147) (0.143) (0.148) 0.0225
Nonwhite -0.1773 0.000137 -0.429 0.3246 -0.335 0.0305 26.24
(0.184) (0.144) (0.188) (0.156) (0.161) (0.162) 0.0002
Near Poor -0.1029 -0.0349 -0.2385 -0.0116 -0.5366 -0.4162 5.31
(0.323) (0.269) (0.343) (0.290) (0.313) (0.320) 0.5051
High Inc. -0.3274 -0.1403 -0.4922 -0.3988 -0.4447 -0.276 8.06
(0.237) (0.186) (0.255) (0.214) (0.210) (0.215) 0.2335
Non-MSA -0.7357 -1.0561 -0.6657 -0.7356 -0.3818 -0.2594 28.72
(0.269) (0.236) (0.281) (0.265) (0.265) (0.265) < .0001
Midwest -0.6148 -0.7988 -0.7126 -0.4183 -0.0198 -0.5187 20.05
(0.283) (0.247) (0.299) (0.275) (0.273) (0.282) 0.0027
Southeast -1.1218 -1.1012 -0.7015 -0.6667 -0.2526 -0.5094 37.13
(0.271) (0.231) (0.277) (0.256) (0.258) (0.262) < .0001
West -1.4324 -0.9188 -1.0171 -0.4055 -0.1904 -1.326 42.41
(0.314) (0.247) (0.312) (0.272) (0.278) (0.307) < .0001
Year 1999 -0.449 -0.2557 2.4078 -0.7343 -0.4114 1.6376 60.6
(0.316) (0.250) (0.532) (0.264) (0.242) (0.449) < .0001
Year 2000 -0.8408 -0.4892 2.7713 -1.1209 -0.7028 2.3272 125.36
(0.325) (0.242) (0.509) (0.266) (0.237) (0.409) < .0001
Year 2001 0.0748 0.0887 2.8791 -0.9877 -1.2597 2.6512 222.43
(0.209) (0.176) (0.480) (0.194) (0.196) (0.373) < .0001
Year 2002 -0.4682 -0.6668 2.8626 -1.0544 -1.3423 2.7507 196.74
(0.241) (0.204) (0.485) (0.213) (0.215) (0.377) < .0001
Year 2003 -0.4693 -0.3535 2.6697 -1.5402 -1.4566 2.7017 192.9
(0.262) (0.213) (0.496) (0.261) (0.242) (0.386) < .0001
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Table 4.15: Arthritis Demand Coefficients - Medicaid Insurance
Variable Hospital Office Off. + Oth Off. + Ibup. Ibuprofen Other χ2
Intercept 0.4914 1.2503 -2.1409 0.8127 0.1255 -2.9654 18.41
(0.850) (0.698) (1.222) (0.764) (0.817) (1.182) 0.0053
Past -0.5028 -0.7489 -0.2409 -0.4019 -0.7799 -0.8426 15.49
Condition (0.291) (0.241) (0.351) (0.255) (0.263) (0.331) 0.0168
Age 0.0273 0.0227 -0.00123 -0.00646 0.0252 0.0215 4.09
(0.024) (0.020) (0.031) (0.022) (0.023) (0.029) 0.665
Age2 -4.30E-04 -1.20E-04 2.51E-04 7.60E-05 -1.60E-04 4.07E-06 6.07
(2.51E-04) (2.02E-04) (2.94E-04) (2.14E-04) (2.18E-04) (2.76E-04) 0.4151
High 0.2817 -0.3085 -0.2617 -0.1842 0.0267 0.5592 7.95
School (0.309) (0.278) (0.374) (0.289) (0.291) (0.345) 0.2419
College 0.4131 0.6607 -1.2623 -0.0796 -0.0475 0.264 5.45
(0.588) (0.473) (1.110) (0.562) (0.622) (0.735) 0.488
Female 0.00618 -0.3261 -0.241 -0.0913 0.0389 0.3426 3.99
(0.324) (0.256) (0.376) (0.277) (0.294) (0.394) 0.678
Nonwhite 0.1437 0.3591 0.5974 0.5167 0.1923 0.0497 5.84
(0.307) (0.253) (0.380) (0.269) (0.280) (0.348) 0.4411
Near Poor 0.2929 -0.5936 -1.055 0.0386 0.2141 0.7386 13.94
(0.483) (0.346) (0.490) (0.412) (0.431) (0.600) 0.0303
High -0.1312 -0.4952 -0.5913 0.1004 0.1729 0.015 4.47
Income (0.531) (0.379) (0.520) (0.441) (0.464) (0.656) 0.6137
Non-MSA -1.2188 -0.4981 -0.5508 -0.2283 -0.3878 -1.0676 12.48
(0.395) (0.367) (0.476) (0.402) (0.411) (0.473) 0.0521
Midwest -1.0791 -0.5612 -0.372 0.3834 -0.1466 -0.5621 9.42
(0.534) (0.484) (0.623) (0.474) (0.515) (0.608) 0.1512
Southeast -1.4536 -0.307 -0.6322 -0.3524 -0.4494 -0.1884 10.25
(0.479) (0.394) (0.544) (0.441) (0.449) (0.492) 0.1146
West -1.8295 -0.9198 -1.9529 -0.663 -0.2656 -1.3701 25.48
(0.462) (0.388) (0.611) (0.426) (0.412) (0.525) 0.0003
Year 1999 -0.1222 -0.7497 0.7669 -1.1857 -0.3556 -0.7387 9.66
(0.503) (0.434) (1.053) (0.469) (0.415) (1.166) 0.1399
Year 2000 -1.3287 -1.6798 1.494 -2.1557 -1.6228 0.7415 45.07
(0.579) (0.450) (0.855) (0.504) (0.451) (0.679) < .0001
Year 2001 -0.0245 -0.6701 2.7624 -0.9557 -1.2476 1.402 41.44
(0.434) (0.370) (0.800) (0.377) (0.428) (0.650) < .0001
Year 2002 -0.2661 -0.7528 1.9189 -1.6729 -1.8903 1.6663 58.38
(0.417) (0.336) (0.799) (0.387) (0.451) (0.608) < .0001
Year 2003 -0.407 -0.8493 1.405 -1.3261 -1.065 1.2594 34.26
(0.434) (0.345) (0.833) (0.360) (0.367) (0.625) < .0001
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Table 4.16: Arthritis Demand Coefficients - Uninsured
Variable Hospital Office Off. + Oth Off. + Ibup. Ibuprofen Other χ2
Intercept -2.9597 0.4469 -3.3037 -0.7308 0.3749 -2.5781 12.4
(1.607) (1.228) (2.036) (1.512) (1.308) (1.505) 0.0536
Past -1.2034 -1.1014 -1.47 -1.7728 -1.3339 -1.1523 18.79
Condition (0.478) (0.380) (0.515) (0.459) (0.403) (0.421) 0.0045
Age 0.0153 -0.0431 -0.0849 -0.0757 -0.0446 -0.00606 8.79
(0.043) (0.034) (0.047) (0.041) (0.037) (0.039) 0.1855
Age2 9.40E-05 2.37E-04 9.07E-04 7.61E-04 6.26E-04 3.34E-04 11.02
(3.66E-04) (3.03E-04) (3.94E-04) (3.50E-04) (3.16E-04) (3.26E-04) 0.0878
High 1.1621 0.5158 0.0193 0.3441 0.9003 0.671 9.92
School (0.479) (0.395) (0.543) (0.462) (0.417) (0.438) 0.1281
College 0.9945 1.3802 0.8339 0.794 1.6097 0.5914 6.35
(0.930) (0.739) (0.888) (0.870) (0.765) (0.853) 0.3848
Female 0.028 0.3633 -0.1141 0.00261 0.2268 -0.0611 2.39
(0.471) (0.388) (0.474) (0.439) (0.417) (0.412) 0.8807
Nonwhite 2.0436 1.5807 1.0811 1.601 1.1098 0.8399 25.73
(0.487) (0.387) (0.508) (0.446) (0.403) (0.426) 0.0003
Near Poor -0.1064 -0.2445 -0.3769 0.9684 0.4774 -0.3419 10.77
(0.567) (0.466) (0.627) (0.538) (0.493) (0.510) 0.0957
High -0.3273 -0.0487 0.1338 0.6747 0.4541 -0.4282 7.75
Income (0.546) (0.431) (0.540) (0.512) (0.458) (0.481) 0.257
Non-MSA 1.314 1.5047 2.3214 2.2428 0.6171 0.9298 10.59
(0.764) (0.664) (1.185) (0.937) (0.639) (0.719) 0.1019
Midwest 1.6823 1.3179 3.0759 1.7719 0.255 1.6187 9.5
(0.991) (0.901) (1.334) (1.176) (0.931) (0.938) 0.1474
Southeast 0.0223 0.3824 1.0416 1.0614 -0.6234 0.1202 6.75
(0.732) (0.627) (1.172) (0.910) (0.610) (0.680) 0.3449
West -0.1427 1.1563 2.0146 2.2775 0.6401 0.3221 9.59
(0.963) (0.738) (1.243) (0.994) (0.726) (0.826) 0.1432
Year 1999 -0.1472 -0.1472 0.8945 -1.4697 -1.1698 1.402 12.71
(0.921) (0.693) (1.549) (0.873) (0.773) (0.944) 0.0479
Year 2000 -0.5523 -0.5088 2.4162 -1.2771 -1.2437 1.4027 20.56
(0.875) (0.634) (1.219) (0.742) (0.663) (0.870) 0.0022
Year 2001 0.2025 -0.3906 2.5452 -0.9838 -1.5898 1.6269 33.26
(0.660) (0.531) (1.149) (0.587) (0.576) (0.783) ¡.0001
Year 2002 0.1093 -0.6423 2.6178 -0.7456 -1.4565 1.8754 30.27
(0.708) (0.556) (1.154) (0.597) (0.596) (0.781) ¡.0001
Year 2003 0.7791 -0.5014 2.6875 -1.2876 -1.0871 2.2398 37.12
(0.676) (0.576) (1.174) (0.690) (0.590) (0.783) ¡.0001
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Table 4.17: Arthritis Production Coefficients
Std. Std.
Parameter Estimate Error Parameter Estimate Error
Intercept -2.4176 1.3192 Near Poor 0.1517 0.0852
Priv. Hospital 0.465 0.2636 Middle Income 0.0771 0.0766
Priv. Office 0.5406 0.2552 High Income 0.029 0.0599
Priv. Office
+ Other Rx 0.675 0.262 Northeast -0.0359 0.0769
Priv. Office
+ Ibuprofen 0.3458 0.2626 Midwest -0.0867 0.072
Priv. Ibuprofen 0.3954 0.261 Southeast 0.0241 0.0621
Priv. Other Rxs 0.2109 0.2671 West -0.0181 0.0739
Priv. Non-Hosp. 0.5581 0.2413 Age*(Low Exp.) 0.086 0.0562
Mcd. Hospital 0.3241 0.2683 Age2*(Low Exp.) -0.0009 0.0006
Mcd. Office 0.4651 0.2485 Age*(Middle Exp.) 0.0832 0.0294
Mcd. Office
+ Ibuprofen 0.5991 0.2512 Age2*(Mid. Exp.) -0.0008 0.0003
Mcd. Ibuprofen 0.1768 0.2629 Age*(Near High Exp.) 0.032 0.0408
Mcd. Other Rxs 0.0453 0.2913 Age2*(Near High Exp.) -0.0001 0.0004
Mcd. Non-Hospital 0.2602 0.236 Age*(High Exp.) 0.0332 0.0228
Unins. Hospital 0.1922 0.3175 Age2*(High Exp.) -0.0003 0.0002
Unins. Office 0.4127 0.2712 Middle Exp. -0.0952 1.4641
Unins. Office
+ Other Rx 0.3928 0.3391 Near High Exp. 0.6914 1.6239
Unins. Office
+ Ibuprofen 0.3738 0.3022 High Exp. 1.1027 1.4043
Unins. Ibup. 0.2348 0.2828 Female 0.1894 0.0496
Unins. Other Rxs 0.1046 0.3008 High School 0.0754 0.0581
Unins. Non-Hosp. 0.2956 0.2812 College -0.0507 0.0743
Prior Hospital -0.8068 0.1586 Year 1997 -0.0145 0.1048
Prior Office -1.1811 0.1328 Year 1998 -0.0357 0.1147
Prior Office
+ Other Rx -1.14 0.1974 Year 1999 -0.1388 0.1144
Prior Office
+ Ibuprofen -1.0486 0.1487 Year 2000 -0.2927 0.115
Prior Ibuprofen -1.0206 0.1434 Year 2001 -0.3761 0.0996
Prior Other Rxs -0.7616 0.1624 Year 2002 -0.164 0.1018
Prior Non-Hosp. -0.9884 0.1164 Year 2003 -0.1898 0.105
Nonwhite -0.0658 0.0529
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Table 4.18: Depression Demand Coefficients - Private
Off. + Off. + SSRI Other
Hospital Office SSRI Other Rxs Only Rxs χ2
Intercept 0.6235 1.6683 0.7596 0.1732 -0.2257 -0.7243 57.74
(0.461) (0.333) (0.312) (0.355) (0.307) (0.366) < .0001
Age -0.027 -0.00761 0.00262 -0.0022 0.0166 0.0111 13.95
(0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 0.0302
Age2 -8.00e-05 -3.50e-04 -1.50e-04 -2.36e-06 2.60e-05 1.25e-04 15.18
(194e-6) (133e-6) (111e-6) (126e-6) (100e-6) (120e-6) 0.0189
Neurotic -0.415 -1.0984 -1.0307 -0.5235 -1.3773 -0.7868 165.72
(0.196) (0.145) (0.123) (0.137) (0.118) (0.139) < .0001
Psychotic -1.1039 -2.1747 -2.1127 -0.7126 -2.0114 -0.8149 191.32
(0.287) (0.243) (0.217) (0.188) (0.200) (0.196) < .0001
High -0.2758 -0.0373 -0.0426 -0.1339 0.0931 -0.1913 5.28
School (0.229) (0.176) (0.157) (0.182) (0.147) (0.172) 0.5085
College -0.4456 0.1257 0.2826 0.3034 0.1634 -0.0356 13.51
(0.240) (0.178) (0.160) (0.181) (0.152) (0.177) 0.0356
Female -0.4824 -0.3176 -0.0816 -0.2288 0.1666 -0.2193 29.25
(0.180) (0.128) (0.116) (0.130) (0.111) (0.129) < .0001
Nonwhite 0.7828 0.6073 0.1886 0.0131 0.0595 -0.00262 33.85
(0.208) (0.152) (0.144) (0.169) (0.139) (0.168) < .0001
Near Poor -0.0976 0.1843 0.0544 0.2655 0.0706 0.1213 1.85
(0.373) (0.246) (0.234) (0.249) (0.222) (0.264) 0.933
High Inc. 0.2123 -0.4076 -0.0623 -0.1423 -0.1854 0.00128 10.05
(0.216) (0.177) (0.148) (0.175) (0.141) (0.167) 0.1225
Non-MSA 0.2594 -0.3095 0.123 -0.0714 0.384 0.6579 26.56
(0.276) (0.200) (0.181) (0.195) (0.164) (0.211) 0.0002
Midwest 0.2463 0.0807 0.318 -0.1955 0.2744 0.4407 12.13
(0.281) (0.192) (0.180) (0.201) (0.167) (0.219) 0.0591
Southeast -0.4405 -0.5249 0.1224 -0.2739 0.0126 0.4567 27.34
(0.282) (0.187) (0.167) (0.183) (0.156) (0.202) 0.0001
West -0.22 0.0957 0.3718 -0.0395 0.1672 0.5169 12.14
(0.303) (0.194) (0.181) (0.199) (0.171) (0.219) 0.059
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Depression Demand Coefficients - Private (cont.)
Off. + Off. + SSRI Other
Hospital Office SSRI Other Rxs Only Rxs χ2
Year 1997 -0.4299 -0.3993 -0.1955 -0.2422 -0.00709 -0.5142 6.91
(0.361) (0.253) (0.232) (0.277) (0.235) (0.277) 0.329
Year 1998 -0.4792 -0.6744 -0.312 -0.6427 0.1488 -0.0825 15.5
(0.389) (0.281) (0.250) (0.316) (0.246) (0.280) 0.0167
Year 1999 -0.4285 -0.3272 -0.1502 -0.138 0.3466 -0.541 14.81
(0.395) (0.271) (0.249) (0.296) (0.245) (0.302) 0.0218
Year 2000 -0.5453 -0.4917 -0.2331 -0.2012 0.0832 -0.321 8.13
(0.389) (0.268) (0.244) (0.290) (0.243) (0.284) 0.2287
Year 2001 -0.5636 -0.7611 -0.4284 -0.3448 0.1096 -0.3935 19.34
(0.349) (0.250) (0.226) (0.268) (0.224) (0.259) 0.0036
Year 2002 -0.4106 -0.6578 -0.3883 0.073 0.2736 -0.2693 23.15
(0.339) (0.245) (0.223) (0.257) (0.221) (0.254) 0.0007
Year 2003 -0.632 -0.4242 -0.5618 0.1277 -0.032 0.0822 16.17
(0.359) (0.246) (0.233) (0.262) (0.229) (0.254) 0.0129
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Table 4.19: Depression Demand Coefficients - Medicaid
Off. + Off. + SSRI Other
Hospital Office SSRI Other Rxs Only Rxs χ2
Intercept 1.197 0.971 0.063 -0.351 -0.284 -0.895 11.96
(0.653) (0.627) (0.632) (0.619) (0.717) (0.680) 0.0628
Age -0.028 -0.023 0.016 -0.014 -0.021 -0.009 6.860
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 0.3339
Age2 6.50e-05 -6.00e-05 -3.60e-04 2.62e-04 8.60e-05 2.71e-04 9.39
(229e-6) (232e-6) (220e-6) (203e-6) (224e-6) (220e-6) (153e-3)
Neurotic -0.913 -2.357 -1.746 -0.438 -1.306 -0.669 109.18
(0.229) (0.286) (0.238) (0.208) (0.234) (0.234) < .0001
Psychotic -0.858 -2.195 -1.156 -0.225 -1.038 0.125 51.530
(0.334) (0.381) (0.322) (0.289) (0.361) (0.306) < .0001
High -0.107 -0.267 -0.145 -0.163 -0.091 0.007 1.750
School (0.232) (0.242) (0.222) (0.217) (0.230) (0.235) 0.9416
College -0.796 0.177 -0.266 -0.222 -0.674 -0.415 11.96
(0.337) (0.302) (0.302) (0.288) (0.340) (0.333) 0.0629
Female -0.503 -0.133 0.227 -0.375 0.723 -0.482 26.160
(0.235) (0.233) (0.241) (0.221) (0.290) (0.240) 0.0002
Nonwhite 0.002 0.321 -0.351 -0.145 -0.392 -0.133 13.57
(0.215) (0.209) (0.203) (0.198) (0.216) (0.217) 0.0348
Near Poor 0.543 -0.051 -0.040 0.602 -0.127 0.172 7.570
(0.355) (0.304) (0.294) (0.328) (0.303) (0.330) 0.2716
High 0.414 -0.078 -0.054 0.648 -0.223 0.319 7.73
Income (0.380) (0.325) (0.318) (0.347) (0.333) (0.352) 0.2589
Non-MSA -1.155 -0.008 0.229 0.433 -0.186 0.862 36.490
(0.305) (0.292) (0.290) (0.270) (0.306) (0.330) < .0001
Midwest -0.785 -0.234 0.099 0.103 -0.343 0.215 9.47
(0.333) (0.343) (0.337) (0.318) (0.366) (0.409) 0.1489
Southeast -0.704 -0.003 0.203 -0.253 0.187 0.987 23.210
(0.296) (0.301) (0.309) (0.316) (0.309) (0.341) 0.0007
West -0.301 0.835 1.019 0.614 0.707 1.150 27.75
(0.330) (0.318) (0.320) (0.315) (0.329) (0.369) 0.0001
187
Depression Demand Coefficients - Medicaid (cont.)
Off. + Off. + SSRI Other
Hospital Office SSRI Other Rxs Only Rxs χ2
Year 1997 0.072 0.043 -0.135 -0.183 -0.018 -0.319 0.850
(0.474) (0.476) (0.490) (0.446) (0.584) (0.489) 0.9906
Year 1998 0.586 0.789 -0.140 -0.232 0.840 -0.303 8.72
(0.500) (0.498) (0.550) (0.498) (0.586) (0.544) 0.1898
Year 1999 0.065 0.337 0.601 -0.100 0.517 0.181 2.570
(0.542) (0.523) (0.516) (0.508) (0.614) (0.534) 0.8609
Year 2000 -0.144 0.241 -0.157 0.438 0.667 0.099 3.02
(0.566) (0.526) (0.561) (0.485) (0.607) (0.549) 0.8059
Year 2001 -0.898 -0.080 0.220 -0.207 0.437 -0.254 5.630
(0.538) (0.472) (0.472) (0.449) (0.558) (0.490) 0.4658
Year 2002 0.008 -0.781 0.274 -0.086 0.801 -0.118 8.49
(0.459) (0.478) (0.452) (0.420) (0.530) (0.458) 0.2042
Year 2003 -0.115 0.082 0.111 -0.595 0.341 -0.233 3.980
(0.457) (0.445) (0.452) (0.430) (0.537) (0.456) 0.6788
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Table 4.20: Depression Demand Coefficients - Uninsured
Off. + Off. + SSRI Other
Hospital Office SSRI Other Rxs Only Rxs χ2
Intercept -2.1968 2.7339 0.013 -1.1667 1.3282 0.6513 22.7
(1.553) (0.905) (1.000) (1.463) (0.877) (1.013) 0.0009
Age -0.0438 -0.0586 -0.0176 -0.0256 -0.024 -0.0469 6.68
(0.033) (0.026) (0.025) (0.031) (0.023) (0.028) 0.3512
Age2 3.51e-04 3.09e-04 5.54e-06 2.10e-04 2.58e-04 6.71e-04 6.73
(369e-6) (300e-6) (288e-6) (354e-6) (263e-6) (303e-6) 0.3469
Neurotic -0.8489 -1.1308 -0.9985 -0.8849 -1.3003 -1.0456 23.41
(0.409) (0.326) (0.307) (0.395) (0.295) (0.344) 0.0007
Psychotic -0.4937 -1.2647 -1.7961 0.0279 -0.9504 -1.4507 12.59
(0.664) (0.589) (0.724) (0.602) (0.546) (0.727) 0.0501
High School 0.116 -0.1778 -0.086 -0.365 -0.324 -0.1582 2.64
(0.399) (0.323) (0.307) (0.385) (0.284) (0.336) 0.8522
College 0.8685 1.027 0.5643 0.0854 -0.0215 0.3161 10.27
(0.602) (0.464) (0.476) (0.572) (0.461) (0.525) 0.1139
Female -0.1346 -0.6495 -0.1325 -0.1411 0.3183 0.0452 12.67
(0.389) (0.305) (0.305) (0.371) (0.293) (0.337) 0.0485
Nonwhite 0.7118 1.3236 0.9807 0.5093 0.3171 0.2366 24.96
(0.407) (0.327) (0.317) (0.399) (0.307) (0.361) 0.0003
Near Poor 0.6452 -0.1357 0.0561 -0.6153 -0.3899 -0.4229 9.09
(0.471) (0.356) (0.341) (0.442) (0.322) (0.391) 0.1683
High Income 0.796 0.1755 0.0741 -0.00415 -0.0404 0.2818 4.36
(0.475) (0.354) (0.347) (0.410) (0.317) (0.365) 0.6285
Non-MSA 0.9389 -0.181 0.3813 1.2778 0.1404 0.3419 3.69
(0.867) (0.553) (0.616) (1.124) (0.504) (0.597) 0.7188
Midwest 1.7846 -0.1576 0.9113 2.6436 -0.0389 0.2198 11.82
(0.963) (0.716) (0.744) (1.178) (0.676) (0.802) 0.0662
Southeast 0.5605 -0.4454 0.5181 1.3471 -0.2923 0.1831 6.31
(0.865) (0.544) (0.600) (1.113) (0.503) (0.593) 0.3891
West -0.1905 -0.3464 0.3924 1.5 -0.0981 0.00714 3.87
(0.956) (0.561) (0.622) (1.126) (0.522) (0.628) 0.6945
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Depression Demand Coefficients - Uninsured (cont.)
Off. + Off. + SSRI Other
Hospital Office SSRI Other Rxs Only Rxs χ2
Year 1997 1.7267 -0.3027 -0.0388 0.7325 0.01 -0.209 4.7
(1.184) (0.653) (0.787) (0.858) (0.671) (0.733) 0.5824
Year 1998 1.9802 0.4206 0.9649 0.1059 0.3233 0.3412 3.67
(1.246) (0.714) (0.821) (1.027) (0.737) (0.791) 0.7212
Year 1999 0.7067 -0.192 1.092 0.1706 0.2355 0.1798 3.91
(1.384) (0.761) (0.831) (1.038) (0.765) (0.820) 0.6891
Year 2000 -0.7868 -1.6587 0.2603 -0.2882 -0.2099 -1.248 11.49
(1.511) (0.701) (0.732) (0.884) (0.639) (0.762) 0.0744
Year 2001 0.8362 -1.2287 -0.0186 -0.6435 -0.3502 -0.7282 7.7
(1.173) (0.617) (0.705) (0.864) (0.609) (0.674) 0.2607
Year 2002 0.7847 -1.5617 0.1613 0.1244 -0.5856 -0.6962 13.33
(1.153) (0.612) (0.682) (0.793) (0.601) (0.653) 0.0381
Year 2003 1.5452 -0.4341 0.5446 0.1117 0.2939 -0.5553 6.85
(1.169) (0.623) (0.718) (0.858) (0.629) (0.715) 0.3346
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Table 4.21: Depression Production Coefficients
Std. Std.
Parameter Estimate Error Parameter Estimate Error
Intercept 0.3432 0.2715 Northeast -0.0873 0.0543
Psych Hospital 0.0389 0.2101 Midwest 0.0253 0.0531
Psych Office 0.1117 0.2109 Southeast -0.0715 0.0474
Psych Office + SSRI 0.1429 0.1921 West -0.0522 0.0514
Psych Office + Other Rxs 0.2496 0.1563 Near Poor 0.0192 0.061
Psych Other Rxs 0.3032 0.1921 Mid. Inc. -0.0304 0.0528
Psych SSRI 0.0799 0.1683 High Inc. -0.0354 0.0428
Psych SSRI + Other Rx -0.0132 0.1116 Nonwhite 0.0438 0.0408
Neur Hospital 0.0223 0.15 Married -0.0423 0.0364
Neur Office -0.0612 0.1273 Age -0.015 0.0068
Neur Office + SSRI -0.1841 0.0989 Age2 0.0002 0.0001
Neur Office + Other Rxs 0.077 0.1114 Female 0.0463 0.0369
Neur Other Rxs -0.0313 0.0948 High School 0.0455 0.0434
Neur SSRI 0.0858 0.119 Some College 0.1577 0.0625
Neur SSRI + Other Rx -0.1006 0.0825 College Plus 0.1047 0.0595
Priv Hospital 0.1961 0.1431 Year 1997 -0.0649 0.0767
Priv Office 0.4248 0.1406 Year 1998 -0.1306 0.0812
Priv Office + SSRI 0.4309 0.1346 Year 1999 -0.1528 0.0808
Priv Office + Other Rxs 0.3235 0.1422 Year 2000 -0.0601 0.0805
Priv Other Rxs 0.4906 0.1345 Year 2001 -0.1824 0.0741
Priv SSRI 0.4448 0.1456 Year 2002 -0.0702 0.072
Priv SSRI + Other Rx 0.3888 0.1367 Year 2003 -0.1007 0.0732
Mcd Office 0.3993 0.154 Log(Exp.) 0.026 0.0706
Mcd Office + SSRI 0.2529 0.1513 Log(Exp.)2 -0.0033 0.0059
Mcd Office + Other Rxs 0.2699 0.1569
Mcd Other Rxs 0.2721 0.1608
Mcd SSRI 0.2266 0.1694
Mcd SSRI + Other Rx 0.1566 0.1443
Unins Hospital 0.1084 0.2072
Unins Office 0.0285 0.1712
Unins Office + SSRI 0.3926 0.1712
Unins Office + Other Rxs 0.2605 0.213
Unins Other Rxs 0.3947 0.161
Unins SSRI 0.22 0.1919
Unins SSRI + Other Rx 0.2605 0.1752
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Table 4.25: Hypertension Production Coefficients
Std. Std.
Parameter Estimate Error Estimate Error
Intercept -2.699 0.5434 Near Poor 0.2388 0.0726
Priv. Hospital -0.3959 0.1959 Middle Income 0.1147 0.0642
Priv. Off. -0.6322 0.2058 High Income 0.1196 0.049
Priv. Oth. Cards -0.6461 0.1862 No Cond.*(Exp.) -0.0533 0.1742
Priv. ACE -0.6792 0.2042 No Cond.*(Exp2) 0.009 0.014
Priv. BB -0.4105 0.2013 Prior Cond.*(Exp.) -0.1005 0.1024
Priv. Off. + ACE -0.8715 0.2146 Prior Cond.*(Exp2) 0.0178 0.0088
Priv. Off. + Card Rxs -0.6178 0.1836 No Cond.*(Age) 0.0658 0.0255
Priv. Off. + BB -0.301 0.1941 No Cond.*(Age2) -0.0006 0.0003
Priv. Off. + ACE + Rxs -0.5907 0.2019 Prior Cond.*(Age) 0.0302 0.0178
Priv. Off. + Rxs -0.2855 0.1838 Prior Cond.*(Age2) -0.0001 0.0002
Priv. Oth. Trtmt -0.2467 0.1826 Nonwhite -0.0893 0.0426
Mcd. Hospital -0.1443 0.2109 Female 0.074 0.0397
Mcd. Off. -0.5774 0.2797 High School 0.0135 0.0489
Mcd. Oth. Cards -0.4811 0.2238 Some College -0.0058 0.0757
Mcd. ACE -0.6984 0.3197 College Plus 0.0124 0.0695
Mcd. BB -0.7553 0.4625 Year 1997 0.1451 0.0887
Mcd. Off. + ACE -0.6691 0.3207 Year 1998 0.0576 0.0971
Mcd. Off. + Card Rxs -0.3297 0.1971 Year 1999 0.0374 0.0945
Mcd. Off. + BB -0.1817 0.2621 Year 2000 0.0416 0.0927
Mcd. Off. + Rxs -0.1662 0.2078 Year 2001 -0.0602 0.0894
Mcd. Oth. Trtmt -0.2035 0.2083 Year 2002 0.1143 0.084
Unins. Hospital -0.2121 0.2292 Year 2003 0.0939 0.0858
Unins. Off. -0.5257 0.2637
Unins. Oth. Cards -0.4526 0.2149
Unins. ACE -0.6373 0.2963
Unins. BB -0.4453 0.2952
Unins. Off. + ACE -0.7491 0.3105
Unins. Off. + Card Rxs -1.023 0.2514
Unins. Off. + BB -0.3272 0.2809
Unins. Off. + ACE + Rxs -0.3381 0.2687
Unins. Off. + Rxs -0.3512 0.2377
Unins. Oth. Trtmt -0.1451 0.2096
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